The Central Research institute
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

Received: *May 21, 2025*| **Revisions Requested:** - | **Revision Received:** -
Accepted: *October 28, 2025* | **Published Online:** *April 10, 2026*

Licensed (C) by Creative Commons Attribution International License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-SA)

DOI: 10.62524/msj.2026.4.1.10

The Foresight of the russian federation's Mobilisation Potential: Structure, Mechanisms and Development Scenarios for 2025–2026 years

Volodymyr Hurkovskyi
Doctor of Public Administration, Professor
Chief of Branch
The Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
03049, Povitrianykh Syl Avenue, 28 B, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: volodymyrgurkovskyi@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-2021-5204

Robert Ovanesian
Leading Research Fellow
The Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
03049, Povitrianykh Syl Avenue, 28 B, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: bober1609@gmail.com
ORCID: 0009-0008-6761-2059

Denys Kalashnikov
Research Fellow
The Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
03049, Povitrianykh Syl Avenue, 28 B, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: kalash179@gmail.com
ORCID: 0009-0003-4625-6191

Andrii Tsybizov
Candidate of Military Sciences, Senior Researcher
Senior Research Fellow
The Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
03049, Povitrianykh Syl Avenue, 28 B, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: Enigma_007@ukr.net
ORCID: 0000-0001-6555-5005

Karel Nedbalek
Doctor of Law, Professor
European Professional Doctorate
Zlín, Czech Republic
e-mail: slusovice@motelgolg.cz
ORCID: 0000-0002-1010-2460

The Central Research institute
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

Abstract. Relevance of the study is due to the need to anticipate how the russian federation will compensate for its losses under the conditions of a protracted war. For example, analysis of open sources from July 2025 indicates russia's plans to expand conscription through reforms of the military administration, which may change the dynamics of the war. For Ukraine, this means a need for accurate data and forecasts in order to effectively allocate its own resources. The article is dedicated to a systematic analysis and foresight of the mobilisation potential of the russian federation under the conditions of full-scale war against Ukraine. The study reveals the structure, troop generation mechanisms, and limitations of the russian mobilisation system, proposing a forecast of its development for 2025–2026. The aim of the article – is to conduct a systematic analysis of the organisation of russia's mobilisation resource in the context of its war against Ukraine and to develop a forecast of its mobilisation capabilities for 2025–2026. The article outlines the structure and characteristics of russia's mobilisation resource, including the legal framework and recruitment mechanisms; it examines the specifics of partial mobilisation, contract service, recruitment of foreigners, and forced conscription in the occupied territories; it identifies key limitations of the system based on verified data; it formulates a forecast based on current trends and historical examples; and it offers conclusions to support Ukraine's strategic defence planning. A systemic approach is the basis of the study, as mobilisation in russia represents a complex system encompassing the legislative framework, administrative mechanisms, socio-economic conditions, and the ideological apparatus. For the analysis, the model of general systems theory by Ludwig von Bertalanffy is used, which considers a system as a set of interconnected elements, where a change in one component, for example, the demographic reserve, affects others, such as military effectiveness or economic stability. Based on empirical and theoretical methods, including the analysis of official documents, reports by ISW, RAND, Human Rights Watch, and other open sources, it has been established that mobilisation in russia relies on a centralised repressive system, but faces a demographic crisis (a 10% decrease in the working-age population by 2030), economic sanctions (a 3.5% decrease in GDP in 2023–2024), and organisational problems (corruption, lack of equipment). Partial mobilisation, contract service, recruitment of foreigners (including from North Korea and Nepal), and forced conscription in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine are the key mechanisms, but their effectiveness is decreasing due to low training levels and resistance. The forecast for 2025–2026 anticipates the continuation of hybrid mobilisation (150–200 thousand people annually), but with the risk of exhaustion due to economic and social constraints. Historical examples (Japan 1941–1945, the USSR in Afghanistan) highlight the vulnerability of such systems. For Ukraine, information operations, strikes on logistics, and strengthening of sanctions are recommended. The study offers strategic leverage points to weaken the enemy, which is of critical importance for state defence.

Keywords: mobilisation resource, russian federation, mobilisation potential, russian-Ukrainian war, foresight, partial mobilisation, contract service, occupied territories, demographic crisis, economic sanctions, strategic planning.

Introduction

The war of russia against Ukraine, which has been ongoing since 2014 and escalated sharply with the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, imposes new requirements on the analysis of russia's military capabilities, in particular its mobilisation resources. Against the backdrop of significant losses, which, according to estimates by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), amount to hundreds of thousands of killed and wounded as of 2025, russia is forced to continuously adapt its force generation system in order to maintain its offensive potential.

The losses of the russian army, together with the need for troop rotation and the creation of reserves, have created an urgent demand for replenishing human resources to sustain the war effort.

Since the conflict has officially been referred to as a "special military operation", full

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

mobilisation has not been declared in russia. Instead, alternative methods of force generation have been employed, including partial mobilisation, forced conscription in occupied territories, recruitment of so-called volunteers into regular forces and "private military companies", the use of prisoners, foreign nationals, and the transfer of conscripts to contract service. However, these methods have faced serious organisational, logistical, and social challenges, complicating the provision of sufficient personnel. This process includes partial mobilisation, contract-based service, forced recruitment of residents in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, and the enlistment of foreign mercenaries. For Ukraine, which is resisting aggression, understanding these mechanisms is critical for forecasting enemy actions and developing effective counter-strategies.

The mobilisation resource of russia is a complex system dependent on demographic, economic, and political factors. The totalitarian regime, which has intensified since 2022, effectively suppresses any attempts at public resistance by employing repressive legislation, such as the amendments to the Criminal Code of the russian federation of 3 March 2022, which предусматривают (provide for) up to 15 years of imprisonment for "disseminating false information" about the actions of the russian armed forces. At the same time, russia faces internal challenges: a demographic crisis, economic sanctions, and the loss of skilled personnel complicate efforts to expand its military. For example, according to ISW data, russia is planning reforms to expand the recruitment of reservists and contract soldiers to compensate for losses; however, these measures have limited effectiveness due to low public motivation and economic constraints.

