The Central Research institute
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Military Science. Vol. 2 No. 3 (2024)

DOI: 10.62524/msj.2024.2.3.09

Training of units of a separate airborne assault brigade for assault operations: problematic issues and ways to solve them

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Abstract. The liberation of the territories occupied by the enemy is impossible without moving forward, which requires from commanders and units to be ready to conduct assault operations. With the beginning of a large-scale invasion of the territory of Ukraine, assault operations are important in every military unit, especially in the units of the Airborne Assault Forces, which are directly related to the performance of tasks characterized by rapid maneuver, coordination of units, and the ability to take calculated risks.

Taking into account the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the issues of conducting assault operations in order to seize new frontiers, restore lost positions or capture (destroy) objects remain unresearched, as they are associated with the active use of new types of weapons, ammunition and tactics of units. The latest approaches for planning assault operations, manning, equipping and training personnel, creating a combat order that will be effective in a particular area, organizing the cooperation of units involved in the assault, their support and supply in combat require further in-depth study.

The result of the study should be the formation of a common understanding by commanders and staffs of the procedure for organizing assault operations. The main problematic issues to be investigated are: approaches for planning, coordination of the use of disparate elements of the combat order that are part of assault units (groups), engagement of the necessary weapons and equipment to ensure the ability to quickly and covertly move to the starting areas (borders), and fulfill the tasks of assault operations at its stages. In the article, the authors propose the content of training an assault detachment (group), a systematic approach to the work of the commander and staff, and consider the most complex planning issues that determine the success of assault operations.

Keywords: assault operations, planning, training, forms and methods of deployment, combat order.

Introduction

The practice of fighting an enemy that is significantly outnumbered has once again proved that not only numerical superiority in terms of means and strength is important, but also the ability to correctly use the available resources to achieve the set goals. Today, assault operations are being conducted in virtually all areas of the frontline and become especially important in the face of the

enemy's well-prepared engineering defense. Even if there is a strong desire to avoid areas of prepared enemy defense, it is impossible to do so in some areas. Therefore, in order to achieve success at the operational level, the issue of solving tactical problems by conducting assault operations arises.

Assault actions are coordinated and interrelated in purpose, tasks, place, and time actions of combined arms units, units within an assault detachment or group with the support of military units, units of types, and separate branches of the armed forces to decisively overcome and break through the enemy's front line, destruction of its units without remaining in individual centers of resistance, rapid advance with constant and direct fire support to capture a designated fortified stronghold, military object, positions of the enemy's prepared defense area or capture a city or settlement occupied by the enemy [1].

The success of assault operations is possible only if they are thoroughly prepared, and planning involves detailed actions in stages: fire destruction, advance, deployment, attack, consolidation at intermediate lines, increasing efforts, seizing the object of attack, holding it, and developing an offensive in depth.

When preparing for assault operations, the squad (group) commander must achieve a common understanding by the group (subgroup) commanders of the conditions that ensure the advance of units at all stages. To do this, he must reasonably answer the following questions: what information is available about the enemy, how reconnaissance will be organized during the assault and in the future, whether there are enough forces and means for the assault, the procedure for using combat vehicles, forces and means to support the assault groups, their place in the combat order, the procedure for deployment and movement, basic and reserve means of communication, the procedure for evacuation, and others.

Materials and Methods

During the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) in the East of the country, offensive combat operations were conducted by assault units (groups) because in most cases they took place in difficult terrain that limited deployment in combat formations, constrained units in maneuvers to achieve success in tactical and operational depth.

The peculiarity of the combat operations of that time for our units was the asymmetric environment, which was manifested by the occupation forces using groups of illegally created formations ("IAF") under the leadership of trained Russian officers who, hiding behind civilians, tried to achieve the goal of seizing power in cities and discrediting the leadership of Ukraine and its Armed Forces.

A successful example of assault operations by the ATO forces is the "Mykolaivka" operation to block and clear the village of Mykolaivka from militants and terrorists, which was planned and conducted between July 1 and July 4, 2014. Due to the precise planning and execution of the task, ATO forces managed to block the settlement, conduct assault operations with six assault units and destroy six strongholds of pro-Russian militants, destroy ammunition depots in Mykolaivka and in the area of Semenivka in Sloviansk. The terrorists' losses during the operation amounted to over 150 people, and more than 50 terrorists surrendered, led by the leader nicknamed "Scorpion".

