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The Post-War Development Strategy of Ukraine: Assessment of the Global Security Environment

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Abstract. The structure of the Strategy for the Development of Ukraine draft in the Post-War Period envisages the implementation of five main stages, the justification of which in terms of structure and content has been described in previous studies. The first stage – the assessment of the strategic situation (the global security environment) – is decisive. It lays the foundation for ensuring Ukraine's security guarantees, primarily in the military sphere, in both the short and long term, based on the analysis of the transformation of security processes at the global and regional levels.

The relevance of the article is driven by the necessity of forming an adequate assessment and forecast of the further development of the current security environment at both the global and regional levels in order to implement the subsequent stages of the development of the draft Strategy for Ukraine's Development in the Post-War Period.

The aim of the article and its direction is to conduct an assessment of the current security environment and its impact on resolving the issue of providing military security guarantees to Ukraine.

The main results of the article is the consideration of possible formats for providing military security guarantees to Ukraine (bilateral, multilateral, and/or alliance-based), based on an analysis of the current security environment, with the aim of identifying and developing effective mechanisms for ending the russian-Ukrainian war with minimal losses.

The practical significance of the article's results lies in the attempt to assess the current strategic situation (the global security environment), which will contribute to the identification and formulation of Ukraine's long-term strategic development goals in the field of national security and defence, as well as in other areas of the state's living activity.

Keywords: military security guarantees, global security environment, russian-Ukrainian war, post-war development strategy of Ukraine.

Introduction

The full-scale armed aggression of the russian federation against Ukraine has continued for the fourth year with the aim of restoring the "russian empire" on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The plans of the putin regime have not changed – the destruction of Ukraine as an independent state, its return under russian geopolitical influence, the occupation of its territory, and the deprivation of the Ukrainian population of its national identity.

Taking into account the position of the United States regarding forcing the russian federation to cease fire and end the russian-Ukrainian war, China's expansionist plans concerning Taiwan and North Korea's concerning South Korea, Iran's nuclear ambitions in the Middle East, Israel's permanent war with Palestinian militants, and other negative factors in the transformation of the global security environment, the urgency of addressing the issue of adequately assessing the situation and forecasting its further development is increasing.

The development of criteria for such an assessment will contribute to determining and implementing priority and subsequent steps in all areas of the state's functioning and to enshrining the relevant decisions in long-term documents that define its further development.

The relevance of the article is due to the need to form an adequate assessment and forecast of the further development of the current security environment at both the global and regional levels for the implementation of the next stages in the development of the post-war Strategy for the Development of Ukraine.

Literature review

Much attention has been paid to the issue of providing military security guarantees to Ukraine. Since 2023, numerous meetings of partner countries have taken place, during which the issue of providing military security guarantees to Ukraine after the end of the russian-Ukrainian war was discussed. Possible actors and mechanisms for forming a "security umbrella" have been considered in many analytical studies (reports) by both domestic and foreign institutions, information and analytical agencies, well-known politicians, and individual experts [1, 2]. Reports by research centers such as the RAND Corporation, Hudson Institute, Atlantic Council, CSIS, RUSI, and others have outlined the United States's strategic vision regarding russia through the lens of ending the russian-Ukrainian war, the United States's interests in Europe and globally, as well as possible scenarios for shaping the post-war future for all parties and building a new security environment [3–6]. The definition of the actors and mechanisms for providing military security guarantees to Ukraine largely depends on the global struggle to uphold the geopolitical interests of the world's centers of power — the United States and China — and on the relations each of them maintains with russia, which claims the status of a center of power and rejects a bipolar world order that leaves no place for it.

It should be noted that most materials present possible formats for providing military security guarantees that have been proposed at high-level international meetings; however, forecasts regarding the mechanisms and timelines for their implementation remain cautious and restrained [7–10]. This indicates a certain uncertainty still present regarding the issue of guaranteeing military security to Ukraine after the end of the russian-Ukrainian war.

The above highlights the urgent need to address the task of assessing the global security environment as the foundation for developing the post-war Strategy for the Development of Ukraine.

Methodological Framework

The development of the draft Strategy for the Development of Ukraine in the post-war period involves the implementation of five main stages [11].