The analysis of russia's mobilisation resource is important not only for assessing its current capabilities but also for forecasting its actions in the medium term (2025–2026). The historical example of France's mobilisation during the Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815), when the "levée en masse" system enabled the rapid formation of a large army but led to resource exhaustion, illustrates the limits of coercive mobilisation models. Today, russia, similarly to historical empires, is balancing between coercion and attempts to stimulate voluntary recruitment, creating both opportunities and vulnerabilities.

The aim of this article is to conduct a systematic analysis of the organisation of russia's mobilisation resource in the context of the war against Ukraine and to develop a forecast of its mobilisation capabilities for 2025–2026. The objectives are as follows:

to characterise the structure and features of russia's mobilisation resource, including the legislative framework and recruitment mechanisms;

to examine the specifics of partial mobilisation, contract service, recruitment of foreigners, and forced conscription in occupied territories;

to identify key limitations of the system based on verified data;

to formulate a forecast based on current trends and historical examples;

to provide conclusions that will support Ukraine's defence planning.

The relevance of this study is determined by the need to anticipate how russia will compensate for its losses in the context of a protracted war. For instance, the analysis of open sources from July 2025 indicates russia's plans to expand conscription through reforms of its military administration, which may alter the dynamics of the war. For Ukraine, this implies the need for accurate data and forecasts in order to effectively allocate its own resources. The following section, devoted to methodology, will outline the analytical approach ensuring the validity and reliability of the conclusions.

Methodological Framework

The study of the mobilisation resource of the russian federation in the context of the full-scale war against Ukraine requires a systematic approach that integrates empirical and theoretical methods to analyse the interconnections between demographic, economic, political, and military factors. This section outlines the methodological framework used for the analysis, explains the selection of sources

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

and methods, and substantiates the relevance of the topic for Ukraine's defence planning.

A systems approach forms the basis of this study, as mobilisation in russia represents a complex system encompassing the legislative framework, administrative mechanisms, socio-economic conditions, and ideological apparatus. The analysis employs the general systems theory model of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, which considers a system as a set of interconnected elements, where changes in one component, such as the demographic reserve, affect others, including military effectiveness and economic stability [1]. This approach makes it possible to identify leverage points — vulnerabilities within the system that may be exploited for strategic influence.

Empirical methods include the analysis of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources comprise official documents, in particular Presidential Decree of the russian federation No. 647 of 21 September 2022 on partial mobilisation [2]. Secondary sources include analytical reports of international organisations such as ISW and the RAND Corporation, as well as publications in academic databases (JSTOR, Springer) and media outlets such as Euromaidan Press and Texty.org.ua. In particular, the ISW report of 22 December 2024 on the militarisation of youth in russia and in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine was used to analyse military-patriotic training programmes [3]. To ensure relevance, data from posts on the X platform from July 2025 were used, indicating russia's plans to reform its conscription system [4].

Theoretical methods include comparative analysis and forecasting. Comparative analysis was applied to compare contemporary russian mobilisation with historical examples, in particular the "levée en masse" system in France during the Napoleonic Wars, which demonstrated both the effectiveness of forced mobilisation and its limits due to resource exhaustion [5]. Forecasting is based on a qualitative approach that takes into account demographic trends, such as the projected decline of russia's working-age population by 2030 according to Rosstat [6], economic constraints caused by sanctions [7], and political factors, including the strengthening of the repressive apparatus through amendments to the Criminal Code of the russian federation [8]. Scenario analysis is used to assess possible developments, enabling the modelling of different trajectories for 2025–2026, such as the continuation of partial mobilisation or a transition to full mobilisation.

The selection of sources is determined by their relevance and reliability. Academic databases such as JSTOR provide access to studies on mobilisation systems in authoritarian regimes [9], while reports by ISW and RAND offer up-to-date data on russian military strategy [3, 10]. Media outlets such as Euromaidan Press are used to analyse developments in the occupied territories [11], while posts on the X platform are employed to track current trends, including statements on reforms of military administration in russia [4].

The choice of the research topic is based on its critical importance for Ukraine's national security. russia's mobilisation resource directly affects the course of the war, as its effectiveness determines the ability to compensate for losses, which, according to estimates by Forbes Ukraine, may reach up to 30,000 personnel per month [12]. These data suggest that the russian federation may sustain its mobilisation reserve until 2032 under current conditions, making the forecasting of its capabilities strategically essential. For Ukraine, which is confronting a numerically superior adversary, understanding these processes enables the development of countermeasures, such as strikes on logistical centres or information campaigns aimed at demoralising russian recruits.

The proposed methodology ensures a comprehensive and substantiated approach to the analysis by combining empirical data with theoretical models. The following section, devoted to the results of the study, will examine in detail the structure of russia's mobilisation resource, the mechanisms of force generation, and the key limitations of the system, thereby providing a foundation for forecasting developments in 2025–2026.

Results and Discussions

The methodological framework outlined in the previous section has enabled a systematic

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

approach to analysing the mobilisation resource of the russian federation, considering it as a complex system operating under the conditions of a full-scale war against Ukraine. This section examines the specific features of mobilisation organisation, the structure of the mobilisation resource, force generation mechanisms, and the key constraints affecting the effectiveness of the russian military system. The findings are based on the analysis of official documents, reports by international organisations, academic sources, and up-to-date data reflecting the situation as of July 2025.

Features of mobilisation organisation in russia

Mobilisation in russia is a centralised system regulated by a number of legislative acts, in particular the Federal Law "On Mobilisation Preparation and Mobilisation in the russian federation" No. 31-FZ of 1997, supplemented by amendments introduced after 2022 [13]. These amendments, inter alia, expanded the powers of military commissariats and introduced electronic draft notices, enabling the automation of conscription processes [14]. The system relies on a totalitarian state apparatus which, akin to a "web", encompasses regional administrations, security structures, and propaganda media, ensuring the coercive involvement of citizens. However, this centralisation also has a downside: bureaucratic inertia and corruption complicate the rapid deployment of forces.

