National Resilience and National Resistance - the Cornerstones of Ukraine's Steadfastness: Following the russian-Ukrainian War Lessons

Ivan Havryliuk
Candidate of Military Sciences, Senior Researcher
First Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine
e-mail: ivan_havryliuk@ukr.net,
ORCID: 0000-0002-3514-0738

Vasyl Cherep
Candidate of Military Sciences, Senior Researcher
Chief of the Scientific and Research Directorate
The Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
03049, Povitrianykh Syl avenue, 28 B, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: vasya.cherep1976@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-3305-4518

The Central Research institute
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

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Volodymyr Didichenko
Candidate of Military Sciences, Senior Research Fellow
The Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
03049, Povitrianykh Syl avenue, 28 B, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: DVP1951@ukr.net
ORCID: 0000-0002-0440-2299

Oleksandr Kin
candidate of technical sciences, senior research fellow
associate professor
Hennadiy Udovenko Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
01001, m. Kyiv, str. Velika Zhytomyrska, 2
email: cubalibre1972@ukr.net
ORCID: 0009-0001-2196-7515

Abstract. The article contains a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of national resilience and national resistance in Ukraine as key factors underpinning the country's steadfastness during the ongoing russian-Ukrainian war, from 2014 to 2025. National resilience is defined as the capacity of Ukrainian society and state institutions to effectively resist aggression, maintain stability under critical conditions, and rapidly adapt to the challenges posed by war. National resistance is viewed in the article as a multi-layered process of opposition, incorporating both military elements (the Armed Forces of Ukraine, territorial defence, and the partisan movement) and a wide array of civilian initiatives (volunteering, information warfare, and cultural resistance). To deepen the exploration of the topic, the article draws on examples from various Ukrainian regions that have been particularly prominent in the struggle against the aggressor: the defence of Kyiv in February–March 2022, peaceful and partisan resistance to occupation in Kherson, and the prolonged defence of Donbas. A key aspect is the comparative analysis of the Ukrainian experience alongside international practices for ensuring national resilience in the face of external threats, particularly the experiences of Israel and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). The analysis demonstrates that the unity of Ukrainian society, the consolidation of national identity, widespread citizen participation in resistance, and extensive international support were crucial in ensuring that Ukraine not only withstood aggression but also showcased a unique capacity for recovery and continued struggle. Based on this analysis, practical recommendations are provided for strengthening national resilience and reinforcing Ukraine's national resistance framework moving forward.

The article materials can be used by government bodies, military structures, educational and research institutions for the development of strategic documents and programmes on national security and defence, personnel training, and educating citizens on actions to take in crisis situations.

Promising areas for further research include the study of civil society's role in Ukraine's post-war reconstruction, the improvement of territorial defence, as well as the examination of the psychological aspects of national resilience in the context of prolonged military conflicts.

Key words: national resilience; national resistance; russian-Ukrainian war; volunteer movement; territorial defence; cultural resistance; steadfastness.

Introduction

The ongoing russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014, has posed an unprecedented

challenge to Ukrainian society and statehood. The concept of "national resilience" refers to the ability of the state and society to effectively resist threats of any origin or nature, adapt to changes in the security environment, maintain stable functioning, and rapidly restore equilibrium after crises [1]. In contrast, national resistance covers all forms of opposition to the aggressor – from armed struggle to mass civil disobedience [2]. In the Ukrainian context, these phenomena gained particular significance after the war's onset in 2014, when the annexation of Crimea and the fighting in Donbas mobilised Ukrainians to defend their country. By 2014, a powerful volunteer movement had emerged, with volunteer battalions formed (at least 44 units participated in the defence of the east), manifesting the people's resistance to aggression [3]. At the same time, the state began security and defence sector reforms aimed at enhancing the military's combat readiness and integrating volunteers into official military structures.

russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a new phase in testing national resilience. Both the Ukrainian state and society demonstrated exceptional cohesion and readiness for total resistance. In late 2022, President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the "formula for national resilience" during the war – the continuity of state functioning, societal resilience, and dependable international support – emphasising that for the first time in many centuries, Ukraine possesses all these components simultaneously [4]. Indeed, in the early days of the invasion, Ukrainians flocked to the territorial defence forces, engaged in volunteer activities, and international partners rallied to provide assistance. Thus, national resilience (the ability to withstand the blow and continue functioning) and national resistance (the ability to actively resist the enemy) became key factors defining Ukraine's invincibility. The purpose of this article is to explore the manifestations and factors of Ukraine's national resilience and resistance from 2014 to 2025 and to analyse their role in ensuring the state's endurance during wartime. To achieve this, both internal aspects (military and civil resistance within the country) and external aspects (international support, parallels with other countries' experiences) are examined.