At the first stage, the global situation is assessed as a basis for determining Ukraine's place in the global security environment in the post-war period, based on a comprehensive analysis of available information, namely:

the impact of changes in the world order on the timeline for ending the russian-Ukrainian war and the positions of the world's centers of power (country alliances) on this issue;

possible scenarios for ending the russian-Ukrainian war, changes in the security environment that create conditions for refining these scenarios in accordance with the situation, and their impact on global and regional security [12, 13];

the most effective strategies for ending the war [14, 15];

factors, risks, and threats that influence the state, changes, and further development of the security environment at global and regional levels, as well as the military-strategic situation around Ukraine;

actors and mechanisms through which they will provide military security guarantees to Ukraine in the post-war period, and other related aspects.

Results and Discussions

The assessment of the global security environment indicates that the new world order is being formed under conditions of unresolved contradictions between the leading geopolitical actors (global centers of power), which they are attempting to resolve, in particular, through the use of military force. The existing global security architecture, based on all countries' adherence to universally recognized principles and norms of international law, enshrined in relevant treaties, and on the operation of international control regimes, has become ineffective.

The intensification of the aggressive policies of authoritarian states—such as China, Iran, russia, North Korea—as well as transnational terrorist groups and organizations, is leading to the disregard of traditional mechanisms and processes for resolving emerging conflicts, the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, and a refusal to recognize the right of neighboring countries to sovereignty and independence.

The onset and course of the open phase of the russian-Ukrainian war, along with the assistance provided to russia by other authoritarian regimes, demonstrate that they have formed a geopolitical axis to confront the so-called "collective West" and to limit its influence. This constitutes a real and growing challenge aimed at dismantling the liberal-democratic world order and the American-centric model of global security. The formation of this "axis of evil" was finalized at the beginning of 2025, after the ratification in April 2025 by the State Duma of the treaty on strategic partnership with Iran and the signing of the corresponding law by the president of russia. Prior to that, in November 2024, the treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership between russia and North Korea was ratified, and in May 2024, during putin's visit to China, a decision was made and a memorandum signed on strengthening cooperation between the countries' defence ministries.

The unsuccessful course of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine for russia and the disregard for its geopolitical ambitions indicate the gradual loss of russia's subjectivity. The russian president views the partial occupation of Ukraine and the creation of a buffer zone of tension ("managed chaos") on NATO's eastern flank as the foundation for building the future, which, in his opinion, would make russia the third pole of the world and break the bipolar model of the global order "USA – China" that is currently taking shape. russia is employing the logic of the Nazi dichotomy from the Second World War – either russia defeats the "collective West," or it ceases to exist and loses its former pre-war status as one of the centers of power in the global world.

The open armed aggression of russia against Ukraine is combined with the intensification of hybrid influence measures across various spheres. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, russia was effectively in political isolation, with belarus as its only ally. Currently, however, russia is reactivating pro-russian politicians in the West. Its destructive activity in African countries amidst a

provoked food crisis deserves attention, as it aims to gain allies in these regions. Additionally, russia is covertly implementing manipulative measures aimed at escalating "frozen" and smouldering conflicts around the world. The hybrid component of russia's aggression is aimed at reducing support for Ukraine, diverting attention from the russian-Ukrainian war, and restoring its pre-war status after the failure of the blitzkrieg in the so-called "special military operation".

In the bipolar world order model of "USA – China," russia will become a vassal of one of the two hegemons, with no right to act as an independent global power center. Aware of this, russia is using every possible tool to prevent the loss of its former status. To this end, so-called "signals" are emerging in the Western press about russia's alleged readiness for pseudo-peacemaking activities and cessation of hostilities on Ukrainian territory, while retaining the occupied territories along the current line of contact at the time of negotiations. "Peacekeeping" proposals and initiatives are also appearing within the European and US establishments. These measures are a façade for gaining a pause to accumulate necessary resources, continue the "creeping" advance to seize Ukrainian territory, restore lost combat capabilities, conduct covert or open mobilisation, and exploit the "fatigue" from the russian-Ukrainian war. Considering the possible split in NATO, triggered by statements from D. Trump after phone conversations with putin, russia seeks to obtain a carte blanche to realise its imperial ambitions in Europe.