A key feature is the hybrid approach, combining forced mobilisation with voluntary contract-based service. For example, following the announcement of partial mobilisation in September 2022, russia reportedly mobilised 300,000 personnel; however, actual figures are likely higher than officially declared, as the kremlin continues to employ covert mobilisation practices. Against this background, recruitment is further complicated by draft evasion and logistical challenges [15]. At the same time, the state has intensified propaganda campaigns aimed at "patriotic" indoctrination, particularly through programmes such as "Yunarmiya" and the militarisation of schools, which, according to ISW data, involved up to 1.5 million adolescents in 2024 [3].

Structure of the mobilisation resource

russia's mobilisation resource is based on the country's demographic structure, which comprises approximately 146 million people, of whom the working-age population (15–59 years) accounts for around 80 million [6]. However, the actual mobilisation potential is limited: according to expert estimates, the working-age population will decrease by 10% by 2030 due to low birth rates and emigration [16].

At the same time, russia's mobilisation potential is significantly larger in theoretical terms due to its population size. Estimates suggest that the total mobilisation potential amounts to approximately 20–25 million people. However, this figure is purely theoretical and does not account for the actual capacity or willingness of these citizens to serve. The practical ability to mobilise such numbers is constrained by economic, logistical, and social barriers, which hinder the rapid formation of large military contingents.

The core mobilisation reserve includes:

conscription-age individuals – men aged 18 to 30 subject to mandatory military service;

reservists – citizens who have previously completed military service and remain in reserve, forming the main component of the mobilisation reserve (approximately 2 million individuals with prior conscription experience) [17];

contract soldiers – approximately 500,000 personnel in the russian armed forces as of 2025 [18];

volunteers – individuals who join the armed forces voluntarily;

conscripts – up to 250,000 annually through regular conscription cycles [19];

women – individuals with relevant military specialisations who may also be mobilised.

Losses in Ukraine, which, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, exceeded 700,000 killed and wounded as of July 2025, have significantly reduced this reserve [20]. For comparison, during the Second Chechen War (1999–2009), russia lost approximately 25,000 personnel over ten years, highlighting the unprecedented scale of current losses [21].

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

Mechanisms for Manning the Armed Forces

At the outset of its full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the russian federation deployed approximately 200,000 troops. By the end of 2023, according to statements by the russian dictator, around 617,000 military personnel were already involved in the so-called "special military operation", with 244,000 directly engaged in combat operations [22]. In the context of a war of attrition, manpower requirements are not limited to compensating losses but also include the accumulation of reserves for future military operations and the rotation of personnel.

To maintain the necessary level of personnel, russia employs several approaches:

Mobilisation in the occupied territories:

In the occupied territories of Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions), russia conducts forced mobilisation. According to available data, starting from 19 February 2022, the russian federation carried out mobilisation in the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Within this framework, supporters of the so-called "russian world" were recruited voluntarily, while other citizens were forcibly conscripted, including full-time students and cadets of the Donetsk and Luhansk academies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These measures were accompanied by mass "round-ups" of men of conscription age. According to estimates by the Eastern Human Rights Group, as of June 2022, around 140,000 individuals had been mobilised, with an additional 80,000 mobilised during the so-called partial mobilisation. By summer 2024, this number had risen to 300,000. The mobilisation of human resources in the occupied territories continues to this day [23].

The involvement of personnel who previously served in the so-called "people's militias", the use of mobilised individuals from these regions, and the recruitment of russian volunteers partially compensated for losses and the growing demand for manpower; however, significant problems remained unresolved.

According to Human Rights Watch, between 2022 and 2024 up to 100,000 individuals were mobilised in the so-called DPR and LPR, often under the threat of execution [28]. These units are frequently used as expendable forces, which reduces their combat effectiveness and provokes local resistance.

Partial mobilisation:

The russian federation first faced an acute need to reinforce its armed forces in early autumn 2022. This was a consequence of the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region. As a result, in late September 2022 the kremlin was forced to announce a partial mobilisation, which formally lasted until January 2023. This measure enabled a rapid increase in troop numbers by approximately 300,000 personnel. However, the process revealed systemic challenges: ineffective accounting of mobilisation resources, insufficient infrastructure, and logistical shortcomings in equipping recruits. To partially mitigate these issues, russia began using the territory of belarus as a training ground for newly mobilised personnel.

The partial mobilisation announced in September 2022 became a key instrument for replenishing the armed forces. According to official figures, 300,000 individuals were planned to be mobilised, but the actual number was lower due to widespread draft evasion: according to BBC estimates, up to one million men left russia in 2022–2023 [15]. The mobilisation process exposed systemic deficiencies, including inadequate training of reservists, corruption in military enlistment offices, and shortages of equipment. For example, mobilised personnel from Dagestan reported a lack of body armour and modern weapons [25].

At the time of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the strength of the armed forces of the russian federation amounted to 1,902,758 personnel, including 1,013,628 military servicemen. However, since January 2023, the kremlin has been forced to increase the size of its armed forces three times. As a result, the authorised strength rose by 12.5% to 2,039,758 personnel, including 1,150,628 military servicemen. From December 2023, the authorised strength was further increased by 14.7% to 2,209,130 personnel, including 1,320,000 military servicemen. From 1 December 2024, the size

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

of the armed forces increased by a further 13.6%, reaching 2,389,130 personnel, including 1,500,000 military servicemen.

The dynamics of the growth in the size of the armed forces of the russian federation are illustrated in Figures 1–5.

It should be noted that the announcement of partial mobilisation did not trigger critical internal upheaval for the kremlin, although public dissatisfaction increased. According to data from the Levada Center, in August 48% supported the continuation of military actions, while 44% supported the initiation of peace negotiations. In September, the figures shifted to 44% and 48% respectively. October polling showed a more pronounced change: 57% supported peace negotiations, while 36% supported the continuation of military actions. However, it would be premature to interpret these figures as evidence of growing pacifism among russians. On the contrary, according to the same surveys, the proportion of russians supporting the war against Ukraine remains very high: 76% in August, 72% in September, and 73% in October.