Methodological Framework

The research methodology combines qualitative content analysis of documents and quantitative data with an interdisciplinary approach. The theoretical foundation draws on the concepts of societal resilience and people's defence. Specifically, societal resilience is defined as the ability of a complex social system to effectively respond to external and internal threats, adapt to sudden security changes, ensure continuous functioning during crises, and quickly return to a level not lower than pre-war conditions [4]. The concept of national resistance is examined in the context of Ukrainian realities: it involves the consolidated efforts of the state and citizens to repel aggression, which has been formalised with the adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On the Fundamentals of National Resistance" No. 1702-IX (in force since 2022) [2].

The study spans the period from the start of the war in 2014 to early 2025, enabling the tracking of resilience and resistance dynamics. A historical-chronological method is employed to highlight key events (such as the defence of Donetsk Airport in 2014–2015, the battles for Kyiv in 2022, and the de-occupation of Kherson in 2022) and society's response to them. For a detailed analysis, three regions have been selected: Kyiv (the capital, which successfully repelled the enemy's advance), Kherson (the regional centre that endured occupation and was liberated, demonstrating civilian resistance), and Donbas (a region marked by prolonged conflict and heroic defence). Figure 1 illustrates the geographical location of these regions in Ukraine, which are discussed in the article.

In addition to analysing the Ukrainian experience, a comparative method has been applied, drawing parallels with countries that have endured prolonged conflicts or faced constant military threats. Specifically, examples from Israel and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) are

considered, as these nations have built comprehensive defence and societal resilience systems in response to external threats. This approach enables a comparison of Ukrainian national resilience and resistance methods with international practices, highlighting both common features and unique aspects.

The empirical basis for this work relies on open sources: official data from Ukrainian state bodies (legislative acts, official statements, reports), results from sociological surveys on public sentiment during the war, analytical materials from both domestic and international researchers, and media reports. Authoritative sources and statistics have been used to verify the factual data. For instance, data from the Ministry of Culture on the number of destroyed cultural heritage sites and research on Ukrainian volunteer activity have been utilised [5]. Information on the experiences of Israel and the Baltic States has been sourced from analytical reports, military expert commentary, and official publications (e.g., materials from the RAND Corporation on the concept of total defence in Lithuania) [6]. This comprehensive approach provides a detailed overview of the phenomena of resilience and resistance.



Figure 1. The map of Ukraine with highlighted key regions
(Kyiv, Kherson, Donbas)

Results and Discussions

National resilience and resistance development (2014–2021). The early stages of the war saw a significant rise in the role of civil society in the country's defence. Following the Maidan events and the onset of russia's aggression in the east in 2014, the state found itself unprepared for the challenges ahead: the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) were limited in both numbers and resources. In response, tens of thousands of citizens joined volunteer formations and provided military support through volunteer efforts [7]. Spontaneously formed volunteer battalions went to the front, holding the enemy at bay in Donbas. By September 2014, at least 44 volunteer battalions had participated in the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), ranging from the People's Militia of Kyiv to

units formed by local communities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Figure 2) [3]



Figure 2. Volunteer battalions's subordination within Ukraine's Forces

The 2014–2015 volunteer movement laid the foundation for long-term societal resilience. Researchers suggest that the active civic stance – Ukrainians' willingness to self-organise and assist one another – became one of the most effective mechanisms for adapting society to the challenges of a prolonged conflict (Figure 3) [8].

During this period, the state learned from its initial defeats and began reforming the security and defence sector: defence funding was increased, a rotation and training system was established, and volunteer units integrated (most battalions joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine or the National Guard). By 2021, the combat readiness of the Ukrainian army had significantly improved, and society was generally better prepared for a potential new assault. Additionally, the 2014 resistance experience prompted the creation of a legislative framework for comprehensive defence. It became clear that the army alone could not effectively protect the country without popular support. This led to the development of the territorial defence concept and resistance movement, which was later enshrined in the National Resistance Law.