China plays a significant role in shaping the future world order, as one of the global centers of power and a major rival to the United States. Its position remains far from clearly defined regarding the violation of international law and the use of military force in the russian-Ukrainian war, yet it is becoming increasingly assertive concerning Taiwan and the Philippines. China also has its own geopolitical interests in the armed confrontation between Pakistan and India in the disputed regions of Jammu and Kashmir, aiming to gain control over Tibet.

The development of relations between China and the United States, as global actors, will be decisive in forming the new world order, as well as in resolving the main contradictions driven by their national interests and a range of regional and global issues. However, it must be considered that the United States and China are situated on opposing political poles, and each is pursuing its own strategy. Therefore, the United States's expectations that China might use its influence on russia and North Korea to promote a peace-oriented stance on Ukraine, as well as on Iran regarding its actions in the Middle East, appear rather pessimistic.

China and russia are strengthening their influence and international standing in the political domain by forming an anti-Western coalition as an element of geopolitical confrontation with the United States, and the BRICS summit serves as one of the platforms to demonstrate such a stance. At the latest 16th summit held on 22–24 October 2024, its membership was expanded (Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, and the UAE were added).

A telling factor indicating the growing convergence of russia, China, and Iran in the military domain—and the emerging threat of a new global alliance against the United States and NATO—is the joint military exercise Security Bond. These exercises have been held annually since 2019, but under the current geopolitical circumstances, they take on particular significance: russia seeks to demonstrate its military power against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions pressure; China continues to expand its military presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, aiming to challenge the United States; Iran strives to strengthen its military ties with russia and China to cement its role in opposing the West. Previously, China and russia had already conducted large-scale joint exercises in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans and coordinated their actions in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas.

Further evidence of the deepening military rapprochement between russia and China includes the sale of russian military aviation equipment and modern air defence systems, as well as the probable transfer of submarine production technologies, the use of which would provide China with

a degree of parity in potential military conflicts with the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region.

Western analysts view these exercises as a show of force against the United States and its allies. However, Donald Trump sees no reason for concern.

The ongoing russian-Ukrainian war, in which russia is gradually losing its military and economic potential, contributes to the achievement of the United States' geopolitical goals. Therefore, continued support for Ukraine by the United States—even through the transfer of outdated military equipment and weapons—on the one hand, enhances Ukraine's ability to inflict irreparable losses on russia, and on the other hand, the allocated appropriations for the implementation of these measures remain within the United States and are directed toward strengthening the military potential of the U.S. Army. This is of great significance if, in the near future, the United States faces the threat of an escalating armed conflict with both russia and China simultaneously [14, 15].

The return to power of Donald Trump at the beginning of 2025 drastically altered the strategy for ending the russian-Ukrainian war that had been developed in 2024 by partner countries led by the United States. All hopes for a swift agreement on a ceasefire and an end to the war remained unfulfilled. The issue of ending the war had been a grand pre-election promise of Donald Trump, which left the new Administration of the United States facing two very significant problems: first—the inheritance of the russian-Ukrainian war, which is reaching a "dead end" with no way to end it "within 24 hours"; second—the lack of a clear vision or plan on how to achieve this.

After Donald Trump's election victory, several options for ending the russian-Ukrainian war were developed within his team and were made public through the media. However, all of them, in various interpretations, envisaged a "freezing" of the current front lines, a postponement of Ukraine's NATO membership in the near future, and an undefined mechanism for providing military security guarantees to Ukraine.

A particularly unexpected move was Donald Trump's demand that Ukraine repay funds for the military assistance provided by signing a minerals agreement, his messaging about a potential United States's withdrawal from NATO, the necessity for European countries to increase their defence spending, as well as the launch of a "tariff war." Even during his first presidential term, Donald Trump was sceptical about NATO as a collective force capable of ensuring security in the North Atlantic. He believed that European defence expenditures were insufficient and that these countries were taking advantage of U.S. security guarantees as the Alliance's most powerful member. He considered the possibility of the United States leaving NATO. Donald Trump insisted that European Alliance members allocate 2% of GDP to defence.