Figure 1. Dynamics of the growth in the number of military personnel of the armed forces of the russian federation

At the same time, according to various estimates, between 500,000 and 1 million people left the country. In order to avoid further escalation of social tensions, the kremlin was forced to revise its military recruitment strategy.

Contract service:

At present, the most widespread official method of recruitment is the signing of contracts with russians who join the army predominantly not as volunteers but as mercenaries. Contract service forms the basis of so-called “voluntary” recruitment. There is a continuous effort by the authorities to encourage the population to join the russian army. The most effective incentive for recruitment is the comparatively high salary (relative to the national average in russia), as well as substantial one-off payments upon signing a contract.

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)




Figure 2. Strength of the armed forces of the russian federation as of 24 February 2022




Figure 3. Strength of the armed forces of the russian federation as of 01.January 2023




Figure 4. Strength of the armed forces of the russian federation as of 1 December 2023




Figure 5. Strength of the armed forces of the russian federation as of 1 December 2024

Thus, in 2023, prior to the spring conscription campaign, a media campaign promoting contract service with the ministry of defence of the russian federation was launched. Mobile recruitment points for contract military service were deployed in city streets, while managers of enterprises and educational institutions received recommendations to promote contract service among employees and students. In addition to the informational component, there was also a financial one: the russian federal authorities offered a one-off payment upon signing, salaries significantly higher than the national average, and numerous benefits for both the servicemen and their families. This became an attractive factor for a portion of recruits and also reduced the financial burden on regional authorities, which were often unable to adequately support the formation and functioning of volunteer battalions.

russia offers high financial incentives (up to 200,000 roubles per month), but motivation remains low due to high casualty rates. According to RAND, in 2024 russia recruited approximately 100,000 contract soldiers, primarily from economically disadvantaged regions such as Buryatia and Tuva [10]. Coercive methods are also used in recruitment, including threats of imprisonment for economic debts [26].

From July 2024, at the federal level, every citizen who signs a contract for military service in the russian army receives:

400,000 roubles – a one-off payment;

from 204,000 roubles – monthly salary;

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

40,000–50,000 roubles – monthly payment during the training period.

In addition, all constituent entities of the russian federation have introduced one-off payments for signing military service contracts under regional programmes. Between 2023 and 2024, there was a clear upward trend in financial "incentives" for contract signing across the russian federation, although since the beginning of 2025 a reverse trend has been observed. At present, these payments range from 300,000 to 2,600,000 roubles, depending on the region.

In December 2023, putin, for the first time since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, announced the number of contract servicemen in the russian army — 640,000. dmitry medvedev stated that in 2023 alone, 410,000 russians signed contracts, while since the beginning of 2024 this figure has increased by a further 53,000. At the same time, according to viktor sobolev, a member of the defence committee of the state duma of russia, as of 4 February 2025, the total number of individuals who had signed contracts for military service in the russian army amounted to approximately 740,000.

Despite this, according to ISW, since late 2024 the monthly "recruitment" rate into the russian army has likely been equal to or lower than the number required to replace monthly losses on a one-to-one basis. Moreover, certain regions of the russian federation are unable to meet their monthly recruitment quotas, as citizens are increasingly reluctant to participate in the war.

Significantly greater attention has also been paid by the defence establishment to conscripts. Since early 2023, active recruitment campaigns targeting young men have been conducted and continued throughout the year. Unit commanders and senior servicemen have applied various methods of influence, ranging from individual conversations to threats and intimidation. The combination of incentives and coercion allows recruitment targets for contract service to be met through conscripts.

To improve the effectiveness of conscription followed by transition to contract service, the russian state duma adopted legislative amendments that increased the conscription age to 30, thereby expanding the pool of eligible men. In addition, a reformed system of military registration was introduced, covering all persons liable for military service. Electronic draft notices were also implemented; these are considered legally served from the moment they appear in the personal electronic account of a conscript on the "Gosuslugi" portal. Failure to report to the military commissariat may result in restrictive measures, including bans on leaving the country, driving vehicles, conducting real estate transactions, or obtaining loans.

Since 2022, there has also been a steady increase in the number of citizens conscripted for compulsory military service into the armed forces of the russian federation (see Figure 2). In spring 2025, the kremlin conscripted approximately 160,000 men, marking the largest conscription campaign in three and a half years of the war against Ukraine. According to official russian statements, these conscripts are not intended to be deployed to the so-called "special military operation". However, in practice, many recruits are compelled — formally or informally — to sign contracts after entering service and are subsequently deployed to the front lines as part of the occupying forces. This mechanism has become one of the key means for the kremlin to compensate for substantial wartime losses.

Recruitment of Foreign Nationals:

One of the key aspects of the formation of the armed forces of the russian federation is the involvement of foreign nationals. The russian authorities employ an extensive system for recruiting foreigners and facilitating their participation in military operations.

The primary focus is placed on countries with low income levels and relatively favourable attitudes towards russia. Foreign recruits are offered high remuneration, service in rear areas, and the prospect of obtaining russian citizenship. The most active recruitment efforts are conducted in Syria, India, Nepal, as well as in countries of Africa and Central Asia. In addition, there is confirmed evidence of the participation of citizens of North Korea in the war against Ukraine on the side of

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

russia.

According to Euromaidan Press, in 2024 up to 10,000 Nepalese citizens and up to 15,000 North Korean soldiers took part in hostilities [11]. Recruitment relies on both economic incentives and coercion; however, the effectiveness of such units remains low due to language barriers and inadequate training [27].

According to intelligence assessments from South Korea and the United States, the DPRK deployed between 10,000 and 12,000 military personnel, including special units, who participated in combat operations in the Kursk region. On 26 April 2025, the Chief of the General Staff of the russian federation, Valery Gerasimov, officially acknowledged their participation in hostilities in the region, and on 27 April 2025, Pyongyang confirmed the deployment, stating that it had been carried out under a mutual defence agreement signed with russia in June 2024 [24]. Thus, North Korea is actively involved in the war, and it is assumed that it may expand its military presence, although the scale and timing of further deployments remain uncertain.