A key aspect of national resilience during this period was the consolidation of Ukrainian identity and information resistance to the aggressor. Since 2014, a consensus has developed in Ukrainian media and public opinion regarding the fight against russian propaganda. A notable example is the emergence of initiatives such as the "Informational Resistance" group, established by enthusiasts led by Dmytro Tymchuk, which, from spring 2014, exposed fake news and swiftly informed the public about the real situation at the front [9]. This contributed to raising public awareness and building immunity against disinformation. Simultaneously, a gradual cultural shift occurred: more people began using Ukrainian in daily life and rejected the imposed russian narratives. Social media studies revealed a long-term trend of rejecting the russian language, which intensified significantly after 2014 (Figure 4). [5].




Figure 3. The number of Ukrainian volunteers




Figure 4. Statistical data on the use of Ukrainian and Russian languages

This cultural and informational resistance became an essential part of national resilience, uniting society around the ideas of independence and sovereignty.

Summarising the 2014–2021 experience, it can be said that Ukraine gradually built resilience potential: military (defence capability improvements), social (citizen solidarity, volunteering), political (elite unity in the face of external threats), and economic (restructuring the economy for wartime needs). Although the conflict in Donbas remained positional and localised, Ukrainian society adapted to prolonged war, minimising panic and growing accustomed to constant risks. This was especially evident in the residents of frontline areas in Donetsk and Luhansk, who demonstrated resilience for years despite shelling and economic hardship. A reserve strength was thus developed, which proved crucial at the critical moment – in early 2022

The 2022 full-scale invasion: the peak of national resilience. On 24 February 2022, russia launched a large-scale assault across nearly all fronts, aiming to swiftly break through Ukraine's defences. However, the blitzkrieg plan largely failed due to Ukraine's highly unified response. During the war's initial phase, military resistance emerged: the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), supported by reservists and volunteers, engaged in fierce defensive battles. The defence of Kyiv – the Battle of Kyiv (February–March 2022) – proved especially pivotal. The Ukrainian army, with the backing of territorial defence forces and ordinary Kyiv residents, successfully halted superior enemy forces near Bucha, Irpin, and on the approaches to Kyiv. During these days, thousands of Kyiv residents participated in fortifying the city: building barricades, preparing Molotov cocktails, and guarding self-defence units. The state distributed over 18,000 rifles to civilians for the capital's defence [7]. On the streets, civilians with rifles could be seen patrolling areas (as shown in Figure 5, where Kyiv volunteers, mainly local residents, are depicted in the first days of the invasion). Thanks to the widespread involvement of citizens in the defence, the enemy failed to execute its plan to capture Kyiv.



Figure 5. Armed civilian volunteers patrol the entrance to Kyiv, February 2022. (Source: Daniel Leal / AFP)

Alongside the military effort, a broad civilian resistance emerged. Millions of people across the country became involved in volunteer work: raising funds, weaving camouflage nets, preparing

food for the military, and hosting refugees. Volunteer activity reached unprecedented levels; in 2022, according to a charitable foundation, 86% of Ukrainians donated money or goods to support the army or those affected by the conflict, while one in three personally took part in volunteering (in comparison, only 5% of the population was involved in 2021) [10]. This surge in citizen participation in the resistance meant that virtually every family became part of the collective effort to bring victory closer.

One form of civilian resistance was information counteraction: Ukrainians widely reported enemy movements on social media, corrected artillery fire using special bots, and debunked fake news. In essence, every smartphone user became a scout or "information soldier". This greatly complicated the occupiers' operations, making them vulnerable even deep within their rear positions. For example, columns of military vehicles advancing towards Kyiv encountered resistance not only from the Armed Forces of Ukraine but also from local residents – they blocked roads, removed or altered city signposts to mislead the enemy [7]. The government openly supported such actions: Ukavtodor, in the war's early days, called for road signs to be removed and created the now-famous sign "Direction of movement…" with an obscene message to direct the enemy's route. This had not only a practical effect but also a psychological one – Ukrainians showed they were unafraid and ready to fight the enemy by all means.

In territories temporarily occupied by russian forces, Ukrainian resistance took the form of both partisan warfare and peaceful protests. A notable example is the occupation of Kherson (March–November 2022). Despite russian military control of the city, Kherson residents began peaceful protests with Ukrainian flags from the very first days, chanting pro-Ukrainian slogans in the central square [11]. On 5 March 2022, hundreds gathered in Kherson to protest against the occupation – unarmed citizens demonstrated that Kherson remained Ukrainian. Initially, the occupiers attempted to prevent large-scale protests, dispersing them with tear gas and shooting into the air. They later resorted to repression and the abduction of activists. In response, open protest transformed into underground forms. The "Yellow Ribbon" movement emerged, with participants discreetly posting pro-Ukrainian leaflets, yellow ribbons, and graffiti bearing the slogan "Kherson is Ukraine" throughout the city [11]. One such ribbon, drawn by Liliya Aleksandrova on a fence under the threat of capture by the occupiers, was later taken to Brussels after the liberation, serving as a symbol of people's resistance [12].