On July 4, 2014, Mykolaivka was completely liberated from pro-Russian militants and taken under control by ATO forces [7].

During the offensive against the enemy's engineer-prepared defense, as well as during the capture of large settlements, when it was not possible to seize certain objects on the move, the units and subunits of the Airborne Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at that time planned and carried out assault operations, which were carried out mainly by a rapid rush forward, using close combat techniques, with close interaction and support of artillery, tank and mechanized units. Without lingering on individual centers of enemy resistance, the units resolutely moved forward from one

previously targeted object to another, consolidated at certain borders with further clearing of the object.

With the beginning of the large-scale invasion, the issue of assault tactics, in particular the assault and clearing of the fortifications of the stronghold, became relevant.

An analysis of the counteroffensive operation in the summer of 2023 showed that the high density of minefields installed in front of the enemy's front line, combined with a fire system based on anti-tank firepower, required the search for new ways for the Airborne Assault Forces to accomplish their tasks in an offensive battle. The battle for the capture of a landing or a part of it increasingly resembled the most complex variant of offensive combat - the assault on a settlement, which requires an appropriate construction of the unit's combat order and particularly careful coordination of the efforts of assault groups to capture the object of attack.

The use of assault groups on foot led to the neutralization of the effect of the enemy's anti-tank mines and anti-tank firepower. In turn, the search for ways to accurately guarantee the defeat of important enemy targets, especially in conditions of insufficient artillery, has led to a rapid increase in the role of drones with dumps and FPV [10].

The results of the experience study require a generalization of the relevant methods of training assault units, which generally includes: action planning (a set of measures to determine the sequence, timing, methods of action and the necessary composition of forces and means to accomplish the tasks), training of units (manning, training, provision, equipment, knowledge of the object, motivation), preparation of the initial area, positions (taking up the initial position, camouflage, engineering equipment), practical work of commanders in subordinate units), practical work of subordinate units.

Planning. Assault actions are planned and conducted with the aim of destroying (disabling) the most important enemy objects (positions, areas), settlements prepared for positional defense within a short time. Their planning begins with the receipt of a combat order or a preliminary order and includes all stages of the military decision-making process (hereinafter - MDP), taking into account the features that characterize the detail of the task by the assault squad (group) [3].

At the first stage, during the analysis of the combat mission, the assault squad commander additionally assesses: the most important objects that ensure the stability of the enemy's defense and which must be seized first; the composition and tasks of the elements of the combat order of the squad (group); ways to defeat the enemy, taking into account the peculiarities of the construction of buildings and other objects. The first stage involves the preliminary selection of forces and means of assault groups, their division into subgroups based on the tasks to be performed, calculation of time for advancement, occupation of initial positions, methods and time for making passages in engineering barriers, covering and supporting the assaulters, and subsequently replacing them.

At the second stage, during the assessment of the situation, the following are additionally studied: terrain and its main characteristics (size, configuration, layout, density and number of storeys of buildings, roads, fences, presence of rivers, canals, and ravines that can hide the approach of enemy reserves; features of fortified positions in strongholds, buildings (structures), namely complexes of buildings, type of buildings, presence of underground structures and communications, nature of fortifications, places of barriers and their types, presence of trenches, circular traffic areas, natural obstacles or bridges, as well as communications for communication with their units; location of enemy firepower, their fire sectors and dead spaces, the possibility of firing from neighboring strongholds and buildings; the possibility of a covert approach to favorable lines and a sudden attack, infiltration of small groups into the rear and flanks of the objects of assault (attack); gaps between enemy strongholds; limited areas of use of ATGM by the enemy; the level of training of enemy personnel; the enemy's routine.

The importance of the analysis and evaluation process is well described by the saying that every minute spent on planning sometimes saves hours on execution. Preparing assault operations is a

challenge not only for the commander who plans them in the upper chain of command, but also for the commander and lower-level personnel who will be the direct executors on the battlefield. Given that it will be the infantry, mainly with small arms, grenade launchers and an increased supply of fragmentation and thermobaric hand grenades, that will assault, clear and hold the captured borders, areas and objects for a certain period of time, the senior commander must plan and think through high-quality support for the assault groups, and comprehensively provide everything necessary to achieve the goal.