Figure 2. The dynamics of the increasing number of citizens conscripted for compulsory military service in the russian federation

In March 2024, a scheme involving the forced recruitment of Indian citizens was uncovered, whereby individuals were lured with offers of education at private russian universities and subsequently sent to the front. It is estimated that at least 180 Indian nationals were affected by this scheme.

A typical method of recruiting foreign nationals involves offering employment in the rear of the russian army, followed by reassignment to frontline positions. For instance, in 2023 more than 100 Indian citizens signed contracts with the russian army. A similar scheme was used to recruit Nepalese citizens, and in early 2024 the Nepalese authorities began countering this practice by suspending the issuance of work visas to russia following reports of the deaths of 10 Nepalese nationals.

Furthermore, in September 2023, Cuban authorities dismantled a network engaged in recruiting Cuban citizens. It is likely that some Cubans were incorporated into the 106th Airborne Division. In total, more than one hundred Cuban nationals signed contracts with the russian army.

At the same time, the russian mobilisation system faces a number of constraints:

Demographic crisis: The decline in the working-age population and population ageing reduce

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

the available reserve [6].

Economic sanctions: According to IMF data, russia's GDP declined by 3.5% in 2023–2024, limiting military financing [7].

Corruption: Reports of equipment shortages and embezzlement of funds are systemic [23].

Social demotivation: While the repressive apparatus suppresses dissent, low public trust in the authorities reduces the effectiveness of voluntary recruitment [26].

These constraints resemble the experience of the Soviet Union during the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989), when economic difficulties and public dissatisfaction, combined with the large-scale deployment of both professional and conscripted personnel, ultimately led to a gradual depletion of resources [30].

The findings of the study indicate that the russian mobilisation system, despite its centralisation and reliance on a repressive apparatus, remains vulnerable due to demographic, economic, and organisational constraints. These conclusions provide a foundation for forecasting russia's mobilisation capabilities for the period 2025–2026, which will be presented in the following section.

Forecast for 2025–2026

The findings presented in the previous section have identified both the strengths and weaknesses of the russian mobilisation system, enabling an assessment of its capabilities in the medium-term perspective (2025–2026).

This forecast is based on qualitative scenario analysis, taking into account demographic, economic, political, and military factors, as well as historical precedents. Much like a large-scale mechanism operating at the limits of its capacity, the russian mobilisation system exhibits signs of strain, yet retains the potential to sustain the war effort through totalitarian control and adaptive responses to emerging challenges.

In the short term, russia is likely to continue relying on contract service and the coercive involvement of conscripts, as the declaration of full mobilisation could trigger significant public discontent and mass emigration. Financial incentives will remain a key recruitment tool, although their effectiveness is declining due to economic constraints and decreasing public willingness to engage in military service. Recruitment of foreign nationals is also likely to intensify, particularly in countries demonstrating favourable attitudes towards russia, such as North Korea, where participation of military personnel in hostilities against Ukraine has already been confirmed. At the same time, forced mobilisation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine will continue, although its potential remains limited due to local resistance, logistical challenges, and broader demographic and economic constraints.

Demographic and Economic Constraints

The demographic crisis remains a key factor constraining russia's mobilisation potential. According to forecasts by Rosstat, the working-age population is expected to decline by approximately 10% by 2030, amounting to a reduction of around 8 million individuals aged 15–59 [6]. High losses in Ukraine, which, according to estimates by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, reached 1,052,190 killed and wounded as of July 2025, further exacerbate this pressure [7]. For example, data from ISW indicate that russia loses on average 1,251 military personnel per day in 2025, exceeding the rate of replenishment through conscription and contract service [7]. This creates a deficit of human resources, particularly among qualified specialists such as drone operators and artillery personnel.

In the medium term (2025–2026), russia may face increasing difficulties in maintaining troop numbers due to declining willingness among citizens to serve in the military and growing social tensions associated with sustained high casualty rates. Economic sanctions and logistical constraints will further complicate the provision and sustainment of the armed forces, potentially forcing the kremlin to consider more radical measures, such as full mobilisation or an expansion of the conscription age. However, such steps are likely to intensify internal instability, thereby limiting their

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

practical implementation.

Economic sanctions, which, according to the International Monetary Fund, resulted in a 3.5% decline in russia's GDP in 2023–2024, will continue to constrain military financing [8]. War expenditures, estimated at USD 250 billion by the end of 2024, impose additional pressure on the economy, which, much like a vessel in a storm, remains afloat largely due to energy exports [9]. However, the termination of russian gas transit through Ukraine after 1 January 2025, as noted by the Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal, may further reduce russia's revenues, thereby limiting its capacity to finance contract payments or procure military equipment [22].

Political and Social Factors

putin's totalitarian regime, reinforced by repressive legislation such as the 2022 amendments to the criminal code of the russian federation, effectively suppresses any form of dissent [10]. However, low public motivation remains a significant challenge. According to The moscow Times, in 2024 only 20% of contract soldiers signed agreements voluntarily, while the remainder were subjected to economic or administrative pressure [27]. In 2025–2026, russia is likely to continue employing propaganda campaigns, such as the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland", declared by putin for 2025, in order to further militarise society [22]. This approach resembles the experience of Nazi Germany in 1943–1945, when "total war" campaigns sought to mobilise the population despite economic exhaustion, ultimately resulting in reduced combat effectiveness due to insufficient training and resources [28].

Mechanisms of Force Generation

Mobilisation in the occupied territories. Forced mobilisation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine is expected to continue, although its scale will gradually decline due to local resistance and the depletion of human resources. According to Human Rights Watch, in 2024 russia mobilised up to 100,000 individuals in the so-called DPR and LPR, most of whom were assigned to unskilled tasks, thereby reducing their operational effectiveness [26]. In 2025–2026, russia may intensify repressive measures to recruit additional personnel; however, this could provoke local uprisings similar to those observed in Kherson in 2022 [11].