In addition to non-violent methods, partisans operated under occupation: small groups of brave Kherson residents gathered intelligence for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, sabotaged transport, and attacked enemy supply depots. Thanks to coordinated efforts – military and civilian alike – the Armed Forces of Ukraine successfully liberated Kherson in November 2022. Importantly, underground resistance continues in other occupied regions (parts of Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea), making the russian occupation highly unstable. As analysts note, unlike in 2014, the current resistance movement benefits from organisational support and infrastructure, underpinned by a legal framework [11], allowing more effective coordination.

National resilience was also demonstrated in Ukrainians' ability to withstand strikes on critical infrastructure. In autumn and winter 2022–2023, russia launched massive attacks on Ukraine's energy system, attempting to plunge the country into darkness and cold. During some periods, a significant portion of the population was without electricity for 8–12 hours a day, public transport in cities came to a halt, and heating was intermittent. However, both the government and society showed remarkable endurance. The government established a nationwide network of "Points of Invincibility" – specially equipped locations (tents, buildings) with generators, where people could warm up, charge their phones, and receive hot drinks.

As of the end of 2022, over 10,000 such points were operational, helping people better endure the energy crisis [13].



Figure 6. The Steadfastnss Point




Figure 7. The map of the Steadfastness in Ukraine

Citizens also adapted, purchasing portable generators, power banks, and setting up shelters for work and study. Despite the enemy's efforts to break the spirit of Ukrainians through terror tactics, these attempts failed – on the contrary, the blackout experience only strengthened society's confidence in its resilience. Ukrainians joked on social media, “We weren’t broken by rockets – so we certainly won’t be broken by power cuts.” This ability to maintain societal functions even amidst significant infrastructure destruction stands as a key example of national resilience. As the National Institute for Strategic Studies highlights, Ukrainian society as a whole demonstrated a high degree of unity, readiness to respond to any crises, and support for the state in national security matters [14].

The Ukrainian experience of resilience and resistance mirrors the practices of other countries constantly facing the threat of war. One frequently cited example is Israel. Since its founding, Israel has remained in a state of ongoing conflict or confrontation with its neighbours, which has led to the development of a unique resilience culture within its society (referred to in Hebrew as "bitachon," encompassing both security and trust). Israelis live under the continuous threat of missile strikes and terrorism, yet maintain strong social cohesion and psychological preparedness for emergencies. The country has established an extensive civil defence system: every settlement is equipped with bomb shelters, regular drills are held to teach the population how to respond during attacks, and there is a dedicated rear services unit – the Home Front Command. Under the auspices of this unit, Israel’s National Resilience Academy runs, where local authorities and agencies rehearse scenarios involving mass attacks and emergencies. According to Israeli experts, such training enables rapid mobilisation of resources and the coordination of actions under pressure in real-world situations [15].

Israel’s example illustrates that institutional preparation for defence – through mandatory military service, a reserve system, and security education programmes – significantly strengthens national resilience. Ukraine is following a similar path, developing territorial defence and enhancing cooperation between the military and the civilian population. A striking indicator of Israel’s societal resilience is its reaction to sudden crises. After the unexpected attack by Hamas militants on 7 October 2023, tens of thousands of Israelis volunteered to join the reserve army and defend their country. This mass mobilisation is similar to Ukraine’s response at the onset of the russian invasion. Both nations exemplify societies where a substantial portion of the population is willing to make great sacrifices to protect their homeland [16]. This demonstrates a high level of patriotism and trust in their armed forces, which form the cornerstone of national resilience.

Another relevant example is the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), which, sharing a border with russia and having experienced Soviet occupation, had long prepared for potential hybrid attacks and military threats. Following the events of 2014, the Baltic nations accelerated the implementation of the “total defence” concept, mobilising all available resources for national protection – military, economic, informational, and human [15]. Specifically, in 2016, Lithuania declared that in the event of an invasion, every citizen must be prepared to resist the aggressor, even after territory has been occupied. That same year, the Lithuanian government published a special guide for the public, Ką turime žinoti apie pasirengimą ekstremalioms situacijoms ar karui – essentially a manual for wartime conduct, covering methods of partisan resistance and civil disobedience [15]. This aligns with the Latin saying “Si vis pacem, para bellum,” which the Lithuanians have adapted to the modern age: “If you want peace, prepare for resistance.” Lithuanians anticipate that even if an aggressor manages to temporarily occupy part of the country, resistance will persist everywhere, making the occupation unbearable and ultimately doomed to fail [15]. All three Baltic republics have extensive organisations of reservists and volunteers: Estonia’s Kaitseliit (Defence League), Latvia’s Zemessardze (National Guard), and Lithuania’s Riflemen’s Union. These structures bring together tens of thousands of citizens who undergo military training

