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The Intellectual Component of the Public Administration System for National Security as an Object of Organisational Warfare: An Institutional and Managerial Analysis

Volodymyr Hurkovskyi
Doctor of Sciences in Public Administration, Professor
Chief of Scientific and Research Branch
Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
03049, Povitrianykh Syl Avenue, 28 B, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: vladimir.gurkovskyi@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-2021-5204

Rena Marutian
Doctor of Sciences in Public Administration, Associate Professor
Professor of the Department of Global and National Security
Education and Research Institute of Public Administration and Civil Service
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
04050, Akademika Romodanova Street, 12/2, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: renata_kiev@i.ua
ORCID: 0000-0001-9184-1590

Serhii Trehubenko
Postgraduate Student of the Research and Organisational Centre
National Academy of the Security Service of Ukraine
03066, M. Maksymovycha Street, 22, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: sergeyt686868@gmail.com
ORCID: 0009-0003-6281-0113

Volodymyr Rakhimov
PhD in Military Sciences
Deputy Head of the Institute of Strategic Communications
National Defence University of Ukraine
03049, Povitrianykh Syl Avenue, 28 B, Kyiv, Ukraine
e-mail: rakhimov@edu.nuou.org.ua
ORCID: 0000-0001-9868-986X

Abstract. The article examines the transformation of the intellectual component of Ukraine's national security in the context of organisational changes in the public administration system during 2010–2022. The scientific problem is formulated as a gap between the formally preserved institutional security architecture and the gradual weakening of the mechanisms of intellectual, scientific and expert support for state-management decision-making in the field of national security.

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Military Science. Vol. 4 No. 2 (2026)

The aim of the research is to identify the organisational factors that influenced the weakening of the intellectual component of the public administration system for Ukraine's national security under the conditions of hybrid warfare, on the eve of and during armed aggression. The methodological framework of the research consists of institutional and organisational analysis, elements of the systems approach, as well as case analysis. The theoretical framework combines the provisions of the theory of hybrid and organisational warfare with public administration approaches to the analysis of scientific and analytical institutions. The article consistently considers 2010 as a turning point associated with the liquidation of key state analytical centres in the field of national and international security, as well as the period of 2014–2022, within which the relocation of higher education institutions as a result of occupation is analysed. The main research results indicate that the weakening of the intellectual infrastructure of the public administration system for national security was cumulative in nature and was formed through legally legitimate but strategically ineffective management decisions. The scientific novelty consists in substantiating the role of organisational transformations as an independent factor in reducing the resilience of the public administration system for national security. The practical significance of the results obtained consists in the possibility of using them to rethink approaches to the institutionalisation of strategic analysis in the public administration system as a whole and the intellectual support of the national security system in particular.

Keywords: national security, public administration resilience, organisational warfare, intellectual support, strategic analysis, analytical centres.

Introduction

The beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century for Ukraine meant not so much an increase in the number of threats to national security as a change in the logic of their manifestation. Classical defence instruments were gradually losing their universality. At the centre of security-related decisions there was increasingly not force as such, but the capacity for interpretation, forecasting and strategic thinking.

During this period, the public administration system for Ukraine's national security formally preserved its institutional integrity; however, its internal coordination mechanisms were gradually losing resilience. This concerned, first and foremost, its intellectual component – research institutions, analytical centres, expert communities and educational institutions, whose role consists not in operational response, but in shaping the strategic horizon of decisions.

The armed aggression of the russian federation against Ukraine did not create these problems from scratch. Rather, it made visible processes that had long remained on the periphery of attention. In parallel with the growth of military risks, there was a gradual weakening of research and educational institutions capable of supporting the state's scientific-expert, analytical and prognostic capacity. The sector of strategic studies and public administration in the field of national security proved to be particularly sensitive to such changes. It is precisely here, importantly, that the interests of the state began to intersect with the logic of action of the aggressor country, which was interested in reducing Ukraine's capacity for long-term strategic forecasting and institutional resistance.

After 2010, a situation emerged in Ukraine that is difficult to explain solely by internal management decisions. Most scientific and advisory structures in the field of national security were either liquidated or lost real influence on the processes of state policy development. In the public sector, only the National Institute for Strategic Studies effectively remained, while the analytical field in this area became predominantly non-state in nature.