Partial mobilisation. russia will likely continue its policy of partial mobilisation, as full mobilisation could trigger social instability even under repressive conditions. According to Forbes Ukraine, the current rate of losses allows russia to sustain its reserve until 2032, but only under the condition of recruiting 200,000–300,000 personnel annually [12]. In 2025–2026, russia may expand conscription through the use of electronic summonses and automated databases, simplifying the process but failing to address the issue of inadequate training among recruits [14].

Contract service. Contract service will remain the primary source of force replenishment; however, its effectiveness is expected to decline due to economic constraints. A reduction in financial incentives caused by budgetary pressures will likely lead to a decrease in voluntary enlistment. According to RAND, in 2024 russia already faced a shortage of contract soldiers in central regions, prompting increased recruitment from economically disadvantaged areas such as Dagestan and Chechnya [10]. This trend is likely to persist.

Recruitment of foreign nationals. russia will continue to recruit foreign nationals, particularly from North Korea, Nepal, and Central Asian states. According to Reuters, in 2025 russia may recruit up to 20,000 foreign fighters; however, their limited training and low motivation will constrain their effectiveness [28]. For instance, North Korean units involved in the war against Ukraine have demonstrated low combat effectiveness due to language barriers and poor coordination [7].

Development Scenarios

Baseline scenario (most probable): russia will continue its hybrid mobilisation model, combining partial conscription, contract service, and recruitment of foreign nationals. It is estimated that 150,000–200,000 personnel may be recruited annually, which would allow the continuation of current levels of combat operations but would not enable major breakthroughs due to insufficient

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

training and logistical constraints. Demographic decline and economic sanctions will gradually weaken the system.

Pessimistic scenario: in the event of significant successes by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, such as the liberation of key territories (e.g., the Kursk operation of 2024), russia may declare full mobilisation. This could enable the recruitment of up to 500,000 personnel; however, it would likely trigger economic collapse and internal instability, similar to the crisis experienced by the Soviet Union during the Afghan War [30].

Optimistic scenario (for Ukraine): intensified sanctions, reduced energy exports, and increased resistance in the occupied territories may force russia to reduce mobilisation to approximately 100,000 personnel annually, thereby rendering its armed forces more vulnerable to Ukrainian counteroffensives.

The historical example of Japan's mobilisation during the Second World War (1941–1945) illustrates how economic constraints and sustained losses can undermine mobilisation capacity. Despite mass conscription and societal militarisation, Japan faced shortages of resources and trained personnel, ultimately leading to defeat [32]. Similar challenges may confront russia if economic pressure and battlefield losses continue to increase.

The forecast indicates that russia is capable of sustaining the war against Ukraine until 2026; however, its mobilisation system is approaching its limits due to demographic, economic, political, and social factors. These findings provide a basis for Ukraine's strategic planning, which will be examined in detail in the following section.

Conclusion

The analysis of russia's mobilisation resources in the context of the large-scale war against Ukraine, conducted in this study, has achieved its objective: a systematic examination of the organisation, structure, and force-generation mechanisms of russian armed forces, as well as the development of a foresight assessment for 2025–2026.

The findings, based on open sources, allow for the formulation of key conclusions that correspond to the study's objectives and possess practical significance for Ukraine's strategic defence planning.

Firstly, the organisation of mobilisation in russia is characterised by a centralised approach, relying on a repressive apparatus and legislative framework, including Federal Law No. 31-FZ and amendments to the criminal code of the russian federation [13, 10]. The aggressor state possesses significant mobilisation potential (20–25 million individuals); however, economic, logistical, and organisational constraints complicate its implementation. This system ensures a relatively stable replenishment of forces but suffers from bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. For instance, logistical and equipment challenges observed during the 2022 partial mobilisation remain relevant in 2025, thereby reducing unit combat effectiveness [15, 26].

Secondly, the structure of russia's mobilisation resource is constrained by the demographic crisis and economic sanctions. The working-age population is projected by Rosstat to decline by 10% by 2030, and combined with losses in Ukraine (over 1 million personnel as of July 2025), this creates a significant human resource deficit [6, 7]. This situation resembles the historical example of Japan during the Second World War, where resource depletion led to reduced military effectiveness [32]. For Ukraine, this presents opportunities for targeted actions to further weaken russian reserves.

Thirdly, the mechanisms for force generation—partial mobilisation, contract service, recruitment of foreign nationals, and forced conscription in the occupied territories—demonstrate mixed effectiveness. The 2022 partial mobilisation enabled the conscription of more than 300,000 individuals into the russian armed forces but also revealed systemic issues, provoking social discontent and the emigration of approximately 500,000 citizens. In other words, despite ambitious plans (300,000 individuals in 2022), russia faced evasion and organisational challenges [15].

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

Simultaneously, in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, about 220,000 people were mobilised by July 2022, partially compensating for losses but failing to fully address the replenishment of units that had suffered combat casualties.

To mitigate social tension, russia has intensified the recruitment of contract soldiers, offering high payments (ranging from 300,000 to 2,600,000 rubles) and various benefits, while also forcibly mobilising conscripts, prisoners, and debtors. The russian authorities employ multiple networks to recruit foreign nationals from low-income countries (Syria, India, Nepal, Cuba, DPRK) for subsequent participation in the war.

Although contract service recruits up to 100,000 individuals annually, it remains dependent on economic incentives, which have become less accessible due to sanctions [10, 27]. The recruitment of foreign nationals, such as North Korean or Nepali mercenaries, does not resolve issues related to training quality [28]. The most problematic mechanism is forced conscription in the occupied territories, which provokes resistance and reduces unit combat effectiveness [11, 29]. These vulnerabilities represent leverage points that Ukraine can exploit, for instance through information campaigns to demoralise recruits or by supporting local resistance.

russia employs a broad spectrum of methods to maintain its armed forces, but systemic problems, social discontent, and high casualties complicate the maintenance of necessary troop levels, forcing reliance on coercive and deceptive recruitment practices.