On the eve of his second presidential term, Donald Trump reiterated the same narratives regarding the European members of the Alliance. Although five of them increased their defence spending to 3% of GDP during the russian-Ukrainian war, he argued that it should be raised to 5%. He suggested that the United States might not defend NATO allies who do not meet his target spending benchmarks as part of the Alliance's reorganization. Donald Trump also does not support Ukraine's NATO membership but is interested in a strong and well-armed Ukrainian defence force after the end of active hostilities. He believes that Europe should play the leading role in protecting, supporting, and providing military security guarantees to Ukraine, taking into account the 27 security agreements signed—with seven G7 countries, the European Union, and 19 states that have joined the G7 declaration.

Based on this position of the United States, the European NATO countries anticipate the beginning of a new security era amid the geopolitical changes in the world [16]. For decades, the former Soviet Union sought to "disconnect" the United States from Europe and "break apart" NATO, which was restraining Soviet military expansion in Europe. However, today, the President of the United States Donald Trump is doing what the former Soviet Union could not achieve over many years of the Cold War.

The response to Donald Trump's campaign statements was a series of provocative actions by the russian federation during missile strikes on Ukraine, when missiles and attack UAVs violated the airspace of NATO countries and even fell on their territories. With such acts, the russian federation was testing the resolve and political will of NATO member states regarding the protection of their own borders (airspace) and the possibility of a consolidated response to these provocations. These instances of border violations of NATO countries during massive air attacks on Ukraine by the aggressor's forces, without an adequate reaction from the Alliance, are becoming systematic. All of this indicates that NATO's military-political leadership clearly understands the real threat posed by the russian federation and its own inability to respond decisively to provocations, while the russian federation increasingly feels impunity for its actions.

In this situation, Europe is concerned by the growing realization of the urgent need for rapid rearmament and the shift in American security ideology, which could lead to a split in NATO. At this stage, Europe must determine what in Donald Trump's actions is political maneuvering, and what represents a long-term reorientation of the United States toward authoritarianism.

Against the backdrop of Trump's statements, French President Emmanuel Macron warned of "irreversible changes" in relations with the United States and called for strengthening the European army. He proposed extending France's nuclear "umbrella" to its allies and emphasized that the end of russian aggression must not come at the cost of Ukraine's capitulation.

In Germany, the situation caused particular tension. The country, which was rebuilt after World War II with the United States's support, is now forced to rethink its security policy, taking into account the decline of the post-war world order. Germany's new Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, stated that the absolute priority is to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible in order to gradually achieve independence from the United States. Germany is also considering the expansion of France's nuclear deterrent and a significant increase in defense spending.

Europe has realized that Donald Trump's flirtation with Putin could trigger new waves of aggression, because the russian federation sees Ukraine as an intermediate stage in a global strategy to destabilize NATO and the EU. The ultimate goal of this strategy is, together with China, North Korea, and Iran, to bring an end to the dominance of the collective West, American hegemony, and the U.S. dollar in the world economy.

The above indicates that ensuring their own military security has become a top priority for European NATO members. Therefore, the process of identifying actors and developing effective formats and mechanisms for providing military security guarantees to Ukraine may be somewhat slowed.

In addition, the swift preparation and conduct of negotiations on terms favorable to Ukraine is impossible because the russian federation must be forced into this — placed under extremely unfavorable and harsh conditions not only through heavy losses on the front line and the imposition of effective sanctions negatively affecting its economy, but also through constant political pressure from the world's leading countries. Donald Trump's threats do not have the intended effect or influence. Visits by representatives of the U.S. establishment to russia only contribute to the restoration of diplomatic relations and russia's exit from political isolation. Promises by the russian dictator to the President of the United States regarding future mutually beneficial economic relations only increase the United States's disinterest in participating in negotiations and leave Ukraine and Europe face-to-face with russia. In such a situation, the russian federation shows complete unwillingness to negotiate a ceasefire agreement, as it is achieving success in its "creeping" seizure of Ukrainian territory, despite heavy losses.

The Easter "ceasefire" during the military parade in Moscow on May 9 served as a security guarantee for russia and ensured the absence of strikes from Ukraine's defence forces, as well as an opportunity for russian occupation troops to improve the tactical situation and logistics along the line of contact and in the "grey zones".