The conclusions from the situation assessment directly affect the options for conducting assault operations, which are formed at the third stage of the commander's plan: direction of concentration of main efforts, boundaries (objects), on the capture of which the success of the assault depends; method of conducting the assault (attack) with the determination of the order of its fire damage; routes of advance and deployment boundaries (depending on the conditions of the assault (attack); method of encircling the enemy (type of maneuver and procedure for encirclement) with the indication of the order of its fire damage; combat order (distribution of forces and means by tasks) measures to mislead the enemy.

At the fourth stage, under the leadership of the detachment commander, the developed options for assault actions are analyzed, and their comparison is carried out at the fifth stage and consists in determining the effectiveness of the developed options independently of each other, according to certain evaluation criteria. During the comparison, strengths and weaknesses are identified, which allows the commander to select and recommend the most optimal option for the task, which involves influencing the enemy's weaknesses and simultaneously strengthening their capabilities. It compares and selects options for building a combat order, the sequence of fire and its expected results, since a maneuver can be well planned but poorly executed due to failure to take into account known and hidden factors. In addition, it should be borne in mind that it is not always possible to compare one battle with another, nor is the time available for its preparation, sometimes a week, and sometimes only hours before the start of the action. Also, important criteria for evaluating effectiveness are: the ratio of combat capabilities of the parties, accessibility and speed of maneuver, ammunition, degree of fire damage, security, time allocated for preparation, and others.

Determination of the mathematical expectation [8] of the relative effectiveness of assault operations based on the results of comparing the plan and its practical implementation, which depends on the enemy's opposition and the effectiveness of the commander's management (influence on the situation), the mathematical expectation of the relative damage caused to the object of assault operations can be taken as a criterion of combat effectiveness.

If we initially do not take into account the value of enemy resistance and combat readiness of the assault force (group), we can assume that another area is randomly applied to the conditional area of the object - the fire damage zone of the assault force (group). The intention of assault actions is to affect the key objectives of the object, which, with increasing efforts, leads to a decrease in the resistance of the enemy object and, ultimately, its destruction. However, as a result of accidental events related to enemy counteraction or insufficient management of the squad (group) commander, his untimely influence on the situation that requires improvement of results in terms of defeating enemy targets, the degree of overlap between the first and second planes decreases.

If we consider the total simultaneous fire impact of one assault squad on an assault object, the deviation of the center of the area of destruction from the center of the area of the object follows the normal law of probability distribution of a random variable.

The relative area of overlap between the area of the area of destruction and the object, that is, the relative losses of the enemy in quantitative terms will be equal to:

$$M = \frac{L_x L_y}{\bar{O}_x \bar{O}_y} = M_x M_y ,$$

where M – is the enemy's relative losses;

$L_x L_y$ – the length of the overlap in the x and y axes;

$\bar{O}_x \bar{O}_y$ – dimensions of the object;

$M_x M_y$ – relative dimensions of the overlap in the x and y axes.

The mathematical expectation of the enemy's relative losses will be equal to

$$M = M_x M_y.$$

If the size of the object is too large compared to the radius of destruction of a particular firearm and the scattering is circular, then for approximate calculations it is possible to determine the mathematical expectation of relative losses, which will be equal to:

$$M = \left(\frac{R_{зв}}{R_o}\right)^2 \left[1 - e^{-\rho^2\left(\frac{R_O - R_{зв}}{E}\right)}\right]^2,$$

Where M – is the mathematical expectation of relative enemy losses;

$R_{зв}$ – is the radius of the targeted area of damage;

R_o – radius of the object (radius of the circle compared to the target plane);

E – is the probable deviation of the sum of the affected assets.

At the sixth stage, the senior commander approves the plan for assault operations and formulates a decision on assault operations.

During the organization of interaction, the following are additionally coordinated: actions of assault groups with the fire support group and units operating in front of them during the occupation of the initial position (regrouping or change) in case of counter-preparation by the enemy or when it goes on the offensive; actions of assault groups with air defense units, engineer troops during the advance from the depths to the line of attack, when the enemy strikes with aircraft, armored vehicles and UAVs, remote mining on the routes of advance and deployment lines; actions of assault groups with a fire support group, a barrier group and means allocated for direct fire during the period of fire preparation of the attack, making passages in the barriers in front of the front line of enemy defense, equipping tanks with roller mine trawls; actions of assault groups when passing tanks through their combat formations; actions of capture groups with a fire support group and an air defense unit during the transition to attack, overcoming barriers and obstacles, hastening personnel, attacking the front edge of the enemy's defense, capturing its first trench and destroying the enemy in the strongholds of the first echelon; actions of capture groups with a fire support group and an air defense unit when securing the achieved line and repelling an enemy counterattack; actions of capture groups and cover and consolidation groups (reserve groups) with a fire support group and a barrier group when introducing a cover and consolidation group (reserve group) into the battle, increasing efforts to complete the defeat of the enemy and its objects, as well as overcoming enemy obstacles, including those installed by remote mining.

