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Situational conditions at the state border as a factor influencing the staffing of border guard units' headquarters with managerial personnel

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Abstract. Modern challenges in the state border protection (SBP) require improved approaches to staffing the headquarters of border guard units with management personnel.

Managerial activities have a pronounced intellectual component, as they involve the development, adoption and implementation of managerial decisions in a changing situation. This requires a high level of adaptability and flexibility, as solutions must be effective and capable of changing the course of operations or battles, as well as influencing the mindset and behaviour of troops or forces in the course of performing tasks.

The article deals with the specifics of managerial activities in the units of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) in the context of modern hybrid warfare.

The purpose of this article is to analyze how situational conditions at the state border affect the staffing of managerial personnel in border guard unit headquarters.

The authors pay special attention to the asymmetry of the actions of the russian federation, which is actively using new methods of warfare, in particular the use of strategic and tactical incommensurability between goals and resources, which in turn creates new challenges for border guard units.

Taking this context into account has led to the need to analyse the graphical cause-and-effect relationships of the risks associated with changes in the situation in the border area and to identify the types of tasks that need to be implemented to effectively counter threats. An important aspect is also the definition of criteria for assessing the operational efficiency of border guard unit headquarters, which should take into account the specific conditions of the situation.

It is concluded that the organisation of service in border guard units occurs under conditions of constant change and uncertainty. This requires appropriate, specific decisions to be made, which must be implemented in light of the current situation.

The managerial capacity of the border guard units' headquarters should be focused on a prompt and flexible response to changes in the situation. To achieve this, the headquarters' capability to make quick, accurate decisions in critical situations must be ensured.

The assessment of headquarters performance should take into account the ability of personnel to analyse the conditions of service, clearly define the necessary tasks, and properly allocate available resources. This includes not only professionalism but also the ability to work under conditions of high uncertainty and limited time.

The asymmetric actions used by russia require the search for innovative approaches to the organisation of managerial processes that enable not only to counter traditional threats but also to respond effectively to various forms of aggression.

The procedure for selecting candidates for senior positions in the headquarters of border guard units should include specific criteria that determine the ability of applicants to analyse and make effective decisions in a changing situation. This should include an assessment of their operational thinking, their ability to manage crises and their ability to effectively organise interaction with other units.

The article provides a practical framework for assessing how situational conditions at the state border directly impact the staffing needs of border guard headquarters. Its findings can be used to optimize personnel management decisions and improve the operational readiness of border units.

Keywords: border guard unit, situational conditions, risks, threats, tasks for units, staffing, selection of candidates for senior headquarters positions.

Introduction

Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine with the support of belarus began on 24 February 2022 and became a new stage in the russian-Ukrainian war. The full-scale invasion was made possible by a significant build-up of russian troops along the border with Ukraine and in the occupied territories, which had been ongoing since November 2021.

The aggression of russia, supported by belarus, included not only ground attacks, but also missile and air strikes. At the same time, all attempts by russian officials to deny their aggressive intentions were aimed at disorienting and reducing Ukraine's defence readiness.

The military resistance organised by the Ukrainian defence forces from the first day of the invasion caused the russian army to suffer significant losses. It is already known that russia's losses in manpower and equipment are among the largest in recent history. This also demonstrates the effectiveness of new tactical approaches to defence, in which the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine has played a significant role.

The analysis of combat operations and the effectiveness of managerial decisions of border guard units in wartime conditions is important for further improvement of management activities and training of future managerial personnel to ensure national security.

Analysis of recent research and publications. A number of specialists and scholars studied the issues of assessment and selection of managerial personnel. Paying tribute to their scientific achievements, it should be noted that the studies do not fully take into account the specifics and peculiarities of the management activities of the border guard detachment headquarters under different conditions.

The purpose of the article is to substantiate the relationship between the situational conditions at the state border and the specifics of the decisions that should be made at the headquarters of a border guard unit. The research aims to substantiate the need to adapt the personnel policy in the Border Guard Service to current challenges and threats, which will help improve management efficiency and strengthen national security.