The scientific literature has already accumulated arguments that make it possible to assume that these processes were not accidental or purely administrative and technical [14–15]. Some researchers consider them as a manifestation of hybrid influence aimed not at an immediate result, but at the

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Military Science. Vol. 4 No. 2 (2026)

structural weakening of the state's ability to develop effective, scientifically substantiated management decisions in the field of national security [3–4; 6; 22–25]. Meanwhile, another group of authors emphasises the role of internal institutional inertia, management miscalculations and political compromises [7; 9; 16]. This contradiction is not fully resolved and, most likely, should not be resolved, since vulnerability is formed precisely at the intersection of these factors.

The problem consists in the fact that transformations in the security and defence sector took place in the context of the loss of an integrated system of intellectual support for public administration in the field of national security. Under the conditions of high uncertainty, constant changes in the external environment and the growing complexity of management decisions, the reduction of scientific and expert potential in this sphere increased and continues to increase the risk of strategic errors. Their consequences, as a rule, are not immediate, but have a long-term and cumulative character.

Within this research, the assumption is put forward that the weakening of intellectual support for public administration in the field of national security after 2010 was caused not only by internal institutional processes. It also concerns elements of the systemic hybrid policy of the russian federation, aimed at destabilising Ukraine's analytical and intellectual capacity. In terms of russian military-strategic theory, such actions may be correlated with the concept of organisational warfare, which involves influencing governance structures, personnel potential and decision-making mechanisms. This hybrid strategy provides for the seizure or destruction of the command and control contour of the national security support system of the adversary state instead of traditional combat operations, as well as the management of the adversary's organisational decisions in all parts of its state system. The aim of organisational warfare is to create controlled managerial chaos and to destroy internal political stability in the target state. It is important to note that this does not refer to direct external control. Rather, it refers to the creation of conditions under which the state gradually loses its capacity for subject-based governance and strategic self-organisation.

The aim of this article consists not so much in recording individual management decisions or institutional changes as in attempting to reconstruct the logic of the process within which Ukraine's national security governance system was losing its own intellectual support. It concerns the analysis of the organisational instruments of influence used by the russian federation against Ukraine's public administration system in the field of national security and the assessment of how these instruments overlapped with the internal transformations of the Ukrainian state, amplifying their destructive consequences.

Within the stated aim, the research focuses on the following tasks, which do not form a fully symmetrical logical construction, but reflect the actual route of analysis:

– to reconstruct the key stages in the transformation of the intellectual component of Ukraine's public administration system for national security after 2010, taking into account institutional ruptures and personnel losses;

– to assess the consequences of the weakening of the scientific and expert support for this system for the state's ability to forecast and respond to current challenges and threats to national security and to adopt effective management decisions in this field on the eve of the russian-Ukrainian war.

Literature Review

The sources concerning organisational influences on public administration and national security systems are heterogeneous both in terms of disciplinary affiliation and analytical depth. In the Ukrainian context, this field developed fragmentarily, often in response to events rather than as a result of long-term research programmes.

The first group consists of works devoted to the concept of organisational warfare in russian military-strategic thought. In the works of V. Gerasimov, as well as in later interpretations by Western

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Military Science. Vol. 4 No. 2 (2026)

authors (M. Galeotti, D. Johnson, M. Kofman), the organisational dimension is considered as a component of a broader strategy of indirect actions [1–5]. Importantly, in these works, the adversary's management and institutional structures are viewed not as a neutral background, but as independent objects of influence. It is precisely this logic that is methodologically significant for analysing the Ukrainian case.

The second group is formed by historical and institutional research on the development of Ukraine's national security system. The works of V. Horbulin, O. Lytvynenko and A. Kachynskyi, as well as analytical reports by the NISS, reconstruct the model of multi-level analytical support for state policy [6–9]. These research works emphasise that intellectual support was regarded as a structural element of security, rather than as an auxiliary function. It is precisely this model that contrasts with the transformations that took place after 2010.

A separate place in the research of this issue is occupied by the works of R. Marutian, V. Hurkovskyi and Ye. Romanenko, which offer an interpretation of deinstitutionalisation processes through the prism of organisational warfare [10–15]. This is not a universal explanation, but rather an analytical instrument that makes it possible to link fragmented empirical observations into a relatively coherent model. Thus, R. Marutian's monographic research "Intellectual and Resource Support for Public Administration in the Field of National Security of Ukraine" (2020) [14] addresses the methodological and historical foundations of the formation and development of intellectual resources for public administration in the field of national security, provides a comparative analysis of the main models of scientific and expert support for public administration in this sphere, and proposes the main provisions of a legal model for scientific and expert support for public administration in Ukraine.