The outcomes of the May negotiations in Turkey with the russian delegation regarding a ceasefire clearly demonstrate Putin's unwillingness to end the russian-Ukrainian war.

A ceasefire alone is not enough to achieve lasting peace in Europe — it is merely the first step in applying a comprehensive approach that must include resolving a number of key issues: the full termination of the russian-Ukrainian war, military security guarantees and Ukraine's recovery, the status of the occupied territories, compensation for Ukraine's losses during russia's armed aggression, the diplomatic return of temporarily occupied territories, the return of prisoners of war, children, and civilians, and so on.

It should be taken into account that a ceasefire in the russian-Ukrainian war has an ambiguous impact on European security — it may temporarily reduce the risk of further conflict spreading to neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. However, the relevance of the real threat of aggression from the russian federation remains high.

The negative impact may be caused by the following factors:

during the war, European countries significantly increased defence spending and strengthened cooperation within NATO, but a ceasefire may slow down this process, which would pose a risk in the event of a renewed armed aggression by the russian federation not only against Ukraine but also against European countries;

the restoration of the offensive potential of the russian armed forces during a ceasefire is a realistic condition for possible aggression against the Baltic states (the Suwałki Corridor on the border of Poland and Lithuania, occupation of the Baltic countries);

the joint support of Ukraine during the war became a catalyst for the consolidation of European and Euro-Atlantic structures, but a ceasefire may weaken political unity on issues of military aid to Ukraine and strengthening sanctions against the russian federation;

the retention by the russian federation of the occupied territories of Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire would become a dangerous precedent that would undermine trust in international law and encourage other authoritarian countries to commit aggression in the future;

the easing of sanctions (as one of the possible conditions of the russian federation) without significant concessions on the part of the russian federation regarding the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity would nullify trust in the European policy of deterrence;

a ceasefire may stabilise the supply of gas and oil to Europe (against the backdrop of D. Trump's statements about the possible restoration of the "Nord Streams"), but dependence on the russian federation would remain a risk if Europe's energy diversification is not completed;

a ceasefire would contribute to active efforts by the russian federation to divide the European countries of the Alliance, in particular through pro-russian agents of influence in Europe;

the shift of the United States's geopolitical interests to the Indo-Pacific region, where escalation of actions by China regarding Taiwan and by North Korea regarding South Korea is possible;

a possible reduction in the presence of American troops in the European region as one of the possible conditions of the russian federation for concluding a ceasefire agreement.

The positive impact lies in the following:

bringing (modernising) the armed forces of the European member states of the Alliance up to the technological and technical standards defined by the experience of the russian-Ukrainian war, and in developing an alternative plan for protecting European countries from the russian threat;

increasing the capacities of the defence industries of the European NATO members to produce ammunition, air defence systems, artillery systems, armoured fighting vehicles, other weaponry, and military and special equipment;

conducting a future peacekeeping mission of European countries in Ukraine (with the consent of the russian federation), which would allow multinational units to better prepare for joint armed struggle under modern conditions;

the need to improve the mechanism of military assistance provision by the United States to the

European members of the Alliance and mutual assistance in the event of possible russian armed aggression in Europe;

providing military security guarantees for Ukraine, which would strengthen its position as a future member of the EU and NATO.

The signing of a ceasefire agreement brings to the forefront the issue of conducting a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine within the future buffer zone. European countries discussed the matter initiated by the President of France regarding the possibility of deploying troops to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire or a peace agreement between Ukraine and the russian federation. This is due to the fact that the President of the United States Donald Trump, during negotiations with the Presidents of France and Ukraine in December 2024, ruled out the possibility of U.S. troops participating in ensuring the ceasefire and insisted that this task be carried out independently by European countries. During the discussion of this issue, a number of disagreements emerged regarding the possible objectives and mandate of such a mission in Ukraine: whether the future European mission will fulfil a traditional peacekeeping role (monitoring the ceasefire line), or whether it will ensure reliable deterrence of any potential future attacks by the russian federation. The question remains unresolved as to which countries will be involved, what role the United States will play in supporting this agreement, and whether the russian federation will consent to the participation of NATO countries' troops in the peacekeeping mission.