Since 2022, there has been a trend of increased conscription for compulsory military service (up to 160,000 individuals by spring 2025), an increase of the conscription age to 30, the introduction of electronic summons, and restrictions on draft evaders. Various methods of influence are applied to conscripts, compelling them to sign contracts. Despite these measures, since late 2024, russia has faced difficulties in meeting recruitment quotas, as citizens are increasingly reluctant to participate in the war, and monthly conscription often fails to offset losses.

Foresight for 2025–2026 indicates a likely continuation of the hybrid mobilisation model, which would enable russia to recruit 150,000–200,000 individuals annually, but with gradually declining efficiency due to economic and demographic constraints [12]. In the event of intensified sanctions or successes by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, such as the Kursk operation in 2024, russia might resort to full mobilisation, but this would risk economic collapse and internal instability, similar to the USSR's crisis during the Afghan war [30]. For Ukraine, this underscores the need to strengthen pressure on russia's logistical chains and to use diplomatic instruments to isolate its economy.

Based on these findings, Ukraine can develop strategies that maximise the impact on the vulnerabilities of russia's mobilisation system.

Recommendations

Intensify information campaigns to create conditions for the demoralisation of russian recruits and to support resistance in the occupied territories, as observed in Kherson in 2022 [11].

Focus military efforts on the destruction of logistics hubs, depots, and enterprises involved in arms production, thereby complicating the supply of mobilised units [25].

Enhance diplomatic efforts to strengthen sanctions, particularly targeting russia's energy sector, which would reduce its financial capacity for mobilisation [8].

These findings emphasise that, despite its apparent strength, russia's mobilisation system is vulnerable to systematic pressure. For Ukraine, which is defending its sovereignty, understanding these vulnerabilities is not merely a theoretical achievement but also a practical instrument for achieving victory. As the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu noted in his famous treatise The Art of War, obtaining a strategic advantage over an adversary requires knowledge of their weaknesses.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no competing interests regarding the subject of this article.

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

References

1. Bertalanffy, L. (1974). General system theory: Critical overview. In Problems of methodology of systemic research (pp. 12–35). Naukova Dumka.
2. President of the russian federation. (2022). On the announcement of partial mobilisation in the russian federation." (647/2022). http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/69391
3. Harward, C., Wolkov, N., Mappes, G., Runkel, W., & Barros, G. (2024, Dec. 22). russian offensive campaign assessment. Institute for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2024
4. Posts on platform X regarding the reform of the conscription system in russia. (2025, July). Various authors. https://x.com
5. Bell, D. A. (2007). The first total war: Napoleon's Europe and the birth of warfare as we know it. Houghton Mifflin.
6. Forecast of demographic development of the russian federation until 2030. Rosstat. (n.d.). https://rosstat.gov.ru/population/demography
7. russia's war against Ukraine. All news at this time. (2025, July 30). Radio Svoboda. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/rosiya-ukrayina-zahroza-viyny/31703318/lbl0lbi420651.html
8. Siluanov, A. (2024, Oct. 25). IMFC statement by Anton Siluanov, Minister of Finance, russian federation. International Monetary Fund. https://meetings.imf.org/-/media/AMSM/Files/AM2024/IMFC/Russia.ashx
9. russian invasion of Ukraine. In Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
10. Federal Law of the russian federation "On amendments to the Criminal Code of the russian federation" No. 32-FZ (2022, March 3). http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/67890
11. Intel: russia intensifies forced mobilisation in occupied territories of Ukraine. (2024, Jan. 9). Euromaidan Press. https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/01/09/intel-russia-intensifies-forced-mobilisation-in-occupied-territories-of-ukraine/
12. Analysis of losses of the russian army and their impact on mobilisation potential. (2024). Forbes Ukraine. https://forbes.ua/war-in-ukraine
13. Federal Law of the russian federation "On mobilisation preparation and mobilisation in the Russian Federation." No. 31-FZ (1997, Febr. 26). http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_13551/
14. Sudimykh i ogranichenno godnykh na front [Convicted and limited fit to the front] [Post on X]. (2023, May 31). Mobilizationews [@mobilizationews]. https://x.com/mobilizationews/status/1663930799148740610
15. "Zhizn' otdat', poluchit' uvech'ya". Budet li v Rossii novaya mobilizatsiya? ["Give life, get injuries". Will there be a new mobilisation in russia?]. (2023, Sept. 26). BBC News russian. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c4nvxd54931o
16. Vishnevsky, A. (2023). Demographic challenges in russia: 2020–2030. Higher School of Economics.
17. Gressel, G. (2024, Jan. 18). Beyond the counter-offensive: Attrition, stalemate, and the future of the war in Ukraine. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/beyond-the-counter-offensive-attrition-stalemate-and-the-future-of-the-war-in-ukraine/
18. Assault detachments of Zapad Group complete combat training in rear area. (2025, July 18). Ministry of Defence of the russian federation. https://eng.mil.ru/news/7f137eaf-a4e5-400f-a425-b9724716d6d7
19. russia's General Staff reports on 133,000 conscripts drafted in 2024 fall campaign. (2024). TASS. https://tass.com/defense/1936783