Among the research publications of 2025, V. Zaluzhnyi's research "The Weakening of Ukraine's Strategic Education System (2012–2021) as an Indicator of Indirect russian Influence on the Eve of the Full-Scale Invasion" is of interest and is sufficiently well substantiated. This research focuses on the chronology of personnel appointments and the reorganisation of specialised institutions, including the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Foreign Intelligence Academy and the National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine [16]. In this work, these processes are substantiated as potential indicators of hybrid influence that could have been implemented through the indirect weakening of the state's intellectual and personnel capacity.

The third group of literature consists of empirical research from the last decade documenting the degradation or repurposing of research and educational institutions as a result of the war and occupation. Analyses by VoxUkraine, research by UNESCO and the OSCE, as well as works devoted to the impact of the war on scientific productivity, in particular publications in Research Policy and Science and Public Policy, demonstrate that losses of intellectual infrastructure are long-term in nature and are not automatically compensated for after the end of hostilities [17-18].

Materials and Methods

The methodological framework of the research was formed not as a predetermined scheme, but rather as a response to the complexity and fragmentation of the empirical material. The analysis is based on an interdisciplinary combination of systems and institutional approaches, methods of strategic studies and concepts of hybrid influence, which have been actively developed in the Western and post-Soviet scientific traditions over the past two decades.

Elements of retrospective reconstruction were applied to restore the logic of management decisions adopted in 2010–2014, as well as methods of comparative analysis to compare the Ukrainian experience with models of organisational influence described in the literature. Critical discourse analysis is used in a limited manner, primarily for analysing regulatory documents and public narratives that accompanied the reorganisation of scientific and expert institutions.

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
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Military Science. Vol. 4 No. 2 (2026)

The empirical basis consists of regulatory legal acts of Ukraine, official reports of state bodies, materials of temporary investigative commissions of the Verkhovna Rada, analytical reports by the NISS, as well as open research by international structures (RAND Corporation, NATO StratCom COE, Institute for the Study of War) [19-21].

Results and Discussions

The Theoretical Framework and 2010 as an Institutional Turning Point. A retrospective analysis of the events of 2010–2022 shows a process that is difficult to explain solely by the logic of internal administrative decisions. It concerns the gradual narrowing of the state scientific and analytical base in the field of national security – not as a one-off mistake, but as a series of decisions whose consequences manifested themselves with a delay.

Modern research on hybrid warfare emphasises that its content is not reduced to the combination of military and non-military means in the narrow sense. As noted in the materials of the 2024 international scientific and practical conference, hybrid warfare includes a systemic combination of information and psychological influence with elements of political, economic, organisational and military pressure, involving both state and non-state actors [22–25]. What is fundamental here is that the object of influence is not only territory or the armed forces, but also management structures, decision-making mechanisms and institutions of knowledge production.

It is precisely at this level that it is appropriate to speak of the organisational dimension of hybrid warfare. In the works of F. Hoffman and H. Perepelytsia, to which the authors of the Collection refer, it is emphasised that hybrid actions are aimed at creating a situation in which the target state begins to reproduce the weakening of its own institutions without direct external coercion. This logic makes it possible to interpret formally internal decisions as elements of a broader strategic context, especially when these decisions systematically reduce the intellectual and analytical capacity of the state.

The Ukrainian case is not unique, but it has its own specific features. Until 2010, the system of intellectual support for national security was formed as a relatively extensive network of institutions – research institutions under the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, analytical units of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, departmental structures and specialised institutes. This network was not ideal; however, it ensured competition between approaches and a certain resilience to management errors. Already in the late 2000s, signs of deinstitutionalisation were recorded within it, although they did not yet have a systemic character.

The 2010 decision to liquidate the Institute for National Security Problems and the National Institute for International Security Problems became a turning point not only from a formal perspective. It can be regarded as the moment when institutional plurality was lost. Officially, these steps were framed as reorganisation and the concentration of functions within the National Institute for Strategic Studies; however, in practice they meant the dismantling of two independent intellectual security schools that produced alternative scenarios and long-term risk assessments.

