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Defence Management Issues in Ukraine: The Economic Aspect

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Abstract. The relevance of the article is driven by the need for a comprehensive examination of the economic aspects of defence management in Ukraine. The study explores the economic aspects of defence management in Ukraine during the russian–ukrainian war, with a focus on the financial support for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the specifics of defence procurement, the state of the defence-industrial complex, and the role of international support.

The aim of the article is to examine the key economic aspects of Ukraine's defence

management, particularly the financing of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the reform of the procurement system, the state and development of the defence-industrial complex, as well as international support.

The article applies a systems approach, methods of economic and financial analysis, as well as a comparative analysis of NATO countries' experience.

Based on the analysis of budget expenditures, the study reveals an unprecedented increase in defence spending. The main challenges are identified, including a high level of budget deficit, corruption risks in the defence procurement system, limited production capacity of the defence-industrial complex, and dependence on external financial aid.

Specific recommendations are proposed to improve the system of financial planning and management of defence resources, ensure procurement transparency, intensify reforms of the defence-industrial complex, and strengthen international cooperation.

The results obtained have practical significance for the development of state policy in the field of defence management and may be used in educational and research institutions, as well as by government authorities and military structures involved in addressing defence management issues. Promising areas for further research include examining the place and role of the economic components of defence management in Ukraine's post-war recovery, the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and exploring the prospects for overcoming the technological gap in the national defence-industrial complex.

Keywords: defence management, defence procurement, defence-industrial complex, international support, defence resource management.

Introduction

The full-scale aggression of russia, launched in February 2022, has confronted Ukraine with unprecedented challenges in the field of defence management. The economic component plays a key role in ensuring national security, as financial resources determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces, the effectiveness of defence procurement, the development of the defence industrial complex (DIC), and the ability to attract international assistance. Under wartime conditions, the share of defence spending in Ukraine's budget has risen to record levels, reshaping the priorities of state policy. It is therefore highly relevant to analyse how the state finances defence, how procurement for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AF of Ukraine) is organised, the current state of the national DIC, the role of international support, and the economic challenges faced by the security and defence sector. This paper examines these aspects based on the latest available data, providing specific examples, quantitative indicators, and factual information. This allows for an outline of the key economic challenges in defence management in Ukraine and possible solutions to address them.

Methodological Framework

The methodological framework of the study is a comprehensive approach to analysing defence management in Ukraine, which includes economic analysis, a systems approach, and a comparative analysis of international experience. Methods of statistical and financial analysis were applied to examine data on state budget expenditures for defence, the structure of defence financing, procurement efficiency, and the state of the defence-industrial complex. For comparison, data on international support — particularly military and financial aid to Ukraine — were used. A significant role is also played by theoretical developments and empirical studies that highlight NATO countries' experience in defence planning and the financial management of defence resources. In particular, the works of N. M. Tkachuk (2020), A. M. Novytskyi et al. (2024), O. V. Soldatenko (2023), as well as studies on defence management in NATO member states by O. O. Surkov and Yu. V. Tsurko (2024), and A. Nalyvaiko and A. Poliaiev (2021), were used.

Thus, in (N. M. Tkachuk, 2020), the features of state defence expenditure financing were examined, along with the development of practical recommendations for their optimisation under current development conditions. The article by (A. M. Novytskyi, N. B. Novytska, D. V. Pryimachenko, 2024) is dedicated to the issues of organising control over the use of State Budget funds allocated for the needs of national security and defence. In the study by (O. V. Soldatenko, 2023), based on the analysis of the financing of the AF of Ukraine's needs, the main existing problems in the sphere of defence financing under martial law were identified, and certain directions for their resolution were proposed, taking into account Ukraine's Eurointegration development vector. The search for effective approaches to shaping a modern model for managing defence planning processes, adapting them to the current AF of Ukraine, as well as the principles and standards followed by the armies of developed NATO member states, was discussed in (P. V. Shchypanskyi, F. V. Sahaniuk, Yu. M. Mudrak, 2021). In their research, (H. Bukur-Marku, F. Fluri, T. Tagarev, 2010) explain the principles and approaches to the development and implementation of security and defence policy, present the results of relevant studies, and offer examples of best practices in transforming and managing security sector structures, organisational processes, and resources. An analysis of the functioning characteristics of the main defence management systems in the United States and an identification of differences in the implementation of capability-based defence planning within the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (MoD of Ukraine) and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AF of Ukraine) is provided in (O. O. Surkov, Yu. V. Tsurko, 2024). The article by (A. Koretskyi, V. Sotnyk, V. Mohylevska, R. Boiko, Ye. Kosaretskyi, 2023) is devoted to explaining the essence of the definitions “defence resources” and “defence resource management”, identifying key theoretical issues and proposing possible solutions. In (A. I. Poliaiev, 2020), the features of implementing defence management practices used in NATO member countries’ defence institutions are analysed. The concepts of “financial management of defence resources” and “defence resource financial management system” are clarified in (N. Pantieleeva, M. Khutorna, O. Honcharenko, 2024). The aim of the article by (A. Nalyvaiko, A. Poliaiev, 2021) was to develop approaches to forming a functional model of defence management using domestic experience alongside principles and approaches adopted in NATO member states, and to implement this model in the MoD of Ukraine, the AF of Ukraine, and other components of the Defence Forces. Significant contributions to developing the methodological foundations for defence resource management in the AF of Ukraine were made in (O. Semenenko, P. Onofriichuk, I. Chernyshova, O. Ostapets et al., 2021) and (O. Semenenko, O. Ostapets, P. Onofriichuk et al., 2021).