Methodological Framework

Presentation of the main research material

On 24 February 2022, a heroic period began for Ukraine, when our country's statehood entered into an unprecedented struggle against the aggression of the russian federation and its allies. This period is characterised by numerous heroic deeds that resulted from the determination and dedication of both military personnel and civilians who sacrificed their lives and health for Ukraine's independence. Despite the heavy losses suffered by both the army and the civilian population, the heroism of Ukrainians became a powerful factor that caused shock and confusion among the enemy. This situation was effectively used by the Ukrainian authorities to organise numerous military operations aimed at liberating the occupied territories.

From late February to early July 2022, Ukraine's military command was forced to make a number of decisions aimed at manoeuvrable defence. Military and border guard units quickly adapted to new challenges, using available resources and forces to effectively counter the occupiers.

Since the first days of the war, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) has been implementing a set of measures to counter the invasion of the russian federation across Ukraine's state border. After submitting relevant information reports on the shelling of border crossing points and places of permanent deployment of border guard divisions and detachments, decisions were made to organise surveillance of the enemy's activities (directions of movement of convoys and their numbers, nature of actions, etc.), organise retreats to alternate positions, and set up fire ambushes and observation posts. The next stage was the decision to ‘merge’ the linear border guard units into units of the National Guard of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine and to continue fulfilling the tasks assigned to the border guards by the military command of the defence forces. Separate mobilisation activities were carried out, resulting in the formation of rapid response border commands, combat border detachments (e.g. ‘Steel Border’), reserves of the Head of the SBGS, and other units that reinforced the regular SBGS units.

Nowadays, there are many facts of heroic deeds of border guards during their participation in the combined defence units, which contribute to the overall result of confronting the aggressor and liberating the territories from invaders.

It was the operations of the national defence forces, international military and technical assistance, as well as the activities of the civilian population and the volunteer movement that made it possible to liberate parts of the northern and eastern borders from the invaders and take control of the state border in those areas.

After the de-occupation of certain territories of Ukraine, the tasks performed by the SBGS units should be divided into two separate groups: direct participation in defensive and assault operations (warfare) and control of the state border in the de-occupied territories (operational and military activities).

As for the first group, its very name reveals its essence.

As for the second group, it is appropriate to reveal its essence more broadly. Given the enemy's criminal activities in the occupied territories, the use of prohibited means of warfare, and the negative attitude towards the local population and the Ukrainian nation as a whole, there are issues of secure implementation of tasks by border guard units in these territories. In these circumstances, the SBGS leadership faced the challenge of organising and implementing state border control tasks in the de-occupied territories. It is logical that it is impossible to carry out such tasks in everyday conditions or during an escalation of the situation as in peaceful sectors of the border. The enemy is constantly disturbing the border areas and intensively using unmanned aerial vehicles for aerial reconnaissance and means of remote fire strikes on manpower, equipment of the national defence forces and border infrastructure, using sabotage and reconnaissance groups with wide involvement of collaborators from the local population. In addition, during the withdrawal from our territory, the enemy widely used mines and explosives to counter Ukrainian advancing forces and create sabotage against the

civilian population, disrupt sowing works, destroy economic infrastructure, and damage logistics routes, etc.

These and other conditions revealed the need to search for new forms and methods of organising the protection (control) of the state border, using regular border units and forming temporary units with specific tasks to be implemented under the aforementioned conditions. As for the regular border guard units that were used to perform tasks of controlling the state border, they were provided with attached forces from rapid response border commands, which made it possible to increase the potential of the forces to counter the enemy's sabotage reconnaissance groups.

At the same time, the need for the formation and further use of joint special forces detachments (JSFDs) was identified. The main tasks of these units were local border tasks, which are not typical for regular units.