It is important to note that in 2010 itself, these decisions were not perceived as an element of preparation for a future war. In public discourse, they looked rather like organisational optimisation or personnel reformatting. However, it is precisely this “non-obviousness” that corresponds to the logic of hybrid influence described in the theory of organisational warfare: organisational changes do not signal a threat directly, but gradually change the configuration of the system in favour of an external actor. In practice, this entails a destructive influence on decision-making processes within public administration structures, leading to the weakening of national security systems as the immune system of the state, or to their reprogramming, when this system does not identify threats and does not counter them.

In this sense, one may fully agree with V. Zaluzhnyi, who rightly notes that such patterns have a “cumulative destructive effect” – a process of successive accumulation of negative influences

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Military Science. Vol. 4 No. 2 (2026)

which, over time, lead to a significant deterioration of the security situation. In other words, destructive changes do not occur at once, but are the result of the gradual and cumulative intensification of factors, causing the degradation of the system as a whole [16].

In the following years, the consequences of this turning point became more visible. The centralisation of the analytical function, the reduction of the state order for strategic research and the outflow of personnel led to a decrease in the capacity of the public administration system for national security to produce complex, multidimensional forecasts. The state found itself in a situation where the organisational component of hybrid warfare was already operating, even if it had not yet been recognised as such.

Thus, 2010 should be considered not as an isolated episode, but as an institutional shift that created the conditions for the further weakening of the intellectual component of national security. It is in this sense that it acquires the significance of a turning point. Not because of an immediate effect, but because of long-term structural consequences that became evident with the beginning of the russian-Ukrainian war in 2014 and subsequently during the full-scale invasion of 2022.

2014–2022: Occupation, the Repurposing of Research and Institutional Asymmetry. The events of 2014 marked a sharp change in the context in which previously accumulated institutional deformations ceased to be latent. The annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the rf and the beginning of hostilities in eastern Ukraine not only created new security challenges, but also exposed the structural vulnerability of the research and educational segment of public administration. It was during this period that it became clear that the weakening of the intellectual component of the national security system was not a neutral background to the war, but affected the state's ability to adapt to and counter rapidly changing and asymmetric threats.

The occupation of part of the territories was accompanied not only by the physical loss of infrastructure, but also by the targeted repurposing of research and educational institutions. The term repurposing comes from English and means changing the purpose of an object or idea for another function, for example, transforming old content into new formats.

In Crimea and in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, universities, research centres and educational programmes were incorporated into the regulatory and ideological space of the russian federation. This process was not limited to a change of jurisdiction. It concerned the re-subordination of the functions of research from an instrument of critical analysis and development to a means of legitimising a new political and administrative reality.

The theoretical importance of this point can be clarified through the work of V. Hurkovskyi, devoted to state policy in the field of science under the conditions of an information society [9]. Analysing the role of science in the system of public administration, he emphasises that scientific activity performs not only an innovative or educational function, but also ensures the reproduction of cognitive frameworks within which the state understands its own development. At the same time, the loss or deformation of research institutions means not merely a reduction in research potential, but a change in the very logic of governance.

The application of this approach to the analysis of the occupied territories makes it possible to see that the repurposing of science had a systemic character. The changes affected research topics, language policy, personnel composition, criteria of academic performance and channels of international communication. Science was gradually being embedded into the russian information space, where its main function became not the production of knowledge, but the reproduction of prescribed narratives. According to V. Hurkovskyi, this meant a radical narrowing of the public function of science and its transformation into an element of administrative and ideological control [11,13].

In the territory controlled by Ukraine, the situation looked different, but was no less problematic. The relocation of universities and research institutions, the forced migration of scholars, reduced funding and the fragmentation of state policy in the field of science led to asymmetry in

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
ISSN (online): 2786-9326
Military Science. Vol. 4 No. 2 (2026)

development. Some institutions preserved their formal existence, but lost the ability to fully perform analytical and prognostic functions. This asymmetry was particularly noticeable in the field of national security. On the one hand, the need for high-quality scientific and analytical support for management decisions was increasing. On the other hand, the institutional mechanisms for producing it remained weakened from the previous period. As a result, the state increasingly relied on external analytical centres or situational expert networks, which partially compensated for the deficit, but did not replace a systemic scientific base.

In the context of organisational warfare, this condition may be interpreted as the achievement of a delayed effect. Influence on intellectual infrastructure does not necessarily require direct control over the entire territory. It is sufficient to create a situation in which science and education lose the ability to serve as an autonomous source of critical knowledge and strategic vision.