in their free time, so that in the event of war, they can collaborate with the regular army. Much like Ukraine's territorial defence, these units are highly familiar with the local terrain and rely on community support, making them extremely effective for defending their towns and villages. Analysis by European experts indicates that the Baltic states currently lead Europe in terms of readiness for hybrid threats, due to high societal awareness and swift political decisions to enhance resilience [17]. For instance, in 2023, Latvia established a Crisis Management Centre to monitor threats to the civilian population and coordinate government responses [17]. This move mirrors the Lithuanian model and facilitates rapid responses to a wide range of crises. Thus, the experience of the Baltic states confirms that preparing society for defence in peacetime, fostering patriotism, and having contingency plans for wartime are essential to ensuring that, in critical moments, a nation will not falter but will unite in resistance. Ukraine effectively experienced a similar scenario in 2022 – the mass self-organisation of the population was largely the result of the lessons learned since 2014 and a clear understanding of the threat's reality.

It is important to note that international support has greatly enhanced Ukraine's national resilience. Western countries provided substantial military and financial aid, allowing Ukraine to conserve its resources at a critical moment [4]. However, this assistance was made possible due to Ukraine's internal resilience – the determination shown by Ukrainians to fight. The world witnessed that the Ukrainian people did not falter in the initial weeks, which in turn motivated partners to provide long-term support. Therefore, national resilience also has an external dimension: it can generate trust and solidarity from other nations.

Conclusion

The conducted research allows several conclusions regarding the role of national resilience and resistance in ensuring Ukraine's steadfastness throughout the russian-Ukrainian war.

Firstly, it has been confirmed that national resilience is a multifaceted phenomenon, covering military, social, economic, informational, and cultural aspects. Ukrainian society demonstrated exceptional adaptability and cohesion in the face of a prolonged war: core state institutions were maintained, the economy continued to function, and citizens were prepared to endure temporary hardships for the sake of victory. Unity emerged as a key factor in resilience. The events of 2022 fully confirmed this: Ukrainians from diverse regions, languages, and faiths stood united against aggression, removing any hope for the kremlin of internal division or widespread collaboration.

Secondly, Ukraine's national resistance proved genuinely nationwide, taking both regular and irregular forms. The Armed Forces of Ukraine, which expanded several times in size due to mobilisation, became the central force in defence, but the contribution of non-military factors – territorial defence, partisans, and volunteers – significantly enhanced the resistance's effectiveness. The people of Ukraine wholeheartedly embraced the concept of total defence: everyone able to fight – with or without weapons – joined the struggle. This is exemplified by events in Kyiv and Kherson (where civilians played crucial roles in achieving military objectives), alongside the national mobilisation of volunteer initiatives [4]. Thus, the backbone of Ukraine's steadfastness was the synergy between the military and the efforts of the people. Furthermore, this phenomenon was not spontaneous: it resulted from years of work focused on fostering patriotism and citizens' self-organisation (particularly since 2014). As such, today's Ukrainian resistance is not a chaotic uprising, but rather, to a large extent, an organised movement with structures, coordination, and state backing.

Thirdly, the Ukrainian model of national resilience has gradually become a benchmark for other nations. Ukrainians' extraordinary commitment to defending their land, despite immense losses and destruction, has earned global respect. This moral and psychological resilience, underpinned by concrete actions (volunteering, information warfare, and adaptation to hardships), is

a unique phenomenon in modern history. Its roots lie in a strong national identity and a historical memory of the struggle for independence and democracy, which has fostered the development of an active civil society. Ukraine has shown that, even against a stronger enemy, successful resistance is possible if the state has the full backing of its citizens. This offers an important lesson for NATO allies and other partners: investment should not only focus on armament but also on strengthening societal resilience, as this ultimately determines a country's ability to effectively utilise military aid.