Results and Discussions

State Budget and Defence Share. With the onset of the russian-ukrainian war, Ukraine’s defence expenditures have multiplied significantly. While the 2022 state budget had initially planned spending for national security and defence at approximately UAH 323 billion (≈6% of gross domestic product (GDP)), in reality, a colossal UAH 1.5366 trillion was allocated for these needs throughout the year, amounting to 32.5% of GDP [13]. For comparison, before the war, the share of defence spending in Ukraine’s GDP ranged between 2–3%. In 2023, the defence expenditures were set at UAH 1.141 trillion, or 18.2% of the projected GDP [13]. In fact, by the end of 2023, the total expenditures from the general fund of the state budget for the security and defence sector reached UAH 1.8438 trillion, which accounted for 60.8% of all state expenditures that year [14]. Thus, more than half of the wartime state budget was directed specifically toward defence (see Fig. 1).

In 2024, this trend persisted — the 2024 state budget law allocated nearly 50% of all expenditures (₴1.692 trillion, approximately 21.6% of GDP) to national security and defence [13]. For 2025, a further increase in defence spending is planned, reaching ₴2.223 trillion (26.3% of the projected GDP) [13]. This dynamic is unprecedented and reflects the prioritisation of defence under

wartime conditions (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. National Security and Defence Expenditures in 2023–2025

Defence Budget Structure. The substantial increase in appropriations is accompanied by changes in the structure of expenditures. The priority is the financial support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), including salaries for service members, combat payments, and unit provisioning, as well as material support and procurement of weaponry. Thus, in 2023, out of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine's budget (UAH 857.9 billion), the largest share – UAH 494.1 billion – was allocated to the maintenance and support of the AFU (including troop training, medical provision, and social benefits for veterans). A significant portion – over UAH 350 billion – was spent on the procurement and modernisation of weapons and military equipment [13]. Only small amounts were allocated for other needs (for example, UAH 136 million for the construction of housing for military personnel).

The structure of the wartime defence budget is characterised by the dominance of spending on personnel and material support for the Armed Forces, as well as substantial investments in new weaponry.

Figure 3 summarises the budget expenditure distribution by the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine in 2024 by main categories. According to this data, approximately 51% of the funds were spent on maintaining the army, around 42% on arms procurement, and the remainder on infrastructure and other programmes.

Figure 2 illustrates the share of the state budget allocated to defence and security..

It is worth noting that a significant portion of defence expenditure is financed through the state budget deficit. In 2022, a sharp increase in spending led to a deficit of over 20% of GDP, which was covered by monetary emission and external assistance [13].

Subsequently, the government soug to avoid excessive money issuance due to the risk of inflation, making international financial support critical. According to the Ministry of Finance, in 2023 Ukraine received USD 38.4 billion from its partners to finance the state budget (see Table 1) [15].





Figure 2. Growth of Ukraine's Defence Expenditure in 2021–2025



payment of service allowances, troop training, medical support
procurement, modernisation, development, and repair of weapons, equipment, and military hardware
State Special Transport Service
total defence

Figure 3. Budgetary Funding for Defence and Its Components in 2021–2024

Since the beginning of the full-scale aggression, Ukraine has received approximately €267 billion, or around €80 billion each year of the war in total. Of this total, 49% was military aid, 44% financial, and 7% humanitarian assistance [16].