As the analysis shows, in 2014–2022 Ukraine found itself precisely in such an intermediate condition – between the preservation of formal institutions and the loss of their system-forming role.

The period after 2014 not only deepened the consequences of the institutional turning point of 2010, but also shifted them into a qualitatively different plane. If previously it concerned reduction and centralisation, then under the conditions of occupation and war it already concerned the struggle for the very function of science as a component of national security governance. It is precisely this shift from managerial degradation to organisational confrontation that makes it possible to consider 2014–2022 as the stage at which the organisational dimension of hybrid warfare against Ukraine was completed.

The non-state system of intellectual support for governance in the field of national security has continued to develop in recent years. Thus, in 2025, the private research institution “Institute of National Resilience and Security” was established as a scientific and educational ecosystem that brought together researchers, analysts, practitioners and scholars in the field of international and national security, in particular to reduce the consequences of hybrid threats from the rf and its geopolitical allies [26].

Intellectual Infrastructure under the Conditions of Organisational Confrontation

Case 1. Liquidation of the Institute for National Security Problems and the National Institute for International Security Problems (2010)

The year 2010 became a turning point for the system of scientific and analytical support for Ukraine’s national security. As mentioned above, it was in that year, within the course towards the optimisation of public administration, that decisions were adopted which resulted in the liquidation of two key analytical institutions – the Institute for National Security Problems and the National Institute for International Security Problems, which until then had functioned as autonomous research structures in the field of national security.

The regulatory basis for the logic of these decisions was formed by the 2010 decrees of the President of Ukraine, V. Yanukovych, aimed at optimising the public administration system. In the formal legal sense, the liquidation of the Institute for National Security Problems and the National Institute for International Security Problems took place within the framework of the current legislation and presidential powers concerning the organisation of the activities of auxiliary bodies and scientific and analytical institutions. However, the regulatory correctness of these decisions was not accompanied by the creation of institutionally equivalent mechanisms to compensate for their functions.

Until 2010, these institutes performed different but mutually complementary roles: the Institute for National Security Problems specialised in the analysis of internal threats, institutional resilience and scenario forecasting, while the National Institute for International Security Problems provided the foreign policy and geostrategic dimension of security analysis. In the opinion of the authors of this article, their liquidation within a single package of management decisions meant not merely a reduction in the number of institutions, but the destruction of the institutionally established plurality

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
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Military Science. Vol. 4 No. 2 (2026)

of strategic thinking.

The analytical materials of the National Institute for Strategic Studies and publications by Ukrainian expert centres in the early 2010s recorded that the concentration of the analytical function within a single institution, without the development of alternative state or semi-state centres, increased the risk of managerial one-dimensionality. In the short term, such centralisation appeared rational; however, in the long term, it reduced the capacity of the national security system for internal critical correction.

It is fundamentally important that, at the time when the relevant decrees were adopted, these decisions were not interpreted as security-related. They were interpreted mainly through the prism of administrative efficiency and cost reduction. It is precisely this gap between management logic and strategic consequences that makes it possible to consider the liquidation of the Institute for National Security Problems and the National Institute for International Security Problems as an early institutional marker of organisational vulnerability, which fully manifested itself after 2014.

In our opinion, the liquidation of these scientific and analytical centres had a non-linear effect, since it destroyed not individual institutions, but the system of intellectual support for public administration in the field of national security.

Case 2. The National Institute for Strategic Studies: Centralisation without Compensation

After 2010, the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS) remained effectively the only state scientific and analytical institution directly integrated into the decision-making system in the field of national security. This automatically increased its importance, but simultaneously created structural overload:

In the period after 2014, the NISS was forced to perform several roles simultaneously: that of an analytical centre, an expert platform, a communication venue and an institution providing operational support for political decisions. In the absence of an extensive network of state research structures, such concentration of functions led to a shift in focus from fundamental strategic analysis to short-term applied tasks.

This case is important not as a criticism of a specific institution, but as an illustration of a systemic problem. The centralisation of the analytical function without the parallel development of alternative state and semi-state centres reduces the system’s capacity for internal correction. In terms of organisational resilience, this means a reduction in the variability of scenarios and an increased risk of strategic errors.

Case 3. Relocated Higher Education Institutions: Institutional Survival without a Strategic Function

The relocation of higher education institutions and research establishments from the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas became an unprecedented phenomenon for Ukraine’s science and education system. Formally, the state preserved a significant part of the institutions: universities were relocated, the personnel core was partially restored, and the educational process continued.