Finally, the Ukrainian experience has underscored the importance of international support in the national resilience equation. In today's world, no matter how resilient a nation may be, it cannot stand alone for long against a much stronger aggressor. Support from allies – military, economic, and sanctions pressure on the enemy – significantly broadens the scope of resilience. At the same time, Ukraine has become an example of mutual dependence: through its own courage, it has maintained global interest and assistance, which in turn has strengthened its position. Thus, national resilience in a globalised world has an external dimension: the ability to secure international support is also an indicator of a state's resilience.

To conclude, it is important to highlight that Ukraine's national resilience and resistance from 2014 to 2025 have played decisive roles in maintaining statehood. Without civic unity, the heroism of soldiers and volunteers, state governance flexibility, and partner support, Ukraine would not have withstood the pressure from an enemy with significantly greater resources. However, thanks to these factors, the Ukrainian people not only endured but continue to fight, inspiring the world with their example of steadfastness. Ukraine has become a symbol of resilience and courage for other nations that value freedom. Ukraine's experience demonstrates that when a nation collectively defends its land – from soldiers on the front line to farmers in the rear – it cannot be defeated by a swift strike. A prolonged struggle is won through endurance, adaptability, and belief in one's own strength, qualities that Ukrainians have fully shown. These lessons will prove significant not only for the war's conclusion but also for post-war recovery and future regional security**.**

Recommendations

Based on the analysis, the following recommendations are proposed to strengthen Ukraine's national resilience and resistance:

1. Institutionalising resistance practices: It is recommended to formalise the successful forms of cooperation between the state and its citizens, which emerged during the war, at both legislative and organisational levels. Priority should be given to further developing and integrating the territorial defence system, ensuring its ongoing readiness and sufficient funding. Efforts should be made to maintain citizens' motivation for voluntary participation in defence, through training programmes, military preparation, and benefits for members of the resistance movement. Establishing a coordination body under the National Security and Defence Council or the Cabinet of Ministers is advised, tasked with overseeing cooperation between the Armed Forces of Ukraine, volunteers, local authorities, and businesses in security and defence matters.

2. Strategic communications and education development: Strengthening the society's information resilience must remain a priority. Investment in strategic communications is essential—both internal (ensuring clear, truthful communication between the authorities and citizens during crises) and external (conveying Ukraine's narrative to the world). It is recommended to include courses on national security basics, media literacy, first aid, and emergency response in school and university curricula. This would cultivate a sense of responsibility in the youth regarding their role in upholding the country's resilience. Additionally, supporting independent media and initiatives aimed at combating disinformation should be encouraged to maintain a unified information front.

3. Supporting and coordinating the volunteer movement: Volunteers have proven their effectiveness and have become an integral part of Ukraine's defence capacity. The state should

establish systematic cooperation with major volunteer foundations and citizens' organisations. It is recommended to create a national "volunteer platform" to coordinate front-line needs with available civilian support, avoiding duplication of efforts and resources. Moreover, mechanisms for supporting volunteers and recognising their contributions (such as awards and state-level acknowledgements) should be implemented. Engaging citizens in volunteer work should remain a priority even post-war, especially in areas such as national reconstruction, reforms, and other post-war activities.

4. Strengthening economic and infrastructure resilience: Lessons from wartime should inform infrastructure development planning. Plans for backup supplies in critical industries (energy, communications, logistics) must be developed to address potential new threats. Diversifying energy sources and developing local generation networks will allow communities to function autonomously for a time. Strategic reserves of fuel, food, and medical supplies should be established across various regions. At the economic level, military economy support should continue, while preparing for post-war recovery, ensuring that rapid reconstruction becomes part of the national resilience in peacetime.

5. International cooperation and experience exchange: Ukraine should actively share its unique experience with its partners and adopt the best practices from other nations. Joint civil defence training exercises with allies should be initiated, and participation in NATO's resilience enhancement programmes should be pursued. Experience exchange centres on urban defence and population preparedness could be established in Ukrainian cities that successfully resisted the enemy (e.g., Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv). These steps would not only enhance Ukraine's readiness for future challenges but also elevate its standing as a leader in the field of popular resilience.

Implementing these recommendations will ensure that national resilience and resistance remain the cornerstones of Ukraine's security and development. The lessons learned at great cost during the war should be harnessed to build a strong, secure state capable of ensuring a peaceful and dignified life for its citizens. The steadfastness demonstrated by the Ukrainian people must evolve from a reactive crisis response into a proactive state-building strategy for the post-war period. This will stand as the greatest tribute to the heroes of the resistance and as a guarantee that Ukraine will never again find itself on the brink of survival.

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