One of the options considered was a European mission aimed at supporting Ukraine's economic recovery and reconstruction. The reconstruction security forces could include troops from EU countries or a special coalition, which, together with Ukraine's defence forces, would be deployed in designated industrial zones far from the line of contact to minimise security risks. Given the remoteness of these zones, the russian federation would have to understand that the mission is not intended to support any potential military actions. Armed with air defence and early warning systems, the forces would be mandated to protect areas of economic activity, including reconstruction projects involving European companies, from russian aerial attacks. However, unfortunately, the issue of deploying a peacekeeping contingent from European countries to Ukraine remains unresolved as of the end of April 2025 and is still under consultation.

The current situation regarding the organization of negotiations to conclude a ceasefire agreement and end the russian-Ukrainian war is being used by Donald Trump to divide spheres of influence among the world's power centers. The shaping of the future outline of the United States's security environment in negotiations with russia—without the participation of Europe's leading countries and Ukraine—is being compared by the European political elite to the Yalta Conference of 1945, where the postwar future of Eastern Europe was decided without its involvement. If the agreements between the United States and russia are implemented, then, considering russia's growing influence on the domestic politics of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, Eastern Europe will be left at the mercy of future russian expansion and drawn back into russia's geopolitical orbit. Central Asia may also become a zone of rivalry between russia and China.

If the agreements between the United States and russia on ending the russian-Ukrainian war are not implemented, russia's dependence on China will increase. However, after the start of the "tariff war," China may move closer to Europe economically, which would potentially weaken russia's position, especially considering that China was the one to prevent the collapse of russia's military-industrial complex by meeting its needs for strategic raw materials, electronics, critical electronic components, dual-use goods, and more.

In any case, the terms for ending the russian-Ukrainian war are one of the most important factors in the further division of spheres of influence between the United States, russia, and China.

Taking the above into account, the issue of determining the mechanisms and actors for providing military security guarantees to Ukraine in the postwar period can only be resolved during the preparation of the ceasefire agreement and the end of the russian-Ukrainian war, and should be

enshrined in corresponding bilateral or multilateral agreements as an alliance treaty with specific commitments from the guarantor states.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the following can be stated.

1. An assessment of the global security environment, the strategies of further action by the leading actors regarding the distribution of spheres of influence in the world, the financial, economic, and military-technical capabilities of partner countries in countering russian aggression, as well as the current state of the russian-Ukrainian war, indicates that the issue of a ceasefire through the implementation of a negotiation process with russia—with the participation of Ukraine and the mediation of the United States and leading European countries—is becoming the only way out of the war. The key element in resolving this issue lies in the terms of the ceasefire and war termination agreement, as well as in the mechanisms and actors responsible for providing military security guarantees.

However, negotiations without specific deadlines—with no timeframe for the preparation and signing of the relevant memorandum—provide russia with an opportunity to buy time and concentrate its forces for a summer offensive.

The divergence between the positions of the United States and leading European countries regarding a ceasefire and the end of the russian-Ukrainian war is expected to reach its peak at the G7 Summit in Canada (15–17 June 2025) and the NATO Summit in the Netherlands (24–26 June 2025).

2. A new world order is taking shape amid unresolved contradictions between the leading geopolitical actors (global centers of power), which they are trying to resolve, including through the use of military force. Therefore, the emergence of a multipolar world presents a growing challenge aimed at dismantling the liberal-democratic world order and the America-centric model of global security. This complicates the process of resolving the issue of providing military security guarantees in the postwar period.

3. By using the ceasefire, russia will restore its offensive capabilities for further aggression in Europe, the aim of which is to advance its imperial geopolitical interests. These will be pursued based on the principles of conducting “hybrid warfare” across all domains, as well as through the application of a “carrot and stick” policy toward specific European countries, namely: energy blackmail, influence over global food supply chains, large-scale cyberattacks, global disinformation campaigns, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, threats to global stability and security, and more. In other words, while a ceasefire may reduce the immediate risks of escalation, it will create new challenges associated with the long-term stability of the European region. The upcoming joint russian-belarusian military exercise “Zapad-2025,” scheduled for September 2025 on the territory of the Republic of Belarus, serves as a compelling argument in support of this assertion.