However, from an analytical perspective, this process proved to be much more complex. The relocated higher education institutions found themselves in a situation of double marginalisation. On the one hand, they lost their material base, regional rootedness and stable research networks. On the other hand, they did not receive a clearly defined role in the national system of strategic planning and security.

In many cases, these institutions were forced to focus on the basic functions of survival: student recruitment, maintaining a minimum personnel composition and adapting to new administrative conditions. The analytical and prognostic component, which could have been used by the state to understand the experience of war, remained peripheral.

From the perspective of organisational warfare, this case demonstrates the effect of indirect weakening. Formally, the state preserved the institutions, but in practice they were placed outside the

ISSN (print): 2786-9318
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Military Science. Vol. 4 No. 2 (2026)

strategic contour of governance. This situation is not the result of direct external interference; however, it logically complements the previous stages of the deinstitutionalisation of the intellectual segment of security.

The cases considered do not form a single trajectory, but taken together they make it possible to outline a common trend. In 2010–2022, the intellectual infrastructure of Ukraine's national security functioned in a mode of constant adaptation, often without a clearly defined strategic aim. The occupation led to the direct repurposing of science in part of the territories, while in the territory controlled by Ukraine there was a gradual narrowing of its system-forming role.

In this sense, the case analysis confirms the general hypothesis of the research: the organisational dimension of hybrid warfare is implemented not only through destruction or control, but also through the creation of conditions under which scientific expertise ceases to be a fully fledged component of the national security system.

The analysis shows that the main losses of intellectual capacity do not chronologically coincide with the peaks of military escalation. On the contrary, they accumulate during periods of formal stability, when institutional decisions are not perceived as security-related. This makes it possible to speak of the delayed effect of organisational influence, which becomes visible only in crisis phases.

It has been established that the existence of individual analytical products or expert networks does not compensate for the loss of institutional integrity. Without stable mechanisms for reproducing knowledge, the state retains the ability to respond to challenges and threats, but loses the ability to shape its own strategic horizon.

The experience of relocated higher education institutions shows that the formal continuation of activity does not guarantee the inclusion of institutions in the national security support system. In the absence of a clearly defined role, they perform predominantly educational or social functions, remaining outside the contour of strategic analysis.

The concentration of strategic analysis within a single state institution increases the burden and reduces the internal variability of decisions. In the long term, this limits the system's capacity for self-correction, especially under the conditions of high uncertainty.

Of course, the current involvement of international centres, such as the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, the RAND Corporation, the Institute for the Study of War, the OECD, UNESCO and partner structures, partially compensates for the deficit of internal expertise, but simultaneously changes the focus of strategic thinking [17–18; 20–21]. External analysis is, as a rule, oriented towards a regional or global framework and does not always reproduce the specific features of internal national governance processes.

The results obtained indicate that the mechanical reproduction of pre-war institutional models will not ensure greater resilience. The issue consists not only in the number of institutions, but also in the way they are included in the security decision-making system and interact with one another.

Conclusion

The analysis conducted makes it possible to assert that the weakening of the intellectual component of Ukraine's public administration system for national security was not accidental or merely derivative of military events. It developed gradually, through a series of management and organisational shifts which, at the time of their adoption, were not interpreted as security-related, but later proved to be structurally significant.

In the authors' view, the key vulnerability was not the absence of individual analytical products, but the destruction of mechanisms for their systemic reproduction. Under such conditions, the state retains the capacity to respond, but loses the ability for strategic foresight. This distinction is not merely terminological. It has direct management consequences. The intellectual component of the national security support system became an object of organisational warfare.

An important generalising result of the research is the recognition that the institutional decisions

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Military Science. Vol. 4 No. 2 (2026)

of 2010, in particular the liquidation of the Institute for National Security Problems and the National Institute for International Security Problems, were not an episode of management reorganisation, but a point of structural shift in the public administration system for national security. Formally lawful and administratively motivated, these decisions led to the disappearance of the institutionally embedded plurality of strategic analysis, which had previously ensured internal correction and competition between security approaches. It was the absence of compensatory mechanisms, rather than the fact of reduction itself, that caused the long-term effect of lowering the state's intellectual resilience. In retrospect, this makes it possible to consider 2010 as the moment when organisational vulnerability was formed – one that was not directly related to military actions, but significantly affected the state's capacity for strategic foresight under the conditions of subsequent hybrid and full-scale aggression.