Table 1. Contribution of Allies to Ukraine's Victory. Top 10 Countries

Country	Aid from the Country, GDP %	Total Amount, USD Billion
Estonia	1,26	0,54
Latvia	1,09	0,51
Lithuania	0,95	0,76
Poland	0,68	6,21
Slovakia	0,63	1,06
Denmark	0,51	3,01
Netherlands	0,44	7,24
Finland	0,44	1,97
Bulgaria	0,31	0,48
Czech Republic	0,36	1,57

The largest donors have become the European Union ($17.9 billion) and the United States ($10.9 billion) — these funds were spent on covering salaries, pensions, and other budgetary expenditures, allowing the state to allocate its own resources towards defence [15]. The share of each individual donor is extremely small when compared to the size of their respective economies. For instance, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States each allocated no more than 0.2% of their GDP to aid Ukraine. For France, Spain, and Italy, this figure is even lower — just 0.1%.%.

According to these estimates, the countries that have provided the most direct aid to Ukraine are:

Estonia – 2.2% of GDP;
Denmark – 2.17% of GDP;
Lithuania – 1.8% of GDP;
Latvia – 1.53% of GDP;
Finland – 0.98% of GDP;
Sweden – 0.92% of GDP;
Poland – 0.8% of GDP;
Netherlands – 0.78% of GDP;
Norway – 0.75% of GDP;
Slovakia – 0.65% of GDP.

In other words, the United States does not even feature in the top ten donors to Ukraine relative to the size of its economy.

During wartime, domestic budget revenues (taxes, internal borrowing) have also been mobilised to the maximum: military bonds have been introduced, and the government has significantly reduced civilian expenditure. As a result, defence spending is financed through both internal resources and external support. This enables Ukraine to maintain an army numbering in the hundreds of thousands and to equip it with the necessary weaponry, despite the sharp economic downturn in 2022 and significant GDP losses.

Defence Procurement Needs

Defence Procurement System and Transparency. The urgent wartime needs required rapid and large-scale procurement for the army — ranging from food and uniforms to weapons and ammunition. Before 2022, procurement for the Armed Forces of Ukraine was mostly carried out through open tender procedures (the Prozorro system), in accordance with [17]. However, with the onset of the full-scale invasion, many tenders were classified or replaced by direct contracts due to the urgency of supply. On the one hand, this accelerated the provision of resources to the military; on the other, it created risks of abuse.

Anti-Corruption Reforms in Procurement. In 2023, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine introduced a new two-stage procurement mechanism for food supplies for the Armed Forces of

Ukraine. Firstly, ceiling prices were established for key food products for the Defence Forces in order to prevent procurement at deliberately inflated rates. Secondly, a two-tier procurement system was implemented: from now on, the newly established entity — the State Rear Operator — is responsible for directly concluding contracts with suppliers, while the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine determines the requirements and oversees the ceiling prices [18].

This model aligns with the practices of NATO member states. The State Rear Operator, headed by an expert in the field of anti-corruption, has taken over responsibility for supplying the troops (food, clothing, fuel, medical supplies), while the MoD of Ukraine has focused on policy-making and oversight. At the same time, a separate Defence Procurement Agency was established to centralise the acquisition of weapons and equipment [19]. Thus, crisis conditions have driven a profound restructuring of Ukraine's defence procurement system in line with NATO standards.

The Defence-Industrial Complex of Ukraine (National DIC)

The State and Mobilisation of the Defence-Industrial Complex During Wartime. The Defence-Industrial Complex of Ukraine has historically possessed significant potential; however, prior to 2022, it was undergoing a prolonged reform process. The armed aggression required a sharp increase in the production of weapons and ammunition. At the onset of the war, Ukraine faced a shortage of domestic production capacity in several critical categories (particularly Soviet-calibre ammunition, missiles, modern drones, etc.). Nevertheless, by 2022–2023, the national DIC had undergone accelerated mobilisation. In 2023, production volumes continued to grow.

To support this process, the government adopted a decision obliging the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to purchase all output from ammunition factories (within operational needs), and to turn to imports only in case of shortfalls［20]. This approach guarantees domestic manufacturers a secure market and incentives for ramping up production.

Corporatisation and Sector Reforms. At the same time, the state continued reforming the structure of the Defence-Industrial Complex to enhance its efficiency. The main focus of the DIC reform was the transformation of the state-owned conglomerate Ukroboronprom, which united the country's key state defence enterprises. In June 2023, the conglomerate was officially dissolved as part of its conversion into a joint-stock company called Ukrainian Defence Industry［19].