In the course of work on the organization of command and control [3,4], the following are additionally determined tasks and procedure for the operation of the command and control center (CCC, control group) during the preparation and conduct of assault operations; places and timing of deployment of the CCC (control group) of assault groups and attached units when taking the initial position for the assault (attack), direction of movement during the assault (attack); procedure for transmitting control and warning commands (signals), tasks for ensuring communication, modes of operation of radio equipment methods and timing of reporting and the procedure for exchanging information between interacting assault groups, measures to ensure the stability and continuity of

control; the procedure for restoring broken control; unified signals of combat control, warning and interaction, the procedure for marking their position and methods of mutual recognition.

The probabilistic characterization of the time that can be spent on making an optimal decision in the current situation during the use of an assault squad (group) can be studied as a law of time distribution, described by the following indicator function

$$F'(t) = P[T < t] = 1 - e^{-\mu t},$$

where $F'(t)$ – is the probability of completing an informed decision at time t;

μ – is the average number of changes in the situation per unit of time;

$\frac{1}{\mu}$ – is the average reaction time to one combat situation.

For example, completion of the decision-making process within 4 minutes or more is a practically reliable event, the probability of the event is close to one (Fig. 1), but it is necessary to take into account the possibility that the decision-making process will not be completed within 1 minute, since according to statistical data, this can happen in one third of cases.




Figure 1. The law of time distribution for making an informed decision to solve a situational problem

It is possible to assume that the actual process of solving a situational task is subject to an exponential law if the probability of making a decision from the beginning is sufficiently high, and delaying its adoption for a long time is unlikely. At the same time, the issue of managing an assault squad (group), whose actions are extremely dynamic, requires further study.

When conducting reconnaissance, the commander must additionally indicate (assign) landmarks and clarify on the ground: the front edge of the enemy's defense, approaches to it, the presence and nature of barriers and obstacles, strongholds and locations of enemy firepower, especially anti-tank firepower, possible lines and directions of counterattacks and possible attacks by enemy combat helicopters, UAVs, the presence of open flanks and gaps, strengths and weaknesses in the enemy's defense, and the possible nature of its actions direction of assault (attack), direction of concentration of main efforts, breakthrough area (if assigned), line of attack, combat tasks for elements of the combat order; firing positions of artillery and firepower of the fire support group, which are allocated for direct fire, areas of concentrated and boundary barrage artillery fire and enemy targets (objects) subject to fire damage; firing positions of air defense assets, directions and sectors

on which to concentrate the main efforts when covering assault groups from air strikes; places for making passages in barriers and crossings over obstacles, as well as for passing tanks through the combat formations of units defending ahead; tasks performed by the senior commander's forces and means in the interests of the assault (attack) groups, as well as tasks of neighbors and demarcation lines with them; places of deployment and directions of movement of technical, logistics and medical support units; place of deployment and direction of movement of the command and control center (CCC, control group); starting positions for the assault (attack) during the transition to the offensive from a position of direct contact with the enemy; boundaries of haste and transition to the attack during the offensive with the advance from the depths; routes of advance of units and deployment boundaries.

At the seventh stage, a combat order is given, in which the commander, when setting combat tasks, determines the tasks for all elements of the combat order.

The planning of assault operations in each chain of command will have a number of peculiarities. Where the brigade headquarters will consider the strip, directions and boundaries, the involvement of heterogeneous forces and means to support the assault, the battalion commander will consider the composition and manning of assault groups, reinforcement forces and means, medical evacuation, and ammunition replenishment.

At the level of the company (platoon) commander, the planning process considers in detail the distribution of personnel into subgroups, equipment, weapons, interaction at the stages of the task within the assault group, as well as with the forces and means allocated by the senior commander.