The cases show that the organisational dimension of hybrid warfare is implemented asymmetrically. In the occupied territories, it takes the form of the direct repurposing of science and education, whereas in the territory controlled by Ukraine, it manifests itself through fragmentation, the overloading of individual institutions and the narrowing of their functions. Both trajectories lead to a reduction in the state's cognitive autonomy, but by different means.

The analysis shows that the intellectual infrastructure of the national security system cannot be reduced to an auxiliary function. Its weakening rarely has an immediate effect, but gradually changes the conditions for making strategic decisions, increasing the likelihood of errors in the longer term.

Recommendations

The restoration or creation of new analytical institutions should take place not on the basis of formal network expansion, but with due regard to their functional role in the decision-making system. Without this, there is a risk of reproducing institutions without real influence, which only reinforces the illusion of resilience.

Relocated higher education institutions and research establishments require not only resource support, but also clear strategic positioning. In the absence of such positioning, their potential will remain fragmented and weakly integrated into the state's security contour. Cooperation with international analytical centres is appropriate as an instrument of supplementation, but not as a substitute for the state's own intellectual infrastructure. Excessive dependence on external expertise may shift the focus of strategic thinking and reduce sensitivity to internal management processes.

The proposed analysis rather records a point after which ignoring the intellectual dimension of national security support becomes methodologically problematic.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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Володимир Гурковський
доктор наук з державного управління, професор
начальник науково-дослідного відділу
Центральний науково-дослідний інститут Збройних Сил України
03049, проспект Повітряних Сил, 28 Б, Київ, Україна
e-mail: vladimir.gurkovskyi@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-2021-5204

Рена Марутян
доктор наук з державного управління, доцент
професор кафедри глобальної та національної безпеки
Навчально-наукового інституту публічного управління та державної служби
Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка
04050, вулиця Академіка Ромоданова, 12/2, Київ, Україна
e-mail: renata_kiev@i.ua
ORCID: 0000-0001-9184-1590

Сергій Трегубенко
аспірант науково-організаційного центру
Національна академія Служби безпеки України
03066, вулиця М. Максимовича, 22, Київ, Україна
e-mail: sergeyt686868@gmail.com
ORCID: 0009-0003-6281-0113

Володимир Рахімов
доктор філософії
заступник начальника інституту стратегічних комунікацій
Національний університет оборони України
03049, проспект Повітряних Сил, 28, Київ, Україна
e-mail: rakhimov@edu.nuou.org.ua
ORCID: 0000-0001-9868-986X

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Анотація. У статті досліджується трансформація інтелектуальної складової національної безпеки України у контексті організаційних змін системи державного управління впродовж 2010–2022 років. Наукову проблему сформульовано як розрив між формально збереженою інституційною архітектурою безпеки та поступовим ослабленням механізмів інтелектуального (науково-експертного) забезпечення прийняття державно-управлінських рішень у сфері національної безпеки. Метою дослідження є виявлення організаційних чинників, що вплинули на послаблення інтелектуальної складової системи державного управління національною безпекою України в умовах гібридної війни, напередодні та в ході збройної агресії. Методологічну основу роботи становлять інституційний та організаційний аналіз, елементи системного підходу, а також кейсовий аналіз. Теоретична рамка поєднує положення теорії гібридної та організаційної війни з підходами публічного управління до аналізу науково-аналітичних інституцій. У статті послідовно розглядається 2010 рік як переломний етап, пов'язаний із ліквідацією ключових державних аналітичних центрів у сфері національної та міжнародної безпеки, а також період 2014–2022 років, у межах якого аналізуються переміщення закладів вищої освіти внаслідок окупації. Основні результати дослідження свідчать, що ослаблення інтелектуальної інфраструктури системи державного управління національною безпекою мало кумулятивний характер і формувалося через нормативно легітимні, але стратегічно неефективні управлінські рішення. Наукова новизна полягає в обґрунтуванні ролі організаційних трансформацій як самостійного чинника зниження стійкості системи державного управління національною безпекою. Практичне значення отриманих результатів полягає у можливості їх використання для переосмислення підходів до інституціоналізації стратегічного аналізу в системі державного управління в цілому та інтелектуального забезпечення системи національної безпеки зокрема.

Ключові слова: національна безпека, державне управління, організаційна війна, інтелектуальне забезпечення, стратегічний аналіз, аналітичні центри.