Despite the initiated transformation, by early 2024, the reform of the DIC had not yet been fully completed. Experts note that the delay in reform poses risks, particularly for the development of cooperation with Western partners［20］.

Another challenge lies in the personnel and technological modernisation of the Defence-Industrial Complex. Many highly qualified specialists have been lost, and part of the production facilities have been destroyed by hostilities or are now located in frontline areas. The response to these issues has been the establishment of cooperation with Western arms manufacturers on Ukrainian territory, as well as encouraging private Ukrainian companies to participate in defence production.

The large-scale development of high-tech weaponry requires substantial investment and technology transfer, which can only be secured through continued reform and active international cooperation.

International Cooperation and Import Substitution. Given its limited domestic resources, Ukraine is actively seeking opportunities to produce weapons jointly with foreign partners.

Import substitution of key components—previously supplied from russia or other countries—remains a challenge for the Defence-Industrial Complex of Ukraine. In recent years, Ukraine has managed to localise the production of gunpowder, explosives, and drone electronics. However, certain complex systems (e.g. turbojet engines for missiles) still require cooperation with Western manufacturers.

Due to russian strikes, which have repeatedly targeted defence enterprises, Ukraine has been forced to decentralise production and partially relocate it to underground or fortified facilities. This

complicates and increases the cost of manufacturing. However, despite all the challenges, Ukraine's defence industry is ramping up output: in 2023, production volumes of the Defence-Industrial Complex of Ukraine increased by 28% compared to 2021, and in certain areas (such as munitions and UAVs), output multiplied several times over [13]. This marks a significant achievement in economic aspects of defence management.

At this stage, there remains a shortage of funding for production capacities. Nevertheless, according to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, by 2023–2024 the domestic production of artillery systems, anti-tank weapons, armoured personnel carriers, and munitions had doubled. In 2025, the production capacity of Ukraine's Defence-Industrial Complex could reach 35 billion USD (compared to only 1 billion USD in 2022). In 2023, production volumes of defence products rose to 9 billion USD in domestic funds, supplemented by 1.5 billion USD in foreign investment, while in 2024 the figure already reached around 20 billion USD.

International Aid

Scale and Significance of External Support. International military and financial aid has become a decisive factor in Ukraine's survival in this war. According to Pentagon estimates, as of early 2025, the total value of security aid provided to Ukraine by the United States exceeded USD 65 billion (see Figure 4) [16].

It is more than the military budget of most European countries. The European Union and its member states have jointly provided comparable volumes of support. According to analytical data, 47% of all international aid to Ukraine (in the broad sense, including financial and military) in 2022–2023 comes from EU countries, while the share of the United States is about 43% [15].

International aid has two main components: direct military aid (supply of weapons, ammunition, equipment, training of the military) and financial support (grants and loans that allow Ukraine to maintain macroeconomic stability and finance the wartime budget deficit). Both components are closely interconnected: external grants to the state budget ($38.4 billion to the general fund in 2023) make it possible for Ukraine to pay salaries to military personnel and pensions without resorting to excessive money issuance, while the deliveries of modern weaponry free of charge or on preferential terms significantly enhance the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Therefore, allied aid effectively compensates for Ukraine's economic weakness compared to the aggressor, levelling the situation in terms of resource provision for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The Military Aid Structure. During 2022–2024, Ukraine received a wide range of weaponry from more than 30 countries. The United States focused on supplying high-tech systems. European countries delivered a large quantity of heavy equipment of both Soviet and NATO origin: tanks (over 300 units, including ~100 Leopard 2 from various countries and dozens of other models), infantry fighting vehicles (thousands of units, including Marder, Bradley, CV90), artillery systems (PzH 2000 howitzers, CAESAR, Krab self-propelled guns, and others), air defence systems (SAMP/T, IRIS-T, Gepard), and so on (Figure 5).

United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada. Among international programmes, the European Peace Facility (EPF) stands out – the EU uses it to finance the procurement of weapons for Ukraine (its budget for Ukraine was increased to €5 billion per year by a 2023 decision).The Ukrainian military also received significant humanitarian aid of a military nature – equipment, medical supplies, gear, fuel, and more, delivered both by governments and through private initiatives.

One of the unique phenomena was the global wave of volunteer support: hundreds of millions of dollars were raised via foundations and platforms to purchase drones, vehicles, and thermal imagers for the Ukrainian army. While this lies outside the state management system, it significantly supplements official aid.