At the same time, all elements involved in planning assault operations must share the same understanding of the conditions that are created for success. Despite the extensive preparations involved, success can be achieved through a combination of professionalism of commanders, training of personnel, and provision of the necessary means.

Training of units. A significant part of the success of an assault depends on the implementation of combat support measures. The composition and equipment of an assault force is of particular importance and requires commanders to take a careful approach to their formation, in fact, for each individual battle. Thus, commanders are required to think through not only the elements of the combat order, the order of their application, but also to take into account small details, such as the equipment of an individual soldier [11].

The main factors affecting the composition and equipment of an assault squad (group) have been in the past and will remain in the future: enemy forces and means, their quantitative and qualitative composition, moral and psychological state, location, formation of combat order; terrain, its passability, protective and camouflage properties, conditions of orientation, observation, fire and engineering equipment; availability of neighbors, reserves, collective firepower, especially combat vehicles (tanks), anti-tank weapons and artillery.

Given the specifics of assault operations, where stealth, surprise, and speed of maneuver come to the fore, a special approach to personnel selection is also important. When forming assault groups, attention is paid to the soldiers' training, ability to effectively use standard weapons, throw hand fragmentation grenades, use rocket-propelled grenades, and physical fitness. The issue of motivation and willingness to take risks is not neglected. In general, these are servicemen who have undergone high-quality training in training centers and have experience in combat. Such units are not necessarily regular, they are more often formed on an ad hoc basis, so the number of personnel depends on the specific task and the situation.

Taking into account the above requirements, it is possible to provide a generalized composition of assault units (groups), which can be divided into combat and support components [5]: control subgroup, UAV subgroup, FPV subgroup, UAV countermeasures subgroup, barrier subgroup, fire support subgroup, 1-2 assault subgroups, build-up subgroup, reserve subgroup, support subgroup, evacuation subgroup.

The functions assigned to the subgroups should be identified, their weapons and equipment should be determined, which will determine the effectiveness of their use in combat.

The command and control subgroup includes battalion (company, platoon) commander, who directly supervises assault operations; artillery unit commander, who acts in the interests of the assault squad (group) and provides timely support and fire damage to the enemy; senior UAV subgroup operator, who is responsible for conducting reconnaissance of the object and situational awareness of the control group, the senior evacuation team leader is responsible for medical evacuation and coordination of evacuation subgroups by area, as well as the senior operator of FPV drone subgroups for timely coordination to deliver fire damage to enemy manpower and equipment.

The smallest unit that will be the main assault subgroup is an airborne assault squad or part of it, which on average consists of four to ten people.

Taking into account the peculiarities of combat, the equipment of an assault subgroup differs from the conventional one and includes at least eight loaded magazines for an assault rifle or assault rifle, ready for use, as well as a carry-on ammunition kit - 450 rounds for each shooter, an increased number of hand grenades (up to 6), two of which must be thermobaric and two smoke grenades, to smoke out the enemy from shelters and holes, RPG-18 (RPG-22, RPG-26) and AT-4 anti-tank rocket grenades, complete individual first aid kits, drinking water, backup batteries for communications equipment, radio frequency transmitters of certain colors to send signals of interaction in case of loss of communication, and, if necessary, an unmanned aerial vehicle.

All of the above is evenly distributed on equipment items, load-bearing vests, and combat backpacks.

The cover subgroup is tasked with covering the flanks of the assault group and preventing the approach of enemy reserves. The group consists of an average of 4 to 8 people. The equipment and ammunition of the group is similar to the assault group, except for grenades, which are based on F-1s.

A consolidation subgroup consisting of 4 people to a platoon, in addition to increased ammunition, should be equipped with dry rations and water supplies for an average of three days.

The barrier subgroup is designed to make passages in the enemy's MZ, on average consisting of 2-3 soldiers from an engineer platoon. Taking into account the specifics of the task, its ammunition consists on average of 4 magazines loaded with ammunition and two RGD-5 hand grenades, a complete sapper's bag and a means for making passages such as ZRP-2 "Tropa".

The evacuation subgroup is designed to evacuate the wounded from the red to the green zone. The group consists of 4 to 8 people, depending on the task. As a rule, they are armed with 5.45 mm AK-74 rifles, four magazines for each, and two RGD-5 grenades. The contents of the tactical medical bag are designed for 70% of the assault team: tools for intubating the airways, conventional wound care products, scissors, Israeli bandages, inclusive bandages, tourniquets, burns, hemostatic bandages, additional protection (gloves, masks, and eye protection), and tactical soft stretchers.