As for the JSFDs:

A JSFD should perform tasks using operational and military means in the de-occupied territories in conditions where the enemy, in various ways, opposes the access of regular border units to the state border line from its side;

It is advisable to form a JSFD from servicemen who have special training, experience in organising and implementing operational and service activities at the tactical level, and stable moral, psychological and physical indicators;

A JSFD should be equipped with appropriate weapons, technical means, vehicles that allow to perform tasks in a mobile and autonomous manner at any time of the year, at any sector of the land part of the border, time of day, and ensuring the reduction of the risk to the life and health of the detachment's servicemen;

A JSFD should provide the ability to perform tasks both as the entire unit and by small tactical groups;

The intensity of the deployment of JSFDs should be ensured by the necessary staffing of personnel.

The main tasks for the JSFD should be considered as follows:

1. Conducting reconnaissance and search activities;
2. Detecting possible enemy hiding places;
3. Conducting aerial reconnaissance of the border area, border line and enemy borders to a depth of 3-5 km;
4. Counteracting enemy UAVs;
5. Reconnaissance of the minefield situation;
6. Organising countermeasures against the enemy's sabotage reconnaissance groups;
7. Organising fire ambushes;
8. Organising watch posts;
9. Identifying possible places of service and routes of movement for border details from regular units to them;
10. Reconnaissance of the condition of border crossing points of regular units.
11. Protection and defence of convoys on the march;
12. Counteracting enemy convoys;
13. Implementation of operational information on the detention of border violators in areas liberated from enemy occupation;
14. Inspecting and reconnoitring border settlements (clearing);
15. Work with the local population, detention of persons;
16. Organisation and implementation of interaction with regular border guard units, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine and other entities ensuring national security and protection of the areas of responsibility in the area of the JSFDs;

17. Organisation and implementation of joint operations with interacting units in the area of operations.

These and other tasks, which should be assigned to the SBGS units during military operations and in the context of organising the protection (control) of the state border in the de-occupied territories, can become an effective tool to counteract the enemy's asymmetric activities in the border areas of our country.

In general, the signs of asymmetric activities are difficult to understand, which leads to difficulties in the promptness and adequacy of countermeasures. Asymmetric activities involve the use of non-traditional, fundamentally new concepts using incommensurability (lack of correlation) between the goals of adversaries or between the resources spent and the effect obtained.

The asymmetry of the enemy's activities justifies the need to find adequate countermeasures to be implemented across all spheres of Ukraine's national security (including border security).

As for the border sphere of national security, asymmetric activities can manifest both in everyday conditions and during the escalation of the situation, military operations, and the organisation of the protection (control) and defence of the state border in the de-occupied territories. Based on the above, to illustrate the essence of the issue under consideration, it is necessary to reproduce the cause-and-effect graphical relationship of the risks associated with changes in the situation in the border area and the scope and types of tasks that need to be performed to counteract them (threats) (see Fig. 1).

The ordinate axis represents the levels of escalation (conditions) of the situation (DC, AS, and MO). The organisation of state border (SB) protection and defence in the de-occupied territories can also be attributed to the level of MO, considering the peculiarities of the service.




Figure 1. Graphical representation of the dependence of the substantive and quantitative characteristics of the tasks assigned to a BG body and the situational conditions at the state border

The transition from one level to another is carried out according to the senior officer's order based on the results of a risk analysis, which can be accepted as a normative requirement for subordinate units to organise and implement tasks that are carried out in these (normative) conditions of service. Of course, the transition from one regulatory state to another may have different functional dependencies, which should be investigated in the future. In our case, it is enough to state that there

is a regulatory requirement that allows the headquarters of a BG body to switch from one form of organisation of the protection and defence of the state border in the area of responsibility to another (which is projected accordingly on the number and specificity of tasks for line units and all personnel of the BG body). In Fig. 1, the following options are shown graphically. For example, the abscissa axis represents the points ‘a - c’. At point ‘b’, the normative transition of the BG body from ‘DC’ to ‘AS’ takes place. At the same time, the protection of the SB is implemented in ways both in the ‘DC’ and additionally personnel can be involved to perform specific tasks aimed at neutralising the threats that contributed to the introduction of the ‘AS’. That is, in this variant, a set of tasks similar to those in daily conditions is implemented, and additionally tasks aimed at neutralising threats that contribute to the aggravation of the situation.