Figure 4. Estimated Military Aid Provided to Ukraine by the United States and European Countries. Infographic by the Kiel Institute



Figure 5. Weapons Received by Ukraine from Western Partners

International Support Challenges. Despite its considerable scale, international aid has certain problematic aspects. Firstly, it depends on the political will of donor countries, which may shift. For example, at the end of 2023, there was a pause in the new U.S. aid package worth approximately $60 billion due to political debates in Congress. In Europe, a change of government in Slovakia led to

statements about halting military aid to Ukraine, while the Hungarian authorities have systematically blocked certain joint EU programmes. Such factors create uncertainty regarding the sustainability of external support. Secondly, the logistics and speed of weapons delivery sometimes fail to match the pace of developments on the front line – decisions to provide modern tanks or fighter jets were made by partners after lengthy debates and with delays. Thirdly, there is a need for the effective integration of transferred systems into the structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: training of personnel abroad is required, as well as adaptation of infrastructure (for instance, the transition to NATO calibres demands the re-equipment of some arsenals and technical bases). All of these issues require a high level of coordination and strategic planning from Ukraine's defence management. In particular, the Government of Ukraine has developed a medium-term defence procurement plan, taking into account anticipated international aid to avoid duplication or shortages in specific areas. Additionally, Ukraine is making efforts to ensure accountability and transparency in the use of Western aid, fully understanding that donor trust is critical. In 2023, the "Logfas" weapons tracking system was introduced in line with NATO standards. It allows for tracking of every item of received equipment – thereby increasing partner confidence.

Thus, international aid has become an integral component of the economic support for Ukraine's defence. Without it, the country's own resources would not be sufficient to wage a prolonged and exhausting war. At the same time, the attraction of such aid poses a task for management: to use it effectively and to preserve the political support of allies. Ukraine is striving to demonstrate maximum effectiveness of the received resources on the battlefield, which, in turn, motivates partners to continue their support.

Analysis of the economic component of Ukraine's defence management during the wartime period reveals a number of systemic challenges. The **first** of these is the extreme budgetary burden. Defence spending exceeds the capacity of the national economy, leading to a massive budget deficit (over UAH 1 trillion in 2023) [14]. This makes Ukraine dependent on external funding and forces it to accumulate debt. In the long term, servicing this debt and rebuilding the economy after the war will be a separate challenge. The **second** challenge is maintaining a balance between the speed and transparency of defence procurement. Wartime circumstances demand immediate responses to the needs of the front, but at the same time, society expects proper control over public spending. Any corruption scandals undermine the trust of both citizens and foreign donors. Therefore, it is crucial to bring the initiated reforms to success — to ensure the full functioning of the State Rear Operator and the Defence Procurement Agency, to introduce electronic catalogues and open reporting wherever possible, without compromising secrecy.

The **third** set of problems is related to the limited internal production capacity. Despite gradual growth, the Ukrainian defence-industrial complex is still unable to fully meet the front's needs for critical types of weaponry (for example, air defence missiles, modern aircraft, etc.). The country must rely on imports and aid, which are not always predictable. A post-war strategy for the development of the defence industry needs to be devised, which should include the modernisation of enterprises, workforce training, and technology transfer from partner countries. The **fourth** challenge is both personnel-related and institutional. Waging war depletes not only material but also human resources. It is necessary to ensure adequate funding for military personnel pay to retain the army's human capital and prevent an outflow to the private sector or abroad after the war. At the same time, it is important to strengthen defence management institutions: to enhance the capacity of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to plan budgets and procurements based on the analysis of defence needs, to introduce modern ERP systems for resource management in the military, and to develop civil democratic oversight.

It is also worth highlighting the issue of the effective use of international aid. Ukraine must make the most efficient use of the resources provided in order to achieve a turning point in the war. A clear correlation is already visible: the reinforcement of armaments (artillery, armoured vehicles,

air defence systems) thanks to allied support enabled successful defensive and offensive operations in autumn 2022 and summer 2023. This serves as an argument for further investment in Ukraine's victory. Thus, part of defence management also includes diplomatic work, accountability to partners, and an information policy that demonstrates the effectiveness of the aid – for example, regular briefings showing how many targets were downed using donated air defence systems, how much territory was liberated with the support of Western tanks, and so on.

Finally, a **strategic challenge** lies in planning the post-war recovery of the security and defence sector. Once hostilities end, Ukraine will face the task of maintaining a combat-ready army while simultaneously reallocating part of its resources towards rebuilding the country. Experts are already discussing what level of military spending would be acceptable in peacetime and how to integrate the Ukrainian defence-industrial complex into the European arms market. The economic resilience of the defence sector will require the continuation of reforms – in particular, the introduction of medium-term defence budget planning, the establishment of stabilisation funds, and Ukraine's participation in joint European weapons procurement programmes.