4. A shift in the United States’ strategic direction in the military sphere may lead to the weakening of NATO, which would pose a threat to Eastern Europe from russia and require the rapid build-up of military potential and the development of new effective mechanisms of military mutual assistance to replace Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

5. The terms of the ceasefire and the end of the war will serve as an indicator for the countries of the “axis of evil” – russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. If, under U.S. mediation, conditions dictated by russia are imposed on Ukraine and the occupied territories remain under russian control along the line of contact, this would set a dangerous precedent, undermining trust in international law and encouraging other authoritarian states to commit acts of aggression in the future – for example, China toward Taiwan, or North Korea toward South Korea.

6. Military security guarantees are needed by our state both after the end of the russian-Ukrainian war and in the medium- and long-term perspective. The format of these guarantees may vary – either within NATO or outside of it. Although the President of the United States does not

support Ukraine's accession to the Alliance in the near future and this issue is not being considered in the upcoming agreement on ending the russian-Ukrainian war, Ukraine's foreign policy course toward European integration and NATO membership is clearly defined in the foundational documents of our state's further development.

Ukraine's security orientation may focus on the European members of the Alliance, considering the 27 signed security agreements – with seven G7 countries, the European Union, and 19 states that have joined the G7 declaration. The mechanism for concluding bilateral agreements proposed at the Vilnius Summit exists, but it is progressing very slowly and does not provide the necessary efficiency for their implementation. Additionally, security guarantees outside of NATO can be obtained through the creation of military-political alliances with leading countries and regional powers that support Ukraine. One possible option for implementing such a format could be the establishment of a Baltic-Black Sea belt. At the same time, the agreement between Ukraine and the United States on natural resources is expected to strengthen the strategic partnership within the framework of post-war reconstruction of Ukraine after the end of the russian-Ukrainian war. The presence of the American side at reconstruction sites would provide protection against attempts by russia to carry out strikes with high-precision weapons on the Ukrainian territory.

7. The russian-Ukrainian war must become a significant impetus for the global elites to reconsider the role of Ukraine and the West in building a new format of relations and communication regarding Ukraine's contribution to global security.

Regardless of when and under what conditions the russian-Ukrainian war ends, Ukraine will remain a central element of European security for decades to come. A strong Ukraine has a positive impact on European security today and will be an integral part of it in the future.

Recommendations

The materials presented in this article will be useful to public administration specialists, developers of long-term foundational documents in all spheres of life of our state, as well as to instructors, postgraduate students, and students of higher educational institutions in this field.

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Стратегія розвитку України у повоєнний час: оцінка глобального безпекового середовища

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Анотація. Структура проєкту Стратегії розвитку України в повоєнний час передбачає реалізацію п’яти основних етапів, обґрунтування структури та змісту яких описано в попередніх дослідженнях. Перший етап – оцінка стратегічної ситуації (глобального безпекового середовища) – є визначальним, він закладає основу забезпечення безпекових гарантій України, насамперед у воєнній сфері, у найближчій та подальшій перспективі на підставі результатів проведеного аналізу трансформації безпекових процесів світового та регіонального рівнів.

Актуальність статті обумовлена необхідністю формування адекватної оцінки та прогнозу подальшого розвитку сучасного безпекового середовища на глобальному та регіональному рівнях для реалізації наступних етапів розроблення проекту Стратегії розвитку України в повоєнний час.

Метою статті та її спрямованістю є проведення оцінювання поточного безпекового середовища та його впливу на вирішення питання надання гарантій воєнної безпеки Україні.

Основним результатом статті є розглянуті можливі формати надання гарантій воєнної безпеки Україні (двосторонній, багатосторонній та/або блоковий) на основі аналізу поточного безпекового середовища для визначення та відпрацювання дієвих і ефективних механізмів завершення російсько-української війни з найменшими втратами.

Практична значимість результатів статті полягає у спробі оцінки поточної стратегічної ситуації (глобального безпекового середовища), яка стане в нагоді для визначення та формування довгострокових стратегічних цілей розвитку Держави у сфері національної безпеки і оборони та інших сферах її життєдіяльності.

Ключові слова: гарантії воєнної безпеки, глобальне безпекове середовище, російсько-українська війна, стратегія розвитку України в повоєнний час.