At point ‘c’, upon receipt of a normative instruction from the headquarters of a BG body, the line units switch to performing tasks under ‘MO’ conditions. In this scenario, border guard units are transferred to the operational subordination of the Defence Forces and perform the relevant tasks in combat zones. In addition, a certain number of tasks are implemented by line units in ways that are also used to neutralise threats that led to the aggravation of the situation at the stage of transition to the ‘AS’ level. The tasks performed by the line units in the ‘DC’ during this period in the combat zone are not implemented (see Fig. 1).

It is worth noting that the graphically considered processes to achieve the research goal can be represented as a direct dependence between the critical values (point min = 0 [transparent borders and no border guard units] and point max = 1 [start of combat operations on the border]).

The area bounded by the system of lines: the abscissa axis; a straight line that passes through the ‘DC’ (y = ‘DC’) and x = ‘a’ and x = ‘b’ can be interpreted as the area whose output parameters are the list of tasks and the costs of their implementation (labour costs) during the ‘DC’ at the SB. Other areas can be defined in the same way. However, the above is also the subject of separate studies.

In order to determine the normative moments of transitions from one state of task performance organisation to another, it is advisable to use a proven methodology for determining the values of the risk indicator of the corresponding state [Instruction 2-4].

This Instruction defines the organisation of risk analysis in the State Border Guard Service in the field of state border security, taking into account the common integrated risk analysis model of the EU member states and national experience.

Risk analysis is a set of procedures and methods for processing information in order to identify existing and potential risks in the sphere of state border security. Risk analysis is an integral part of integrated border management: impact is the likely (predictable) consequences of the realisation of a threat or the occurrence of other phenomena and factors that do not pose a threat but may affect the sphere of the state border security;

A threat is an existing and potentially possible phenomenon or factor that negatively affects the sphere of state border security;

Risk indicator is a feature or a set of features with specified parameters, the use of which makes it possible to identify an object that poses a risk; vulnerability is a problem in the state border protection system that prevents this system from adequately counteracting threats.

Risk analysis is carried out by the structural units of the Administration of the State Border Guard Service, regional directorates, border guard bodies, maritime guard detachments and officials of border guard units whose competence includes the issues that are the subject of analysis.

Risk analysis in the State Border Guard Service is divided into:

1) according to the level of conduct: strategic; operational; tactical;

2) according to the purpose of conduct: periodic; thematic; situational.

Risk analysis is carried out in the following sequence:

Depending on the level of risk analysis, the following types of threats are identified:

local threats that are limited to the territory of one or two regions (separate areas of temporary

assignment);

regional threats that are limited to the areas of responsibility of one or two regional directorates;

national threats that affect the entire state border or its individual sections, which can lead to negative consequences;

global national threats that extend beyond the borders of Ukraine.

Threat assessment is carried out by analysts separately for each threat or group of identical threats.

At the initiative of analysts, officials of the State Border Guard Service whose competence includes the issues that are the subject of the threat assessment may be involved in the threat assessment with the consent of the relevant managers.

Based on the results of the threat assessment, external and internal factors that negatively affect (impact on) the state border security are identified (hereinafter - impact factors).

The determination of influence factors is based on a four-level system of control over the entry and stay of foreigners and stateless persons in Ukraine:

in the countries of origin of irregular migrants;

in the countries bordering Ukraine;

at border crossing points and beyond them (during border control and ensuring the protection of the state border beyond the border crossing points);

in Ukraine (compliance with the terms of temporary stay of foreigners and stateless persons in Ukraine).

Based on the results of the quantitative and qualitative characteristics, the following levels of threats are determined: low, moderate, and high.

Terrorist threat levels are determined in accordance with the Regulation on the Unified State System of Prevention, Response and Suppression of Terrorist Acts and Minimisation of Their Consequences, approved by Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 92 of 18 February 2016;

2) conducting a vulnerability assessment, during which:

problems in the state border protection system, their causes, as well as the capacity (capabilities) of the bodies and units of the State Border Guard Service to adequately counteract current and potential threats in the sphere of state border security are identified.