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

20. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. (2025, July). Information materials. https://ivms.mil.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/08.07.-14.07.2025.pdf
21. Lyall, J. (2020). Chechnya: russia's forgotten war. Cambridge University Press.
22. Aksenov, P. (2023, Dec. 14). putin nazval chislennost' voyuyushchey v Ukraine armii. O chem govoryat eti tsifry? [putin named the size of the army fighting in Ukraine. What do these figures say?]. BBC News russian. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cpw3qq6j0y2o
23. russia mobilised over 300,000 people in occupied Donetsk, report reveals. (2024, Oct. 2). NV the new voice of Ukraine. https://english.nv.ua/nation/russia-mobilised-over-300-000-people-in-occupied-donetsk-since-invasion-says-new-report-50455331.html
24. Why did the russian federation officially recognise the participation of DPRK troops in the war. Center for Countering Disinformation. (n.d.). https://cpd.gov.ua/international-direction/yevropa/dlya-chogo-rf-oficzijno-vyznala-uchast-vijsk-kndr-u-vijni
25. russia's war against Ukraine. Resistance. All news at this time. (2024, Dec. 23). Radio Svoboda. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/rosiya-ukrayina-zahroza-viyny/31703318.html
26. In Dagestan, locals fight police on day two of mass protests against mobilisation. (2022, Sept. 26). Meduza. https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/09/26/in-dagestan-locals-fight-police-on-day-two-of-mass-protests-against-mobilization
27. russian regions hike military sign-up payments in bid to boost manpower for Ukraine war. (2024, July 30). The moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/07/30/russian-regions-hike-military-sign-up-payments-in-bid-to-boost-manpower-for-ukraine-war-a85864
28. putin offers citizenship to foreigners who fight for russia. (2024, Jan. 4). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-offers-citizenship-foreigners-who-fight-russia-2024-01-04/
29. russia forces Ukrainians in occupied areas into military. (2023, Dec. 20). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/20/russia-forces-ukrainians-occupied-areas-military
30. Grau, L. W. (2000). The Soviet-Afghan war: How a superpower fought and lost. University Press of Kansas.
31. Tooze, A. (2006). The wages of destruction: The making and breaking of the Nazi economy. Penguin Books.
32. Drea, E. J. (2009). Japan's imperial army: Its rise and fall, 1853–1945. University Press of Kansas.

Форсайт мобілізаційного потенціалу російської федерації в умовах війни проти України: структура, механізми та сценарії розвитку на 2025–2026 роки

Володимир Гурковський
доктор наук з державного управління, професор
начальник відділу
Центральний науково-дослідний інститут Збройних Сил України
03049, проспект Повітряних Сил, 28 Б, Київ, Україна
e-mail: volodymyrgurkovskyi@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-2021-5204

Роберт Ованесян
провідний науковий співробітник
Центральний науково-дослідний інститут Збройних Сил України
03049, проспект Повітряних Сил, 28 Б, Київ, Україна
e-mail: bober1609@gmail.com
ORCID: 0009-0008-6761-2059

The Central Research institute
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

Денис Калашников
науковий співробітник
Центральний науково-дослідний інститут Збройних Сил України
03049, проспект Повітряних Сил, 28 Б, Київ, Україна
e-mail: kalash179@gmail.com
ORCID: 0009-0003-4625-6191

Андрій Цибізов
кандидат військових наук, старший дослідник
старший науковий співробітник
Центральний науково-дослідний інститут Збройних Сил України
03049, проспект Повітряних Сил, 28 Б, Київ, Україна
e-mail: Enigma_007@ukr.net
ORCID: 0000-0001-6555-5005

Карел Недбалек
доктор юридичних наук, професор
Європейський професійний докторат
Злін, Чеська Республіка
e-mail: slusovice@motelgolg.cz
ORCID: 0000-0002-1010-2460

Анотація. Актуальність дослідження зумовлена необхідністю передбачити, як рф компенсуватиме свої втрати в умовах затяжної війни. Наприклад, аналіз відкритих джерел від липня 2025 року вказує на плани росії щодо розширення призову через реформи військової адміністрації, що може змінити динаміку війни. Для України це означає потребу в точних даних і прогнозах, щоб ефективно розподіляти власні ресурси. Стаття присвячена системному аналізу та форсайту мобілізаційного потенціалу російської федерації в умовах широкомасштабної війни проти України. Дослідження розкриває структуру, механізми комплектування військ і обмеження російської мобілізаційної системи, пропонуючи прогноз її розвитку на 2025–2026 роки. Мета статті – провести системний аналіз організації мобілізаційного ресурсу росії в умовах війни проти України та розробити прогноз її мобілізаційних можливостей на 2025–2026 роки. У статті охарактеризовано структуру та особливості мобілізаційного ресурсу росії, включаючи законодавчу базу та механізми комплектування; досліджено специфіку часткової мобілізації, контрактної служби, вербування іноземців і примусового призову на окупованих територіях; виявлено ключові обмеження системи на основі верифікованих даних; сформульовано прогноз на основі сучасних трендів та історичних прикладів і запропоновано висновки, які сприятимуть стратегічному плануванню оборони України. Системний підхід є основою дослідження, оскільки мобілізація в росії являє собою складну систему, що охоплює законодавчу базу, адміністративні механізми, соціально-економічні умови та ідеологічний апарат. Для аналізу використано модель загальної теорії систем Людвіга фон Берталанфі, яка розглядає систему як сукупність взаємопов'язаних елементів, де зміна одного компонента, наприклад, демографічного резерву, впливає на інші, такі як військова ефективність чи економічна стабільність. На основі емпіричних і теоретичних методів, включаючи аналіз офіційних документів, звітів ISW, RAND, Human Rights Watch, інших відкритих джерел, встановлено, що мобілізація в росії спирається на централізовану репресивну систему, але стикається з демографічною кризою (скорочення працездатного населення на 10% до 2030 року), економічними санкціями (зменшення ВВП на 3,5% у 2023–2024 роках) і організаційними

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No.1 (2026)

проблемами (корупція, брак спорядження). Часткова мобілізація, контрактна служба, вербування іноземців (зокрема з Північної Кореї та Непалу) та примусовий призов на окупованих територіях України є ключовими механізмами, але їхня ефективність знижується через низьку підготовку та спротив. Прогноз на 2025–2026 роки передбачає продовження гібридної мобілізації (150–200 тис. осіб щорічно), але з ризиком виснаження через економічні та соціальні обмеження. Історичні приклади (Японія 1941–1945, срср в Афганістані) підкреслюють вразливість подібних систем. Для України рекомендуються інформаційні операції, удари по логістиці та посилення санкцій. Дослідження пропонує стратегічні точки важеля для ослаблення ворога, що має критичне значення для оборони держави.

Ключові слова: мобілізаційний ресурс, російська федерація, мобілізаційний потенціал, російсько-українська війна, форсайт, часткова мобілізація, контрактна служба, окуповані території, демографічна криза, економічні санкції, стратегічне планування.