The supply subgroup is designed to deliver ammunition, includes an average of 2-4 soldiers, armed with a 5.45 mm AK-74 rifle, four loaded magazines and two RGD-5 grenades. The average combat backpack kit contains 0.5 ammunition for each type of weapon.

The UAV subgroup is designed to conduct reconnaissance, timely adjust the actions of the assault subgroup, detect enemy reserves on the routes of advance, artillery destruction means for counter-battery combat and timely inform their artillery and anti-tank units for fire damage. The technical component of the UAV group is up to 5 quadcopters operating simultaneously in the air.

The outcome of the training of units should be their training, both basic and additional, conducted in the rear of their troops in areas or objects that have similar features to the areas or objects where the battle is planned. It is the training, which practises the interaction and synchronization of forces and means, that should be the final stage of a unit's training. Personnel understand the task much better through physical activity, and muscle memory determines the level of preparedness. The

need for intensity of training is determined by the squad (group) commander, but the main thing is to realize that training is important.

Preparation of the initial area (positions). Preparation of the initial area (position) for the assault includes: equipping the starting positions of assault groups and attached units (refitting the positions of previously operating and changing units), firing positions of artillery and destruction means allocated for direct fire, firing (starting) positions of air defense means, launch (landing) sites for UAVs; Preparation of deployment sites for the command and control center (CCC, command and control group), areas of deployment of technical, logistics and medical support units; installation of engineering barriers in the areas of possible enemy attacks; preparation of routes of advance and deployment boundaries for assault groups when advancing from depth; implementation of camouflage and protection measures against armored vehicles and attack UAVs.

Positions should ensure the creation of tactical and firepower advantage, and have a more favorable position in relation to the enemy. If the firepower intended to engage the enemy cannot see the target, the effectiveness of actions is close to zero, which jeopardizes the overall mission, so when choosing positions, the conditions of observation, manner of fire, and correction are taken into account. In the vast majority of cases, such conditions either do not exist or are minimal, so the commander thinks about how to create them artificially. This is a sequence of actions that includes a combination of fire on the enemy combined with the movement of combat groups. Such actions gradually lead to the advantage of the assault group, and the commander's task is to maintain this advantage and use it to his advantage, which ensures the achievement of the goal. Misleading the enemy, engineering equipment, and camouflage are part of the preparation of the initial area (taking up positions).

Practical work of commanders in subordinate units. The practical work of commanders involves checking the implementation of preparations for assault operations, manning, weapons and military equipment, availability of ammunition, knowledge of combat missions and the procedure for their implementation, important components of command, control, interaction and support.

There is never enough time available, so the commander highlights the main points in the preparation, checks the results of its implementation, and during practical work in subordinate units draws conclusions about achieving the required level of readiness of the unit to perform the task, its probable effectiveness.

Conclusion

Further improvement of assault training involves improving the methodology of planning each assault as a separate operation, with the combination of such assaults into a single whole in the form of a set of assault actions conducted according to a single concept and plan in a specific operational area and can lead to a predictable transformation of tactical success into operational success.

The commander has no right to demand high results from his subordinates without making efforts to prepare the unit, set the task and ensure its fulfilment. Often, lack of time, skills, complexity of the situation, lack of understanding of the structure of the plan, namely how, what and in what order to perform, as well as incomplete information from the senior commander (headquarters), leads to unjustified losses.

When planning assault operations, the commander is required to make every effort to coordinate the fire and maneuver of all available forces and means, to neutralize enemy firepower that will affect the task. The spatial representation of the future battlefield requires taking into account even seemingly insignificant factors, predicting the outcome by observing it from different angles, identifying not only the strengths but also the weaknesses of your battle plan in order to influence and improve the situation in a timely manner at the stage of formulating a decision and during its implementation.

During planning, it is important that the commander has the necessary time to assess the situation, select the most appropriate option, critically analyze it (compare options), conduct reconnaissance with key performers, and ensure that the direct performers understand the overall plan and the subtleties of its implementation. It is imperative to have a backup option, including the option of refusing the chosen course of action or the task in general.

Thus, the issue of conducting assault operations by airborne units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is relevant today and requires further study and improvement, both at the planning and practical implementation stages.