Vulnerability assessments are carried out on the components of the state border protection system, as well as on the factors that attract threats.

The determination of the capabilities (capacities) of the SBGS bodies and units is carried out by the structural units of the SBGS bodies and officials of the border guard units within their competence, separately for each threat or group of identical threats.

Assessment of factors that attract threats involves determining the existing internal and external factors in the sphere of state border security that influence the increase in the level of threat.

The results of the vulnerability assessment are provided to analysts for summarisation within the timeframe established for the specific risk analysis.

Based on the results of the vulnerability assessment for each of the identified threats, the following vulnerability levels are determined: low, moderate, and high.

The result description of the vulnerability assessment is followed by the conclusion on the capabilities of the state border protection system to adequately counteract threats;

3) conducting an impact assessment, during which:

the consequences of the state border security threat are determined, including the consequences that affect the crossing of the state border by persons, vehicles and cargo, the procedure for organising the service of border details, etc.

An impact assessment is a study of the aggregate of estimates of immediate impacts, impacts that may increase over time, and individual events that are not significant but that, in aggregate, may reach a level that could have negative consequences.

Based on the results of the impact assessment for each of the identified threats or other phenomena and factors that do not pose a threat but may affect the security of the state border, the following levels of impact are determined: low, moderate, and high;

4) determining risk levels.

The risk level is defined as a function of threat, vulnerability and exposure.

The risk level is determined by analysts using qualitative and quantitative assessments of the threshold value of the established risk levels.

Depending on the results of the risk analysis, the following risk levels are set:

low - for insignificant levels of threat, vulnerability and impact;

moderate - for a low or moderate level of impact, when the level of threat exceeds the level of vulnerability;

acceptable - for a low or moderate level of impact, when the level of vulnerability corresponds to the level of threat;

high - for a moderate or high level of impact, when the level of vulnerability exceeds the level of threat;

critical - for high levels of threat, vulnerability and impact.

In other cases, risk levels are set depending on the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the threat, vulnerability and impact.

In order to conduct risk analysis, the State Border Guard Service applies the risk analysis methods used in the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM). The selection of the appropriate risk analysis method (or combination of methods) depends on the specific risk.

The organisation of the application of these methods is entrusted to the Administration of the State Border Guard Service.

The sources of information on risk analysis are the data received by the SBGS Administration, regional directorates and border guard bodies in the course of operational activities, and from international organisations, border guard and other authorised bodies of foreign countries, in accordance with international agreements, mass media, including the Internet, and other sources, as well as the results of strategic criminal analysis and own analytical developments.

If it is necessary to use information (data) of an intelligence, operational and investigative nature during the risk analysis, the risk analysis is carried out with the involvement of the relevant officials of the structural unit of the border guard body.

Results

Based on the above material (see Fig. 1), it became possible to analyse the impact of different situational conditions on the content and scope of tasks to be performed by border guard units, which requires appropriate decisions to be made by the headquarters of the border guard units. The above substantiates the need to consider the issue of qualitative staffing for managerial positions in the relevant units of the Border Guard Service, and the search for new parameters and an integral indicator to assess the ability of applicants to hold relevant managerial positions in the headquarters of a BG body.

Conclusions

Thus, from the material presented, it can be concluded that the organisation of service in border guard units takes place in different conditions, which reveals the need to implement appropriate tasks specific to the situation with the involvement of adequate forces and facilities, which in turn requires direct consideration of this fact when forming a headquarters that is potentially capable of making

these decisions. The selection procedure should take this fact into account and use appropriate indicators and criteria for evaluating applicants in terms of their ability to analyse the conditions of service, clearly define the required list of tasks, allocate the available forces and facilities of a BG body, etc. with due regard to ensuring the required values of the parameters for assessing the quality of functioning of the headquarters of a BG body.