Conclusion

The economic component of Ukraine's defence management during the russian–ukrainian war is marked by extreme pressure on resources alongside a large-scale transformation of the system for managing those resources. The analysis has shown that Ukraine sharply increased defence spending – the share of military expenditure in GDP rose to more than a quarter, and within the budget structure – to half or more [14]. This became possible due to the mobilisation of internal revenues and unprecedented international support. At the same time, these circumstances highlighted several problems: shortcomings of the old procurement system, the economy's vulnerability to shocks, and insufficient autonomy of the defence-industrial complex. In response, the state implemented a number of important reforms – from new defence procurement mechanisms (via the State Logistics Operator and the Defence Procurement Agency) to the corporatisation of defence enterprises and the involvement of foreign partners in weapons production. These steps have already yielded initial positive results in the form of improved support for the AF of Ukraine and reduced corruption risks.

However, significant challenges remain for defence management. It is necessary to ensure sustainable funding for the army in the context of economic decline, to maintain public trust through transparent and efficient spending of every hryvnia from the defence budget, and to continue strengthening domestic industrial capacity despite enemy strikes and technological limitations. Western support remains crucial – preserving the political will and unity of Western allies in assisting Ukraine until full victory. Economic aspects will also play a major role in the post-war period: the speed of recovery and Ukraine's place in the post-war architecture of European security will depend on how rationally current resources are used.

In conclusion, it can be stated that Ukraine withstood the first and most difficult blow thanks to the mobilisation of all available economic resources and the collective support of the international community. The further task of defence management is to shift from crisis response to strategic planning in order to ensure the long-term defence capability of the state based on sustainable economic development. Studying and taking into account the lessons of 2022–2024 will help strengthen Ukraine's institutional capacity to effectively manage the financial and industrial components of defence, which is an essential condition for achieving victory and preserving statehood.

Recommendations

The materials of the article may be used for the development of state policy in the field of defence management, as well as by educational and research institutions, public authorities, and military structures involved in addressing issues of defence management.

Promising areas for further research include studying the place and role of the economic components of defence management in the post-war recovery of Ukraine, the development of the AF of Ukraine, as well as examining the prospects for overcoming the technological lag of the national defence-industrial complex.

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Проблеми оборонного менеджменту в Україні: економічний аспект

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Анотація. Актуальність статті зумовлена необхідністю комплексного розгляду економічних аспектів оборонного менеджменту в Україні. Досліджено економічні аспекти оборонного менеджменту в Україні в умовах російсько-української війни з акцентом на фінансове забезпечення Збройних Сил України, особливості оборонних закупівель, стан оборонно-промислового комплексу та роль міжнародної підтримки. Метою статті є дослідження ключових економічних аспектів оборонного менеджменту України, зокрема фінансування Збройних Сил України, реформування системи закупівель, стану та розвитку оборонно-промислового комплексу, а також міжнародної підтримки. У статті застосовано системний підхід, методи економічного і фінансового аналізу, а також порівняльний аналіз досвіду країн НАТО. На основі аналізу бюджетних видатків виявлено безпрецедентне зростання витрат на оборону. Визначено основні виклики, зокрема високий рівень дефіциту бюджету, ризики корупції у системі оборонних закупівель, обмеженість виробничих потужностей оборонно-промислового комплексу та залежність від зовнішньої фінансової допомоги. Запропоновано конкретні рекомендації щодо удосконалення системи фінансового планування та управління оборонними ресурсами, забезпечення прозорості закупівель, активізації реформ оборонно-промислового комплексу та посилення міжнародної співпраці. Отримані результати мають практичне значення для розроблення державної політики у сфері оборонного менеджменту та можуть використовуватися в освітніх і наукових закладах, а також органами державної влади та військовими структурами, причетними до вирішення питань, що стосуються оборонного менеджменту. Перспективними напрямами подальших досліджень є вивчення місця та ролі економічних складових оборонного менеджменту у післявоєнному відновленні України, розвитку Збройних Сил України, а також дослідження перспектив ліквідації технологічного відставання вітчизняного оборонно-промислового комплексу.

Ключові слова: оборонний менеджмент, оборонні закупівлі, оборонно-промисловий комплекс, міжнародна підтримка, управління оборонними ресурсами.