Recommendations

The search for effective ways to solve tasks by assault units (groups) requires the study of a function that describes the progress and result of the task, i.e., achieving the maximum value with minimal initial training data.

The value of the degree of realization of the immediate task by an assault squad (group) can be the result of reaching a certain line, the next task is the transition to defense and its retention. Thus, one of the criteria for evaluating the results of the battle will be the depth of movement of the assault unit (group) in a certain time at an average speed, which is laid down in the commander's plan and depends on the conditions of maintaining a stable level of functioning of the unit, that is, preventing a high level of losses. Also, the effectiveness of the assault squad's performance of tasks will be influenced by the effectiveness of the management cycle, the ability to influence the situation in a timely manner, and to solve situational tasks.

The obvious characteristic of management that needs to be further studied, described and detailed is its flexibility, what combines centralization and decentralization of management into a single whole. Finding an effective way to combine these two components in practice and applying them in an integrated manner will yield results.

Centralization means that the senior commander monitors the assault operations from their beginning to their end in readiness to influence the situation: assessing the state of the groups and their readiness, using additional means of influence on the enemy, supporting forces and means, reserves, changing the direction of advance, etc. The overall picture and situation, something that junior commanders may not see, requires the squad (group) commander to warn of danger, choose the best course of action in the given circumstances: advance, stop and disperse, take cover, move to defense at the frontier, choose a way to influence the enemy, that is, comprehensive countermeasures to get ahead of the enemy.

Decentralization is the management and initiative of junior commanders (subgroup commanders). This is important because they are the direct executors, they know best on the ground, they use individual tactics in combat, use combat groups according to the general plan or the situation that has developed instantly. A senior commander may not be able to simultaneously review all areas of the battlefield: the state of the unit, ammunition consumption, individual episodes of combat with their peculiarities, and so on.

During the preparation of assault operations, the composition and manning of assault units (groups) may vary depending on the scale of the operations and the situation, but the commander should remember that the use of these units is limited in time. It is necessary to take into account the intensity of the enemy's counteraction, possible actions of its reserves, the duration of aerial reconnaissance, and the consumption of ammunition. The effectiveness of the use of assault units will be determined by the issue of their comprehensive support, manning in accordance with the conditions of the situation and tasks, as well as the training of personnel and commanders who control the actions.

Techniques and methods of conducting assault operations require further study and implementation in the practice of training units.

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Підготовка підрозділів окремої десантно штурмової бригади до ведення штурмових дій: проблемні питання та шляхи їх вирішення

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Анотація. Звільнення окупованих противником територій неможливе без просування вперед, що вимагає від командирів та підрозділів готовності до ведення штурмових дій. З початком широкомасштабного вторгнення на територію України штурмові дії є актуальними

в кожному військовому підрозділі, особливо в підрозділах Десантно-штурмових військ, які безпосередньо пов’язані з виконанням завдань, що характеризуються здійсненням швидкого маневру, злагодженістю підрозділів, вмінням йти на прорахований ризик.

З урахуванням досвіду російсько-української війни питання ведення штурмових дій з метою оволодіння новими рубежами, відновлення втраченого положення чи захоплення (знищення) об’єктів, залишаються не дослідженими, оскільки вони пов’язані з активним застосуванням нових видів зброї, боєприпасів і тактики дій підрозділів. Потребують подальшого поглибленого вивчення новітні підходи, щодо планування штурмових дій, комплектування, екіпірування та підготовки особового складу, створення бойового порядку, який буде ефективним на конкретній місцевості, організації взаємодії підрозділів, що залучаються до штурму, їх підтримка та забезпечення у бою.

Результатом дослідження повинно бути формування єдиного розуміння командирами і штабами процедури організації штурмових дій. Основними проблемними питаннями, що підлягають дослідженню, слід визначити: підходи до планування, узгодження застосування розрізнених елементів бойового порядку, які входять до складу штурмових загонів (груп), залучення необхідного озброєння та техніки, що забезпечить спроможність швидкого і прихованого висування до вихідних районів (рубежів), виконання завдань штурмових дій на його етапах. У статті авторами запропоновано зміст підготовки штурмового загону (групи), системний підхід у роботі командира і штабу, розглядаються найбільш складні вузлові питання планування, від яких залежить успіх ведення штурмових дій.

Ключові слова: штурмові дії, планування, підготовка, форми та способи застосування, бойовий порядок.