It is necessary to further develop practical recommendations for the assessment and selection of managerial personnel, maintaining the required level of their professionally important qualities for managerial activities. To develop a toolkit that will make it possible to assess the psychological and professional suitability of applicants for managerial positions with further assessment of the quality of the decision and the time spent on decision-making, which, when used in conjunction with the developed operational apparatus, will make it possible to determine the relevance of the decision and, as a result, to build a rating of applicants for managerial positions in the headquarters of a BG body.

These results will be a certain guarantee of confidence in the professional capability of the headquarters of a BG body to make decisions in any situation, which is an integral part of ensuring the specified efficiency of accomplishing the tasks of operational and service activities (operational and service tasks) by border guard units.

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Ситуаційні умови на державному кордоні як фактор впливу на укомплектування управлінського складу штабів прикордонних підрозділів

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Анотація. Актуальність статті полягає у тому, що сучасні виклики в охороні державного кордону (ОПД) вимагають удосконалення підходів до комплектування керівного складу штабів підрозділів охорони державного кордону.

Управлінська діяльність має яскраво виражену інтелектуальну складову, оскільки передбачає розробку, прийняття та реалізацію управлінських рішень в умовах зміни ситуації. Це потребує високого рівня адаптивності та гнучкості, оскільки рішення мають бути ефективними та здатними змінювати хід операцій чи боїв, а також впливати на мислення та поведінку військ чи сил під час виконання завдань.

У статті розглядається специфіка управлінської діяльності підрозділів Державної прикордонної служби України (ДПСУ) в умовах сучасної гібридної війни.

Метою цієї статті є аналіз того, як ситуаційні умови на державному кордоні впливають на укомплектованість керівним складом штабів підрозділів прикордонної служби.

Автори звертають особливу увагу на асиметричність дій російської федерації, яка активно застосовує нові методи ведення війни, зокрема використання стратегічної і тактичної неспівмірності цілей і ресурсів, що в свою чергу створює нові виклики для підрозділів охорони кордону.

Врахування цього контексту призвело до необхідності аналізу графічних причиново-наслідкових зв'язків ризиків, пов'язаних зі зміною ситуації в прикордонній зоні, та визначення типів завдань, які необхідно виконувати для ефективної протидії загрозам. Важливим аспектом є також визначення критеріїв оцінки ефективності діяльності штабів прикордонних підрозділів, які повинні враховувати конкретні умови обстановки.

Зроблено висновок, що організація служби в підрозділах охорони кордону відбувається в умовах постійних змін і невизначеності. Для цього потрібні відповідні, конкретні рішення, які мають бути реалізовані з урахуванням поточної ситуації.

Управлінський потенціал штабів прикордонних підрозділів має бути спрямований на оперативне та гнучке реагування на зміни обстановки. Для досягнення цього необхідно забезпечити здатність штабу приймати швидкі та точні рішення в критичних ситуаціях.

Оцінка діяльності штабу повинна враховувати здатність особового складу аналізувати умови служби, чітко визначати необхідні завдання та правильно розподіляти наявні ресурси.

Це не тільки професіоналізм, але й здатність працювати в умовах високої невизначеності та обмеженого часу.

Асиметричні дії, які використовує росія, вимагають пошуку інноваційних підходів до організації управлінських процесів, які дозволяють не тільки протистояти традиційним загрозам, але й ефективно реагувати на різноманітні форми агресії.

Порядок відбору кандидатів на керівні посади в штабах прикордонних підрозділів повинен містити конкретні критерії, які визначають здатність претендентів аналізувати та приймати ефективні рішення в умовах зміни ситуації. Це має включати оцінку їхнього оперативного мислення, здатності керувати кризами та здатності ефективно організовувати взаємодію з іншими підрозділами.

У статті представлено практичну модель оцінювання того, як ситуаційні умови на державному кордоні безпосередньо впливають на потреби в кадровому забезпеченні штабів прикордонних підрозділів. Отримані результати можуть бути використані для оптимізації управлінських рішень у сфері персоналу та підвищення бойової готовності прикордонних формувань.

Ключові слова: прикордонний підрозділ, ситуаційна обстановка, ризики, загрози, завдання підрозділам, комплектування, відбір кандидатів на керівні штабні посади.